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The Western historiography of Stalin and Stalinism produced in the period 1925 
to the present day is a strikingly varied body of work in which the nature of 
Stalin, his regime and his role within his regime have been and continue to be the 
subject of debate. This characteristic is all the more striking when we consider 
that from the earliest years of the period under study there has been a general 
understanding of the nature of the Stalinist regime, and of the policies and leader 
which have come to define it.  
This thesis analyses the principal influences on research which have led to 
this body of work acquiring such a varied nature, and which have led to an at 
times profoundly divided Western, and more specifically Anglo-American, 
scholarship. It argues that the combined impact of three key formative influences 
on research in the West over the period of study, and their interaction with each 
other, reveal recurring themes across the whole historiography, while also 
accounting for the variety of interpretations in evidence. The first impact 
identified is the lack of accessibility to sources during the Soviet period, which 
posed a constant and real obstacle to those in the West writing on Stalin and 
Stalinism, and the impact of the removal of this obstacle in the post-Soviet era.  
The second is the influence of wider historiographical trends on this body of 
work, such as the emergence of social history. Finally the thesis argues that 
evolving Western attitudes to Stalin and Stalinism over this period have played a 
key role in constructions of Stalin and his regime, demonstrating an on-going 
historical process of the othering of Russia by the West. The extent and nature of 
this othering in turn provide a central line of enquiry of the thesis. Tightly 
intertwined with all three impacts has been the changing global political context 
over the period in question which provides the evolving and influential contextual 
backdrop to this study, and which has given this body of work a deeply political 
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1. Western historiography of Stalin and Stalinism: research 
questions 
 
 The Western historiography of Stalin and Stalinism produced in the 
period from 1925, when Stalin first emerged in an English language 
work on early Soviet politics, to the present day reveals that research 
on this subject has generated a strikingly varied body of work in 
which the nature of Stalin, his regime and his role within his regime 
have been and continue to be the subject of much debate. This 
characteristic is all the more striking when we consider that from the 
earliest years of the period under study, there was a general (if not 
always entirely specific) understanding of the nature of the Stalinist 
regime and the policies and leader that to define it.
1
 This thesis 
analyses the principal influences on this historiography, reflective of a 
varied and at times deeply divided scholarship in the West. In doing 
so, it assesses the impact of what can be considered key formative 
influences on research on Stalin and Stalinism in the West over the 
period of study. Tightly intertwined with these impacts was the 
changing global political context, which provides the evolving 
contextual backdrop to this study.  
The particularities of the conception of a socialist Soviet Union, 
Stalin’s accession to power and the resulting global political and 
diplomatic context directly affected many of the lives of those who 
wrote about Stalin and Stalinism, and these often deeply personal and 
ideological experiences have provided a central character to the 
historiography from the outset: the first works published in the West 
on Stalin and Stalinism were almost without exception written by 
socialists who had become alienated in some way from the Stalinist 
                                                 
1
 See Chapters 1 and 6 specifically regarding early understanding of the nature of 






 Often these were émigrés or exiles from the Soviet Union, 
such as Leon Trotsky. Later, the experience of the Cold War provided 
the context for the formation of extreme views on the danger of 
communism and the ideological and physical threat of the Soviet 
Union to the Western world. Western Communists on the other hand 
lived in a world of persecution where their ideological beliefs became 
their key defining feature, and the absolute epicentre of their lives and 
identities. The post-Soviet period and the experience of observing 
Russia’s faltering transition towards a capitalist democracy from the 
West has provided a radically different but no less influential 
experience to those writing on the Soviet Union at this time. 
Within this changing global setting, the first of three major 
identifiable impacts on the historiography was the lack of 
accessibility to sources during the Soviet period, which posed a 
consistent obstacle to those in the West writing on Stalin and 
Stalinism. For decades information was pieced together from a variety 
of sources such as the Soviet press, personal testimonies (usually 
from exiles or escapees) and Soviet foreign policy information, from 
which more or less could be gleaned on the inner workings of the 
Stalinist regime and life under it. In a feat of resourcefulness and 
tenacity this did not deter those who wished to pursue research in this 
area, and some extraordinarily well-documented pieces of work 
emerged from the Soviet period despite its source limitations.
3
 
                                                 
2
 This is not necessarily unique to this body of work. For example the earliest 
studies on the Holocaust were written by those who had experienced it, and who 
based their works on personal experience. Academic scholarship on the subject 
developed slightly later. With thanks to Pertti Ahonen for his insights on this topic. 
3
 An obvious example is Robert Conquest’s The Great Terror: Stalin’s purge of the 
thirties (London, 1968) which was the first major work to detail the great purges 
and Stalin’s terror. Conquest was able to combine two kinds of sources, which he 
termed ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’. The former were those published in the Soviet 
Union, such as official comment (the work was published after Nikita Khrushchev’s 
1956 secret speech) and publications, which through their varying levels of 
concealment and falsification provided a multi-dimensional source, informing 
Conquest of both facts, and the process of falsification. The latter were testimonies 
of individuals who had escaped the Soviet Union to the West. These included 
political defectors who became memoirists for example. Conquest wrote in more 
detail about his sources and the challenges associated with working with some of 





Nevertheless, there were huge gaps left by the shortage of sources, 
and this lack of information combined with a degree of conjecture 
needed to fill in the blanks can account for some of the most 
important debates in the field that occurred from the 1960s onwards. 
The confrontational and at times bitter nature of these arguments is 
further accounted for when we consider that this conjecture was 
framed by the atmosphere of extreme ideological tension during the 
Cold War, an event which covers much of the period of study. It was 
only with the advent of perestroika and the eventual ‘archival 
revolution’ of the post-Soviet era that access to archival and other 




Simultaneously, writing on Stalin and Stalinism in the West 
was inevitably influenced by wider historiographical trends. The 
impact of the emergence of social history from the 1960s, and cultural 
history in the late 1980s onwards, provoked not only a change in 
research focus but also deep divisions within the field of Soviet 
studies as scholars from different generations attempted to come to 
terms with each others’ methods of research and interpretation. This 
was particularly well exemplified by the debates that occurred as the 
revisionists of the 1980s clashed with totalitarian-model scholars and 
earlier revisionists of the early Cold War period. These 
historiographical trends manifested themselves not only in writing on 
Stalinism but also in writing on Stalin himself. The development of 
psychohistorical writing in the 1970s and wider changes in 
                                                 
4
 The one archival source which became available to researchers after the Second 
World War was the Smolensk Archive. This was a collection of documents taken 
from the Smolensk Party Archive by the Germans after they invaded the Soviet 
Union in June 1941. The USA obtained these documents (about 500 files) during 
the post-war occupation of Germany. The documents were used by several US 
government and intelligence agencies before being made available to scholars. 
Access, when granted, led to some ground-breaking publications such as Merle 
Fainsod’s Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), which 
documented the way in which regional leaders disobeyed orders from the Kremlin, 
arguing that in the regions the regime was disorganised, and faced resistance and 
rebellion from peasants and workers. This was a radical departure from what had 
previously been perceived to be a highly efficient and deeply ingrained regime. 
Despite the so-called ‘archival revolution’, there is still relatively little new 
information available on the earliest period of Stalin’s life, when he was a child and 




biographical writing, for instance, all influenced the ways in which 
Stalin was depicted, and changed ideas about which areas of his life 
were deemed most interesting or significant. Yet taking into 
consideration the wider conditions of the creation of the 
historiography, such as the particularities of source accessibility, for 
instance, how important were these trends in the formation of the 
historiography: did they drive it, or did they merely provide an extra 
push towards political, ideological and interpretative paradigm shifts 
in a changing global context?  
The final impact on this historiography to be analysed in this 
thesis is one that has been largely neglected as a key formative 
influence on Western writing on Stalin and Stalinism. One function 
that the historiography performs is that of a prism through which we 
are able to observe the evolution of Western attitudes to Stalin and his 
regime – and to a degree, by extension, Western attitudes towards 
Russia and the Soviet Union – over the entire period of study. This in 
turn can lead us to question how the West has constructed Stalin and 
Stalinism in relation to itself over the period of study and whether we 
are able to observe the emergence of a Stalinist ‘other’. The process 
of othering in Western (and especially European) discourse has been 
particularly studied in colonial and post-colonial studies.
5
 Implicit in 
the concept of othering is the formation of an identity not only for the 
‘other’ but for the ‘self’ too. The latter is what the former is not and is 
not what the former is: both identities become dependent on these 
                                                 
5
 On Eurocentrism and othering in colonial and post-colonial studies see for 
example D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and 
historical difference (Princeton, 2000); H. K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture 
(New York, 1994) and R. Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West, 
(London, 1990). Chakrabarty largely focuses on the impact of Eurocentrism on the 
social sciences, while Bhabha examines hybridity, mimicry, ambivalence and 
difference in the way the colonised have resisted the coloniser. He argues that 
hybridisation and colonial hybridity, as a cultural form, produced ambivalence in 
the colonial masters and as such altered the authority of power. Young’s work is a 
critical analysis of post-colonial theory that asks whether History is simply a history 






 One particularly well-known variant borne from this 
notion is Orientalism, a term coined by Edward Said in the 1970s to 
describe the prejudiced ideological construction of the Orient, which 
he argued had become hegemonic in Western thinking, and from 
which certain parallels may be able to be drawn in this thesis with 
Western constructions of Russia and the Soviet Union.
7
 This thesis 
will consider as a conceptual basis for othering the process through 
which the West constructs Stalin and Stalinism as its other by 
highlighting the latter’s perceived undesirable and inferior 
characteristics, be they immoral, threatening, backward or dangerous, 
for example. As explained by Sybille Reinke de Biutrago, this usually 
happens through the utilisation of images and various discursive 
means, typically interwoven. In writing, this is particularly done 
through stylistic means that are applied to compare, liken or 
distinguish, to convince, empower or devalue – in short, to construct 
relations between self and other in various ways.
8
 Reinke de Biutrago 
also highlights that existing images of the other may be added to and 
adjusted. New images can also be created, but there must be some 
link to a memory or to existing perspectives or ideas for those new 
images to be able to take hold; 
9
 this notion is particularly relevant in 
relation to the process of tracing the evolution of Western 
representations of Stalin and Stalinism.  
                                                 
6
 There is a huge theoretical body of work on the other/self nexus across the 
psychological, historical, philosophical and anthropological disciplines. Iver B. 
Neumann provides an excellent account of the uses of the other in world politics. 
He identifies four paths in this usage: the ethnographic path, the psychological path, 
the continental philosophical path and the ‘Eastern excursion’. See I. B. Neumann, 
Uses of the other: “the East” in European identity formation’ (Manchester, 1999), 
pp. 1-20. 
7
 E. Said, Orientalism (London, 1978). Three principal patterns were identified by 
Said in Western discourse on the Orient: the exaggeration of difference, thin and 
repetitive forms of intellectual analysis based on previously-made prejudiced 
analysis and assumptions, and the assumption of Western superiority. For an 
account of the reverse process, that is Russia’s othering of Europe, see I. B. 
Neumann, Russia and the idea of Europe: a study in identity and international 
relations (London, 1996). 
8
 S. Reinke de Biutrago, ‘Introduction: Othering in International Relations: 
Significance and Implications’ in S. Reinke de Biutrago (ed.), Portraying the Other 
in International Relations: Cases of Othering, Their Dynamics and the Potential for 







2. Russia under Western eyes 
 
Some of the earliest forms of this process in the relationship between 
Russia and the West can be traced back to the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. During the second half of the fifteenth century, 
faced with the Turkish threat from the East, the term ‘Europe’ had 
become a synonym for the Christian world.
10
 It was Russia’s religious 
and political affiliations with Islam which led to the emergence of the 
notion of Russia as a definitive ‘other’ from Europe, as its Christian 
status was deemed questionable.
11
 Iver B. Neumann states that the 
substitution of the terms ‘Scythians’, ‘Tatars’ and ‘Kalmyks’ for the 
catch-all term ‘Russian’ made its debut as part of European 
constructions of ‘Asiatic’ and ‘barbarous’ Russia in this early 
period.
12
 Sixteenth century accounts of English travellers to Russia 
reinforced the idea of Russian life as crude and inhuman, despite the 
magnificence of the tsar’s court. One British sixteenth century 
traveller wrote of the ‘true and strange face of the tyrannical 
state…without true knowledge of God, without written law, without 
common justice’, which was ‘heavy and grievous to the poor 
oppressed people’. 
13
 Another described how the cruelty of Ivan the 
Terrible bred ‘a general hatred, distress, fear and discontent’ 
throughout Russia.
14
 Descriptions of the court’s opulence provided a 
stark contrast: ‘our men began to wonder at the majesty of the 
emperor…having on his head a diadem or crown of gold, apparelled 
                                                 
10
 I. B. Neumann, Russia as Europe’s Other (Florence, 1996), p. 37. This paper 
gives a concise yet comprehensive account of the evolution of Europe’s othering of 
Russia from the fifteenth century onwards.  
11
 Gerard Delanty has suggested that this principal political polarisation of 
Christendom versus Islam had in reality very little to do with the idea of Europe but 
that it nevertheless influenced the future history of the notion to a great extent. G. 
Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (London, 1995), p.29 
12
 Neumann, Russia as Europe’s Other, pp.38-39 
13
 G. Fletcher, ‘Of The Russe Commonwealth’  in L. E. Berry and R. O. Crummey 
(eds.), Rude and Barbarous Kingdom: Russia in the Accounts of Sixteenth-Century 
English Voyagers (Madison, 1968), p.109 
14





with a robe of goldsmith’s work, and in his hand he held a sceptre 
garnished and beset with precious stones’.
15
 Another visitor 
highlighted  the lavishness of the royal banquets, describing his ‘table 
served all in gold and silver, and so likewise on other tables there 
were set bowls of gold set with stone, worth by estimation four 
hundred pounds sterling one cup.’
16
 
The eighteenth century saw the regular use of the term 
‘barbarians’ to describe Russians, amid fears that they were ‘at the 
gate’ and unlikely to ever be rid of their barbarian state. At the same 
time, an identity was formed of Russia as a ‘learner’ from Europe. 
These two constructions emerged in large part due to Peter the Great, 
whose behaviour led him to be considered a barbarian but one who 
nevertheless showed a will to shed his barbarianism and learn from 
Europe.
17
 One British commentator stated that Peter was ‘extremely 
curious and diligent and has further improved his Empire in ten years 
than any other ever was, in ten times that space.’
18
 His successes were 
seen as all the more admirable when considering the backwardness 
and barbarity of his subjects, described by one eighteenth century 
writer as  ‘[c]reatures with the Names of Men but with Qualities 
rather Brutal than Rational’.
19
 A further differentiating construction of 
this time was the denomination of Russia as ‘the North’. Neumann 
points out that Pushkin’s famous ‘window on the West’ statement 
about St Petersburg was taken from a letter by Count Francesco 
Algarotti in 1739 that actually read: ‘I am at length going to give you 
some account of this new city, of this great window lately opened in 
the north, thro’ which Russia looks into Europe.’
20
 After the Great 
Northern War of 1700-1721 the defeated Sweden withdrew to 
Scandinavia and Finland, separating it from Russia and Poland and 
                                                 
15
 R. Chancellor, ‘The First Voyage to Russia’ in Berry and Crummey, Rude and 
Barbarous Kingdom, p. 24 
16
 A. Jenkinson, ‘A Voyage to Russia in 1557’ in Berry and Crummey, Rude and 
Barbarous Kingdom, p.54 
17
 Neumann, Russia as Europe’s Other,  pp. 25-26 
18
 As cited in M. S. Anderson, Britain’s Discovery of Russia, 1553-1815 (London, 
1958), p.76 
19
 Ibid., p.79 
20




dissolving the idea of ‘the North’. Russia was thus no longer seen as 
one of the component of states making up the Baltic region.
21
 This 
was an important moment as it led to a reconstruction of the 
coordinates of Europe that eventually resulted in the East/West divide 




Ideas of Russian barbarianism and difference continued to be 
propagated in the nineteenth century. The best-selling Marquis de 
Custine’s Letters from Russia (also published as Russia in 1839) 
provided damning verdicts that put considerable distance between 
Russians and Europeans:  
 
I do not blame the Russians for being what they are; I blame 
them for pretending to be what we are. They are still 
uncultivated and this state at least leaves the ground for clear 
hope. But I see them constantly possessed by the desire to ape 
other nations, and they ape as the apes do, mocking what they 
copy. So I think: these are men who have forsaken savagery 
and missed civilization, and I remember the pitiless aphorism 
of Voltaire or Diderot, now forgotten in France: ‘The Russians 




While the Marquis de Custine still referred to Russia as ‘the north’ 
throughout his letters, he also employed the word ‘Orientals’ to 
describe Russians, and his usage of both terms could serve to 
illustrate the nineteenth century transition from the idea of Russia as a 
                                                 
21
 The Great Northern War was fought by Russia, Denmark-Norway and Saxony - 
Poland against Sweden, in order to challenge the latter’s supremacy in the Baltic 
region.  
22
 Neumann, Russia as Europe’s Other, pp.27-28. For a more in depth analysis of 
the transition between North and East, and Western Enlightenment perceptions of 
Eastern Europe and the East generally see M. Confino, ‘Re-Inventing the 
Enlightenment: Western Images of Eastern Realities in the Eighteenth Century’, 
Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. 36, Nos. 3-4 (September-December 1994), pp. 
505-522.  
23
 Marquis de Custine, Letters from Russia (London, 1991), p.57. The book is a 
collection of letters written by Astolphe, Marquis de Custine as he travelled through 
Russia in the 1830s, published upon his return to France. As Iain Lauchlan points 
out, the fact that de Custine was a devout Catholic, fervent republican and had been 
inspired to write the book by Polish émigré nationalists goes some way in 
explaining the general tone, lack of accuracy and hostility in his descriptions of 
Russia. See I. Lauchlan, Russian Hide-and-Seek: The Tsarist Secret Police in St 




northern to an Eastern state as a long-term consequence of the Great 
Northern War. This transition to the Eastern other most closely 
resembles the constructions of Stalin that emerge in biographical 
writing on him as an ‘Asiatic’, although in the earlier years these were 
as often made by Russians as by Westerners.
24
 As the nineteenth 
century progressed, strategic tensions were high in Europe, and the 
key development in Europe’s construction of Russia, through wars 
such as the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829, was to accept and 
recognise it as a legitimate power and player in Europe. This meant 
that on the one hand Russia was seen as a component of Europe. On 
the other hand,, it was also still considered a barbarian (albeit a 
powerful one) at the gate, grasping for hegemony while Europe was 
itself trying to redefine the idea of the European power-balance so 




Following an initially generally positive reaction in the West 
to the 1917 Revolution in Russia, particularly prominent 
constructions of the Soviet Union by the West emerged over the 
course of the twentieth century. In the interwar period, there were 
three principal influences on these. The first was racialist discourse, 
which ranked different races against each other. Previously, Russians 
had been classed as ‘Asiatic’ and thus not European but in the 
twentieth century a more extreme branch of this discourse developed 
(and which bore Nazism) that excluded Slavs from humankind 
altogether.
26
 The second somewhat different influence looked to 
Russia as a land of the future. This was particularly well exemplified 
in the work of the British socialist economists Sydney and Beatrice 
Webb, who saw the Soviet experiment as an effort to attain a higher 
                                                 
24
 See Chapter 6 
25
 Neumann, Russia as Europe’s Other, pp. 15-16. For more on the West’s 
historical relationship with Russia see M. Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes: From 
the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 
1999). Malia traces the relationship between the two from the eighteenth century, 
aiming to define Russia’s position within Europe, rather than emphasising the 
polarity between them. 
26




level of civilisation, one in which the many problems of the capitalist 
and Christian West could be eradicated. 
27
 Finally, the USSR’s 
socialist economic organisation was seen as a credible successor to 
the capitalist economy, as this was still a time when commentators 
could support capitalism yet acknowledge the possibilities of a 
socialist alternative. Inter-war Russia was seen as a part of Europe, 
albeit an errant one. 
28
  
The aftermath of the Second World War and the advent of the 
Cold War led these previous influences on Western constructions of 
the Soviet Union to be subsumed by two catch-all constructions: the 
first was the ‘authorised’ version of USSR, which saw it as an Asiatic 
and barbarian political power that had availed itself of the opportunity 
offered by the Second World War to intrude into Europe by military 
means. The second saw the USSR as the deliverer of Europe from the 
scourge of Nazism and as a model for Europe to emulate with a 
politico-economic model that could have an evolutionary, 
invigorating potential on Europe.
29
 In both cases, it is clear that these 
models of the Soviet Union represented what Europe and the West 
were emphatically not.  
Presently, we are observing post-Soviet Russia in transition, 
though towards what is becoming less and less clear. There has been a 
resurgence of the ‘learner’ identity of the Soviet Union in 
international relations discourse, especially in the decade immediately 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the Western world 
watched expectantly for Russia to make obvious steps towards a 
                                                 
27
 For example, see S. Webb and B. Webb, Is Soviet Communism a New 
Civilisation? (London, 1936). 
28
 Neumann, Russia as Europe’s Other, p.13.  Ronald G. Suny also states that 
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 This has been highlighted by James D. J. 
Brown, who has argued that there is a clear pattern of Orientalism in 
contemporary Western discourse on Russia.
31
 In 2013, however, there 
is an increasing sense that concerns over freedom of speech, human 
rights, political corruption and the state of democracy in Vladimir 
Putin’s Russia are strengthening rather than weakening the West’s 
construction of Russia as its ideological and political other.  
This brief overview of some of the ways in which the West 
has differentiated itself from Russia and the Soviet Union serves to 
illustrate that one of the principal themes of this study does not take 
place in a historical vacuum. This thesis seeks to determine to what 
extent the historiography of Stalin and Stalinism is a manifestation of 
this on-going process from the early 1930s onwards, and in what 
form. 
 
3. Scholarship to date 
 
This study therefore aims to fill a gap in our understanding of the 
main influences on Western writing on Stalin and Stalinism and to 
help assess the West’s changing attitudes towards it over this period. 
To date, historiographical studies of this body of work have not 
examined these three suggested major impacts in conjunction, nor 
examined their relationship with each other and the wider global 
context. The majority of the surveys of the historiography currently 
published are analyses of its outcomes rather than of the conditions of 
its creation, be that through advances in empirical research, or 
changes in principal areas of research within the field. This approach 
has often been combined with a particular focus on the totalitarian 
and revisionist debates of the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, there is 
                                                 
30
 Neumann states that this attempted transition would make Russia appear less of a 
threat.  Neumann, Russia as Europe’s Other pp.5-6 
31
J. D. J. Brown, ‘A Stereotype, Wrapped in a Cliché, Inside a Caricature: Russian 




little to present in terms of previous literature relating to the key 
influences on the creation and evolution of this specific body of work 
as set out in this thesis. 
Instead, an overview of the literature shows that three patterns 
have emerged in historiographical surveys published to date that, 
while related to the themes of this thesis, demonstrate the lacuna in 
analysis of the field that this study aims to fill. The first of these 
patterns is the aforementioned focus on the outcomes of research. 
Alter Litvin and John Keep’s survey of both Western and Russian 
historiography of Stalin and Stalinism, for example is a 
comprehensive summary of the evolution of this body of work and 
especially how it relates to the release of documentation from the 
Soviet Union and, later, Russia.
 32
 Focusing largely on the outcome of 
scholarly investigation into Stalin and his regime, the authors are 
principally concerned with the current state of knowledge that has 
resulted from this research to date. Keep, for instance, looks 
individually at the fruits of research on politics and government, 
gender and foreign policy. The second part of the work, entitled 
‘Wrestling with Revisionism: recent Western writing on Stalinism’, 
suggests that those changes that occurred in the field from the 1970s 
are still having a relevant impact and require our attention. However, 
they are only addressed in terms of the knowledge produced by 
research, rather than in the context of its production. Similarly, this 
approach is employed in the other principal historiographical surveys 
published to date. David L. Hoffmann’s ‘Introduction’ to Stalinism: 
The Essential Readings deals with ‘interpretations of Stalinism’ and 
provides a succinct overview of the principal trends that have 
dominated the historiography, focusing on the Cold War era, during 
which he writes that the debates on what caused Stalinism were 
‘highly politicised’, and revisionism gave way to post-revisionism 
when the historical profession turned away from social history 
towards cultural history. Yet Hoffman’s focus remains largely on the 
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outcomes of these changes rather than the dynamics behind them, 
exemplified by his emphasis on what recent work on Stalinism has 
revealed or demonstrated.
33
 Similarly, Mark Sandle has provided a 
detailed historiographical survey of the field in the post-Soviet era 
through a review of some of the literature published on the Soviet 
Union since 1985. Once again, there is a clear focus on social and 
political historical debate and on the outcomes of research. For 
instance, Sandle suggests that the relationship between state and 
society stands out as the key issue in post-Soviet historiography, and 
he examines the relative merits of social history (coinciding with 
wider historiographical developments), as well as some of the 
criticisms aimed at social historians.
34
 Sandle’s article stands out for 
his appraisal of post-Soviet historiography, as yet still a relative 
rarity, but as with Litvin and Keep, and Hoffman, Sandle’s analysis 
remains focused on the nature of research and interpretation, rather 
than the influences leading to, and on, that research.  
The second theme to emerge is the contextual examination of 
the creation of the historiography in relation to Western writing on the 
Soviet Union generally, rather than specifically in relation to Stalin 
and Stalinism. This is reflected again in Sandle’s article, which 
focuses on the Western historiography of the entire Soviet period. A 
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much denser and more inclusive account of the development of 
Western historiography on the Soviet Union has been written by 
Ronald G. Suny, which looks at the evolution of Western writing over 
the course of the twentieth century, highlighting the influence of the 
changing global political context and of evolving historiographical 
trends of this period.
35
 Suny, for instance, touches on the question of 
the West writing about its other, stating that  
 
In the Western academy the Soviet Union was most often 
imagined to be an aberration of the normal course of modern 
history, an unfortunate detour from the rise of liberalism that 
bred its own evil opposite, travelling its very own Sonderweg 




He notes the difficulties faced by scholars in trying to write a 
balanced narrative in those conditions of heightened ideological 
tensions and suggests that while much valuable research was 
undertaken during the twentieth century by those either deeply 
committed to, or deeply against, Soviet communism, ‘a studied 
neutrality was difficult (though possible) in an environment in which 
one's work was always subject to political judgement’.
37
 In this way 
Suny highlights how important Western attitudes to Soviet 
communism have been to the changing nature of scholarship on this 
subject, as well as the impact of the global context on these attitudes. 
This has been similarly examined in great detail by David C. 
Engerman, whose book Know Your Enemy is a rich and detailed 
account of the relationship between the US State and academia during 
this period. It has greatly contributed to our understanding of the 
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intricate and deeply intertwined nature of academia and politics in the 
USA and the impact of the tense and difficult relationship between 
the USA and the Soviet Union on the production and outcome of 
scholarship during the Cold War era.
38
 
 The third theme to emerge in previous scholarship relevant to 
this study relates to Western attitudes to Russia in the field of political 
science and, more specifically, in the forum of contemporary 
international relations, where clear othering processes have been 
identified in Western discourse. Brown’s convincing argument that 
there are clear Orientalist tendencies in mainstream Western discourse 
on Russian foreign policy suggests that the process of othering Russia 
is on-going in the West. Brown bases his analysis on the application 
of three principal tenets of Said’s Orientalism to this discourse.
39
 The 
first is the amplification of difference between the West and its other 
through crude stereotypes and caricatures based on ethnic typology. 
The second is the portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence 
from Western norms, most specifically in regard to its people, who 
are generally seen as backward and inferior.
40
 The West, in turn, sees 
its own role as that of a committed rectifier of these inferiorities, 
which it aims to fulfil by imposing its own more advanced socio-
economic model on the East. The third feature of Orientalist discourse 
Brown highlights is that of a thin and oft-repeated form of intellectual 
analysis, based on a narrow set of convictions that have become the 
foundation for thinking on the Orient. All analyses of the region have 
therefore become repetitive and unimaginative.
41
 Brown’s article 
demonstrates that applied to Russia rather than the Orient, these 
patterns are clear in a sizeable amount of Western discourse on 
                                                 
38
 D. C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet 
Experts (New York, 2009). 
39
 In Said’s analysis the other was of course the Orient. The perpetuation of the 
concept of the ‘West’ becomes dependent on this stark East-West divide.  Brown, 
‘A Stereotype, Wrapped in a Cliché, 
Inside a Caricature, p.150 
40
 As well as backward, people from the Orient are presented as prone to 
irrationality, inefficiency, the inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic inability 
to govern themselves. As a result, power is the only language they understand. 
Brown, ‘A Stereotype, Wrapped in a Cliché, Inside a Caricature’, p.151 
41




Russian foreign policy. He is able to identify a strong emphasis on the 
marked difference between Russian and Western foreign policy and 
on the danger it presents, arguing that, despite the fall of communism 
in the Soviet Union, Western scholarship continues to represent 
Russia as a threatening other pursuing a ‘qualitatively different mode 
of behaviour’.
42
 Russia’s ‘inscrutable foreignness’ is then reinforced 
through the usage of shared language to describe it.
43
 Brown also 
demonstrates the West’s assumption of its own superiority over 
Russia when engaging in international politics, and its persistence in 
seeing Russia as a pupil, which is once again a manifestation of 
Russia as a ‘learner’ from Europe.
44
 Finally, Brown suggests that 
overall very little imaginative or innovative research is undertaken in 
Western scholarship on this topic and that instead it retains at its core 
the idea that there is a specifically Russian mind-set or pattern of 
behaviour to which the country inevitably reverts, guided by ‘some 
primordial instinct that has been indelibly imprinted upon its national 
character by the weight of geography and history’.
45
 By following the 
three tenets of Said’s Orientalism methodically, Brown has been able 
to identify clear parallels in Western discourse on Russian foreign 
policy. Similarly, Neumann has written some excellent work on 
Russia as Europe’s other historically and throughout the twentieth 
century that has already been drawn upon here to demonstrate the 
historical manifestation of this process. As a political scientist with a 
focus on international relations and identity formation, Neumann is 
principally concerned with the current state of Russo-European 
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political relations, but the depth of his work on Russia as Europe’s 
other demonstrates that this process is on-going and deserves closer 
attention in other fields of study.
46
  
These books and articles, the most in-depth historiographical 
analyses published to date, exemplify the lack of investigation into 
the simultaneous impact of the three key influences – source 
accessibility, historiographical trends and Western attitudes to Russia, 
bound together by the larger global context – on the creation of the 
Western body of work specifically relating to Stalin and Stalinism 
over the period of study.
47
  
4. Thesis structure  
This thesis therefore seeks to contribute to our knowledge of this 
subject by examining the historiography of Stalin and Stalinism ‘in 
practice’, that is its interaction with the world around it, in order to 
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reveal the dynamics, influences and events which have led to its 
creation. 
This thesis does not, and indeed cannot, encompass all of the 
material relating to Stalin and Stalinism that has been written and 
published in the West since 1925. It does not intend to be a 
comprehensive survey of the entirety of this body of work, a task that 
would be impossible within the time and space limitations of a 
doctoral thesis.  
The most obvious boundary of the thesis is the origins of the 
material, since it is concerned mostly with Anglo-American 
scholarship. This is, firstly, due to the size of this body work: it gives 
ample material from which to undertake detailed historiographical 
research. Secondly, the particularity of the Anglo-American 
relationship with the Soviet Union during the twentieth century and 
beyond has led to a historiography reflective of the deep complexity 
of relations between the two. As a result, this body of work provides a 
valuable tool with which to evaluate the extent and nature of othering 
of the Soviet Union by the West over this period, a principal line of 
enquiry of this study. However, the boundary is not entirely rigid. 
Throughout the thesis, where relevant and necessary, works by 
French and Soviet émigré writers have also been included, such as 
those of Leon Trotsky, Henri Barbusse and Boris Souvarine. This has 
mostly occurred when examining the pre-Cold War period, when the 
majority of foundational writing on Stalin was being published in the 
West (in English, French and German) by writers of these origins. As 
the twentieth century progressed, the academic Soviet Studies field in 
the USA and the UK expanded greatly, resulting in the volume and 
dominance in the West of Anglo-American writing on this subject. 
This study has been constructed as a series of case studies that 
examine specific areas within the Anglo-American historiography 
that I have considered either to have been neglected, or that would 
benefit from review, most notably in relation to the Wests’ othering 
of Stalinism. As a result, the thesis does not deal with some of the 




considered essential to a more general study on Western research and 
writing on Stalinism. It does not, for example, deal with the literature 
surrounding Stalin during the Second World War, a vast and complex 
topic that branches out beyond the more familiar political, social and 
economic spheres of Stalinism into military and diplomatic history, 
and that is tightly intertwined with the histories of the other warring 
nations. Similarly, it does not deal with biographical writing on the 
adult Stalin in the second half of the twentieth century, instead 
choosing to focus on biography of the child and adolescent Stalin, an 
under-researched area which reveals much about changing Western 
attitudes towards the man and his regime. 
Indeed, the thesis examines six areas of the historiography that 
allow novel insights into the ways in which Stalin has been written 
about in the West, the conditions of the creation of this writing, and 
the influences on it. In particular, these areas stand out thanks to their 
value in helping to assess the extent and nature of the construction of 
a Stalinist other within this body of work. They have been arranged 
into a chronological structure, which allows us to observe the 
evolution of several key aspects of writing on Stalin over the period 
of study, notably the concept of the Stalinist other and the 
repercussions of the highly influential shifting global political 
context.  
Chapter 1 focuses on the most influential early works on 
Stalin in order to determine the initial extent and nature of this 
othering before the ideological shift of the Cold War, which stretches 
over much of the rest of the period of study and the extent of whose 
influence is a question that has dominated many of the 
historiographical surveys we already have. With many of these works 
being written by émigré or exiled socialist writers, the conditions 
under which they emerged provide an illuminating insight into the 
foundations of Western writing on Stalin and his regime. The analysis 
of the works in Chapter 2 aims to provide a new angle on ‘totalitarian 
model’ writing, a phase of early Cold War Soviet Studies that 




about which there have been few new insights. By focusing on 
language, the usage of the term ‘totalitarian’ and the concepts on 
which the constructions of the Stalinist other were hinged at this time, 
the approach and conclusions presented in this chapter show that there 
are still important new findings to be discovered from this part of the 
historiography.  
The source material in Chapter 3 departs from what can be 
considered as scholarly historiography by examining British 
communist reactions to Stalinism before, during and after Nikita 
Khrushchev’s 1956 ‘secret speech’, as presented in British communist 
journals, books and press. This departure is justified when we 
consider that, to date, examinations of Anglo-American writing on 
Stalin and Stalinism during the early Cold War have been largely 
confined to those of individuals ideologically opposed to 
communism. By examining British communist writing on Stalinism 
in these varied forums, this chapter not only helps to construct a more 
nuanced and inclusive picture of British writing on this subject during 
the Cold War, but also allows a unique insight into the emergence and 
development of an othering process, as British communists reacted to 
the revelations of Khrushchev’s speech.  
As with Chapter 2, Chapter 4 revisits familiar ground in novel 
ways through its examination of the totalitarian model versus social 
history debates that occurred in the 1980s. Within the framework of 
enquiry of this thesis, new insights can be gleaned from these 
discussions about the changing concepts on which the othering of 
Stalinism was hinged as the Cold War progressed. Chapter 5 assesses 
the major themes of post-Soviet writing on Stalinism, a necessary 
inclusion when we consider the dramatic shift in interpretative 
paradigms and source accessibility which occurred after the end of the 
Cold War and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a case study of biographical 
writing on Stalin. By focusing specifically on writing on the young 
Stalin over the entire period of study, this chapter allows us to chart 




youth, how these have been linked to his adult personality and 
leadership, and their part in the construction of Stalin as the other. 
As this thesis seeks to understand the creation and evolution 
of the Western historiography of Stalin and Stalinism, it is helpful to 
define these terms. ‘Western’ is predominantly used in this study to 
refer to the large body of work produced by Anglo-American 
scholarship, but at times will also encompass émigré and other 
European writing, as well as official Soviet literature on Stalin 
published in the West, when it has been necessary and relevant to do 
so. 
What is meant by the historiography of ‘Stalin’ himself is 
largely self- evident: it encompasses biography, both personal and 
political, but can also refer to any works concerning the interaction 
between the man and his regime, for example the examination of his 
correspondence in the post-Soviet era, used to determine his day to 
day involvement in the running of the regime.
48
 ‘Stalinism’ is a more 
complex term. At a general level, Stalinism can be understood as the 
system of governance of all sectors of life put in place by Stalin and 
with which he governed the Soviet Union while he was Secretary 
General. However, the intricacies and the complexity of this system, 
its omnipresence in both the public and private spheres and its deep 
and wide-ranging consequences make its limitations difficult to 
identify. Robert C. Tucker has addressed issues with the usage of the 
term ‘Stalinism’, since he himself was one of the first to employ it. 
According to Tucker, the most notable (and perhaps most debatable) 
of these is that it is unclear what the referent to this term is: unlike 
Lenin, Tucker believed that Stalin did not produce a substantial body 
of theory which led to the ‘ism’ of Leninism. For Tucker, a politico-
cultural approach was the most helpful in defining Stalinism. Firstly, 
it cannot be separated from the man himself. This does not mean 
psychologising history but rather illuminating Stalin’s drive for 
despotic power, the way he went about it and the uses he made of it. 
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Secondly, Stalinism must be seen in cultural terms: Stalin in the post-
Lenin 1920s stood for ‘Russian national Bolshevism’, by which 
Tucker meant ‘Bolshevik revolutionism in Stalin's special 
understanding of it and the great Russian chauvinism that Lenin 
belatedly perceived in him in 1922’.
49
 Finally, while Tucker did not 
reject a social history of Stalinism, any attempts to understand it had 
to include all spheres of life (socio-economic, cultural, intellectual 
and so on) with the state as the prime actor. Without taking into 
account these elements in this politico-cultural perspective, he 
suggested that we cannot understand what happened after Stalin took 
power.
50
 Hoffmann has proposed a more straightforward definition of 
Stalinism: a set of tenets, policies, and practices instituted by the 
Soviet government during the years in which Stalin was in power, 
1928-1953. It was characterised by ‘extreme coercion employed for 
the purpose of economic and social transformation’ and the abolition 
of private ownership and free trade. Hoffmann recognised the 
complexities of attempting to define it and noted that the range of 
phenomena included under the name of Stalinism ‘alerts us to the fact 
that not all aspects of Stalinism can be explained by a single cause’.
51
 
There are many varying ‘definitions’ and understandings of Stalinism. 
However, Hoffmann’s provides a good basis for the term, as long as 
there remains an implicit understanding of its complexities and 
subtleties, as suggested by both him and Tucker. This thesis therefore 
considers as ‘historiography of Stalinism’ to be all work concerned 
with any and all aspects of the regime, its nature, execution and 
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repercussions, across all spheres of life: it is the very variety of 
definitions and understandings of Stalinism that is at the very centre 
of this study. 
5. Chapter summary 
As highlighted in the previous section when addressing the value 
of each chosen case study, these have been organised into six 
chapters.  Chapter 1 examines the historiography in the period 
1925-1947, when the first works on Stalin and his regime began 
to be published in the West. There was a focus on biographical 
writing during this period, and this chapter seeks to examine who 
was writing about Stalin and why. The most comprehensive 
works published in this period were biographies by Stalin’s 
opponents, notably Boris Souvarine, Leon Trotsky and Isaac 
Deutscher. Other works, such as those of Henri Barbusse and 
Bertram D. Wolfe, were important in other ways: for example, 
Barbusse was a supporter of Stalin and provided an alternative 
perspective, and Wolfe’s work in particular helps us to gauge to 
what extent the nature of Stalinism was understood in the West at 
this time. This chapter seeks to define the nature of these earliest 
constructions of Stalin and Stalinism and what informed them in 
an era when Stalin was still alive, and before the West and the 
Soviet Union became embroiled in the Cold War. Further, as 
many of these works were written by anti-Stalinist socialists 
estranged from the Soviet Union, it addresses the question of how 
these early writings presented some of the first forms of othering 
Stalinism in the West. 
Chapter 2 examines a neglected aspect of the creation of the 
totalitarian-model historiography on Stalin and Stalinism during the 
early Cold War, in which Stalinism became synonymous with 
totalitarianism. Moving away from previous analyses of the nature of 
Soviet totalitarianism and its interpretation in Western scholarship, 




‘totalitarianism’ became central to constructions of the Stalinist and 
Soviet other during this period, in what ways this manifested itself in 
writing on Stalinism at this time and the extent to which this tied in 
with the wider political context and discourse. The chapter explores 
the method in which certain common ideas, such as that of the ‘two 
worlds’ of East and West and the danger and deviancy of the Soviet 
Union, were systematically reinforced across Western scholarship, 
while simultaneously constructions of totalitarianism as an extension 
of a Russian tradition of leadership also emerged. 
Chapter 3 examines British communist reactions to Nikita 
Khrushchev’s 1956 ‘secret speech’, providing a case study to help our 
understanding of the development of Western Communist 
historiography on Stalin during this eventful period. The chapter 
investigates how Stalin and Stalinism were thought of and written 
about by British communists before 1956, mainly through portrayals 
in the Daily Worker, the official paper of the communist Party of 
Great Britain (CPGB), but also in works written about Stalin’s Soviet 
Union by British communists. The chapter goes on to analyse the 
ways in which British communists related their socialist beliefs, their 
party and their individual selves to the realities of Stalinism exposed 
by Khrushchev and how this, in turn, manifested itself in the way in 
which they wrote about Stalin and his regime. This study sheds new 
light on a neglected aspect of the historiography and provides an 
additional dimension to what has historically been a dominant focus 
on the work of historians and political scientists ideologically 
opposed to the regime. While much of the writing by Western 
communists at this time was non-academic, by examining these 
works, this chapter allows us to build a far more complete and 
inclusive picture of the way in which Stalin was being written about 
in the West and to understand the development of the historiography 
outside of the confines of Cold War Anglo-American academia, and 
mentality. Through the analysis of the British communist reactions to 
the 1956 secret speech, the chapter also examines the process through 




a particular faction of the CPGB sought to distance and differentiate 
itself and socialism from what they perceived to be the moral and 
ideological stain of Stalinism. 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of social history’s appearance 
in the field of Soviet studies, and specifically the impact of 
revisionism on the way in which Stalinism was constructed by 
scholars during the 1980s. It does so predominantly through an 
analysis of the debates that occurred in The Russian Review in 1986 
and 1987, where totalitarian-model scholars and early revisionists, 
such as Peter Kenez, Stephen F. Cohen and Robert Conquest, as well 
as later revisionists debated in a lively and at times aggressive manner 
the role that social history should take in the research and 
interpretation of Stalinism. A new examination of these debates 
reveals the centrality of the notions of morality and of the locus of 
blame, not only in relation to Stalinism itself but also in relation to 
perceptions of how scholarship on the subject was undertaken. On the 
surface, the arguments in The Russian Review appear to be concerned 
with the role of social history in the study of Stalinism. However, the 
dominant themes of the debates were in fact the moral condemnation 
of Stalinism and the allocation of blame for the regime. This chapter 
argues that the totalitarian model scholars and early revisionists 
engaged in these debates were primarily concerned with the 
importance of highlighting the immoral and evil character of the 
regime and Stalin’s own responsibility for this. The revisionists’ 
reticence to do so with similar determination, and their criticisms of 
earlier scholarship on this subject, in turn not only led to these 
arguments acquiring an often bitter nature but also to the revisionists 
acquiring an immoral quality of their own in the eyes of their earlier 
counterparts. In this way, this chapter sheds new light on the nature of 
these debates by revealing both their strongly moral foundations and 
the nature, resilience and strength of the Stalinist totalitarian other of 
the early Cold War era.  
Chapter 5 examines the changes in research and interpretative 




to the new release of information during the ‘archival revolution’ but 
also due to the cultural turn in the historical profession that displaced 
social history, the shifting global context which saw the end of the 
Cold War, and the Soviet Union becoming a historical notion. This 
chapter asks whether previous arguments and interpretations of 
Stalinism have withstood these changes, and while conditions have 
changed (there is more available information, collaborations with 
Russian archivists and historians have developed, as has a greater 
self-awareness in the field of past interpretative patterns, for 
example), whether many old agendas remain. Similarly it questions 
whether, despite the advent of social and then cultural history, there 
has been a return to a politics-centred view of Stalinism, manifested 
in the large amount of research once again being undertaken on 
Stalin’s role in his regime, as well as the way in which Stalinism itself 
was carried out from within the Kremlin. Finally, this chapter 
assesses whether  the end of the Soviet Union has meant that Western 
scholarship on Stalin and Stalinism still defines them, as it has done 
both historically and throughout this period of study, as the definitive 
other to the West.  
Finally, Chapter 6 is a case study of biographical writing on 
Stalin, undertaken through an analysis of writing on the young Stalin 
(defined as his childhood and adolescence, before he became a 
revolutionary). This chapter examines the way in which a body of 
work can develop from scratch, from the first primary sources 
onwards, providing a detailed example of the evolution of a particular 
body of work on a specific subject. In this case, it enables us to note 
the origins of certain depictions of Stalin, such as Trotsky’s famous 
characterisation of Stalin as ‘mediocre’, and questions whether the 
way in which the young Stalin was depicted is connected to the way 
he was perceived as an adult and leader.
52
 At the same time, the 
evolution of this body of work can help to identify the reflection of 
changing trends in biographical writing over the course of the period 
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of study, such as the development of psychohistory in the 1970s, or 
the increasing focus on the private lives of individuals as a wider 
biographical trend. This examination of the historiography of the 
young Stalin seeks to understand to what extent information from, 
and characteristics of, Stalin’s childhood and adolescence have been 
used to present or reinforce him as the other, notably in terms of his 
Georgian ethnicity, and what importance this period and these 
elements of his life have been given over the period of study in 
attempts to understand Stalin himself. Finally, the case study aims to 
illustrate the themes of the thesis over its entire chronological period 
by assessing how the changing political Soviet and Western context 
deeply affected the historiography of this part of Stalin’s life. It 
evaluates the impact of the lack of source availability on the 
development of one body of work and the extent to which personal 
convictions once again show themselves to be central to its creation 













In 1925, Max Eastman published a book entitled Since Lenin Died.
2
  
In it Eastman, an American Trotskyist, examined the struggle for 
power that was occurring within the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) after Lenin’s death. It was the first publication in the 
West to deal with Stalin’s character and political style: Eastman was 
one of the only people outside the Soviet Union to get hold of parts of 
Lenin’s so-called ‘testament’, a letter written before his death in 
which he had suggested a reorganisation of power within the party, 
including the removal of Stalin from his position as Secretary 
General.
3
 Lenin had, in a post-script to the letter, expressed concern at 
Stalin’s rudeness, and his mishandling of the suppression of Georgian 
dissent. Consequently Eastman’s analysis of the testament and the 
ensuing struggle necessarily led to him addressing the question of 
Stalin.  
Western-published works focusing predominantly on Stalin 
started to appear in the period 1930-1932. The first of these was 
written by Boris Bazhanov, Stalin’s assistant in the Politburo from 
1923 until 1925, who had escaped the USSR in 1928 and settled in 
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Paris. Like Eastman, Bazhanov wrote an account of the power 
struggle and the inner workings of the Politburo in the 1920s, only he 
focused much more closely on Stalin himself and the direction in 
which he was taking the Soviet state as early as the late 1920s. It was 
intended as a warning to the West of the danger of Stalin. The book 
was first published in French in 1930 under the title Avec Staline dans 
le Kremlin.
4
 In 1931 Lev Nussimbaum, an Azeri Jew by birth, 
published a biography of Stalin in German under the pseudonym 
Essad-Bey entitled Stalin: The Career of a Fanatic.
5
 Nussimbaum 
had fled when Bolsheviks overran Baku after the 1917 revolution. He 
was a renowned fantasist (for example, he regularly altered his own 
identity: he converted to Islam in Berlin in 1923, and later became 
sympathetic to the Nazi regime) but his book, and its depiction of the 
mysterious and dangerous Caucasian Stalin, was popular.
6
 Finally, the 
most influential work of these years was a memoir written by Stalin’s 
Georgian schoolmate Joseph Iremashvili, entitled Stalin Und Die 
Tragödie Georgiens, published in 1932. A first phase of the Western 
historiography of Stalin and Stalinism began with the publication of 
these works, and ended when relations between the USSR and the 
West became so tense as to dramatically impact on Western writing 
on Stalin and Stalinism for decades thereafter. Common traits 
emerged in these initial interpretations and approaches, as did patterns 
in the formative influences on these responses. These traits have been 
largely understudied and will be assessed here through an analysis of 
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writing on Stalin himself and on ‘Stalinism’ both as a term and as a 
regime.  
There were many works written in the West on Stalin during this 
period, with a noticeable increase in numbers during and after the 
Second World War when Stalin’s relevance to the West increased 
dramatically, and many of these will be examined to a greater or 
lesser extent in this chapter. However, there are but a few which have 
remained particularly historically significant for their influential 
interpretations of Stalin and Stalinism, and as important sources for 
their depth and scope of analysis, are still used as references today. As 
a result, they provide several new insights into why and how Stalin 
and Stalinism were being written about in this period. These are 
principally the works of Boris Souvarine, Isaac Deutscher and Leon 
Trotsky. 
 
2. Machiavellian, brutal and crude: depictions of Stalin 
 
Part of the interest of the works of this period lies in the ways in 
which these authors wrote about Stalin himself, since these were men 
who had followed Lenin but now found themselves estranged from 
the socialist nation they had supported and of which Stalin was now 
leader. Through their respective descriptions of Stalin key common 
characteristics emerged and, in turn, an analysis of these depictions of 
Stalin reveals a pattern of othering in which Stalin was systematically 
differentiated from, and subordinated to, the authors. 
This first process becomes apparent by the authors’ repeated 
derogatory depictions of Stalin as a method of differentiating 
themselves from him. They most notably do this by highlighting his 
mediocre and unremarkable, yet deceitful and sly, character. The first 
instances of this can be found in Eastman’s work: the speeches and 
articles of Stalin, Bukharin, Kamenev and Zinoviev denouncing 






 This idea was also particularly well exemplified 
by Trotsky, whose interpretation of Stalin’s character is clear even 
from the index of the book: ‘vindictiveness of’, ‘domineering will of’, 
‘provincialism’, ‘not an orator’, ‘not a writer’.
8
 Trotsky wrote 
throughout his book extensively and derisively on Stalin’s character: 
‘Koba's political provincialism is most instructively exemplified by 
his relations with the foreign centre, or rather, by the absence of any 
relations at all with it’
9
, ‘Articles under Stalin's signature do not arrest 
anyone's attention: they are devoid of personality, barring crudity of 
exposition’
10
, ‘Such attributes of character as slyness, faithlessness, 
the ability to exploit the lowest instincts of human nature are 
developed to an extraordinary degree in Stalin and, considering his 
strong character, represent mighty weapons in a struggle’.
11
  Similarly 
Souvarine’s Stalin was defined by four main characteristics: his ‘will 
to power’ was disproportionate to his ‘will to know’ (the same 
expression is used by Trotsky), his ‘narrow realism’, combined with a 
lack of appreciation of theory or general ideas, a religious education 
‘overlaid with a travesty of Marxism’ and lastly an oriental dexterity 
in ‘intrigue, unscrupulousness, lack of sensitiveness in personal 
relations, and scorn of men and human life’.
12
  Souvarine’s Stalin was 
extremely close to Trotsky’s: he was not a man of ideas but one with 
‘small aptitude for intellectual work’. He was neither sophisticated 
nor refined and throughout his revolutionary years ‘he remained 
provincial’.
13
 Deutscher similarly highlighted Stalin’s lack of 
remarkability, stating from the start that ‘What was striking in the 
General Secretary was that there was nothing striking about him’ and 
that he had an ‘almost impersonal personality’.
 14
 These 
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characterisations of Stalin may owe something to Karl Marx’s similar 
description of Napoleon III: ‘the class war in France created 
circumstances and relationships that enabled a grotesque mediocrity 
to strut about in a hero’s garb.’
15
 
However, for Deutscher this apparent nature of Stalin was part of 
an image that was cultivated and whose purpose was to conceal the 
real character, thoughts and intentions of the man. This is made 
apparent by Deutscher’s repeated implications that Stalin’s outward 
persona was a deception: ‘His bearing seemed of the utmost 
modesty’, ‘This [his ability to listen] was one of his qualities which 
seemed to indicate any lack of egotism’, ‘In the Politburo when 
matters of high policy were under debate, he never seemed to impose 
his views on his colleagues’, and finally:  
 
To party audiences he appeared as a man without personal 
grudge and rancour, as a detached Leninist, a guardian of the 
doctrine who criticised others only for the sake of the cause. 
He gave this impression even when he spoke behind the 




Indeed, the reinforcement of Stalin’s lack of remarkability and 
his general inferiority was matched only by the emphasis on his 
cruelty and duplicity, highlighting his danger and untrustworthiness. 
Eastman described Stalin’s approach to discrediting Trotsky during 
the battle for power as a campaign of falsification where Trotsky’s 
words were ‘snatched violently out of context’ and in which he had 
figuratively ‘walked up and hit Trotsky over the head with a club’. He 
was ‘dishonest’ and he ‘fell back upon brutality in order to beat 
Trotsky’s clear arguments’.
17
 Trotsky’s own descriptions included 
‘Undoubtedly characteristic of Stalin is personal, physical cruelty, 
                                                                                                                  
for reality, since Stalin had his own political and theoretical ideas, and some 
personal qualities that affected his political style and policies, which were ‘out of 
the ordinary’. See R. C. Tucker, ‘Several Stalins’ in R. C. Tucker (ed.), The Soviet 
Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change (London, 1972), p.110. 
Nevertheless, this was Deutscher’s Stalin from the vantage point of the late 1940s 
before the benefit of historical distance might influence him otherwise. 
15
 K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (London, 1926), p. 17 
16
 Deutscher, Stalin, pp.274-275 
17




what is usually called sadism’
18
, ‘complaints about his 'poisonous 
cynicism', his rudeness and his vengefulness, occur many, many times 
during Koba's life’.
19
 Stalin’s ethnicity was in large part to blame for 
what Trotsky saw as distinctly non- Russian characteristics.
20
 
Souvarine drew direct comparisons between Stalin and Machiavelli, 
referring to the cheating and duplicity which characterised them both: 
‘On all points an intuitive Machiavellism guided him, often in its 
lowest form. The art of disguising his thoughts has no more secrets 
for him, his power of dissimulation equals his knowledge of 
provocation’.
21
 Souvarine’s Stalin was Machiavellian, brutal and 
crude. For Deutscher, as for Souvarine and Trotsky, Stalin was 
deceitful, untrustworthy and insecure. He used ‘chicanery and 
trickery’ to rule and aspired to be the sole spiritual leader of his 
generation, in part ‘because his vanity had been hurt by the 
intellectual elite not noticing him’ from the off.
22
  
Key characteristics were therefore identified and repeatedly 
reinforced by each author: Stalin was determined, sly, bold and 
ambitious. These facets of his personality were as close as the authors 
got to conceding any qualities to Stalin. More prominent was Stalin as 
a spiteful, provincial, unrefined and mediocre bureaucrat.
23
  In this 
way, they explicitly differentiated Stalin from themselves and from 
the intended path of socialism in the Soviet Union. In Trotsky’s case 
especially Stalin was repeatedly subordinated: Trotsky wrote that 
Stalin’s ‘intellect remained immeasurably inferior to his will’
24
, with 
this point of intellect seemingly crucial. His repeated attacks on 
Stalin’s shortcomings in these areas provided a method by which to 
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elevate himself above Stalin, despite having lost against him in the 
power struggle. Trotsky appeared to ask his reader to not only ask but 
to be outraged at how an unsophisticated, unintelligent yob such as 
Stalin – ‘[h]is thinking is too slow, his associations too single-
tracked…When he desires to produce forceful effect he resorts to vile 
expressions’
25
 –  could have taken a place that was, in Trotsky’s 
opinion, rightfully his.
 
 This replicated the emphasis on these traits in 
Deutscher and Souvarine’s works, and this implicitly but clearly 
differentiated Stalin not from only the author but also from Lenin and 
socialism.  
The second strand of othering in evidence more closely 
resembles the Orientalist model and its tendency to emphasise 
specific national or regional traits perceived as innate and 
unchanging. It is predominantly present in Deutscher’s systematic 
comparisons of Stalin to previous Russian leaders. Writing towards 
the end of Stalin’s life in 1949, and with the majority of the Stalinist 
regime to reflect upon, Deutscher found similarities in the autocratic 
rule and characteristics of many of them, including Nicholas I, Peter 
the Great, Alexander I, and Ivan the Terrible.
26
 He likened, for 
example, the Stalin of the Second World War years to ‘Ivan the 
Terrible raging against the boyars’, whereas the earlier 
industrialisation push made him look ‘more like Peter the Great's 
direct descendant: was he not building industrial Russia in a way 
similar to that in which Peter the Great built his St Petersburg, on the 
swamps and on the bones of the builders?’.
27
 He remarked on the 
similarity of Stalin’s ‘ferocious spirit of empire building’ to that of 
the early tsars and believed that events now followed a path ‘familiar 
from the history of Russian autocracy’.
28
 These comparisons suggest 
that Deutscher’s Stalin was not a historical aberration but a 
continuation of a Russian political tradition of leadership largely 
disconnected from the socialist revolution he was meant to be the 
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vanguard of. As Tucker has pointed out, Deutscher’s Stalin was not a 
Marxist theorist or a man of ideas. He was principally a pragmatist 
concerned with making things work.
29
 This did not mean that 
Deutscher maintained a neutral stand regarding Stalin’s character. 
Despite the unremarkable nature of his private life, ‘beyond reproach 
or suspicion’
30
, Deutscher’s Stalin was hardly inoffensive, not least 
due to these perceived similarities with some of Russia’s past leaders. 
Deutscher, however, clearly expressed that Stalin was not a surprise, 
nor someone out of the ordinary: for example, ‘his chicanery and 
trickery’ were the methods by which ‘rulers of all ages and countries 
had held their people in subjection’.
31
 Stalin was not unique; he was 
an almost predictable leader of Russia.
32
  
Deutscher, Trotsky and Souvarine were not alone in writing 
on Stalin in the West during this period and so not all works were 
written by anti-Stalinists or socialists who were trying to distance 
themselves from his regime. On the pro-Stalin front there were a 
number of publications, such as that of the French communist writer 
Henri Barbusse, which conveyed adoration of their subject, providing 
a striking contrast to the anti-Stalinists and a revelatory insight into 
the way in which Soviet sympathisers and loyal communists viewed 
Stalin at this time: Stalin was a man of simple and humble needs and 
manner, who was kind and gentle, but also brilliant.
33
 In this way we 
see what the anti-Stalinists perceived as Stalin’s provincialism and 
mediocrity depicted instead as desirable traits of simplicity and 
humility. His deceitfulness and slyness became cleverness and 
brilliance. Barbusse’s text, for instance, was dense with these 
alternative depictions: the young revolutionary Stalin was able, 
through his simple manner, to relate to, and talk with, the workers 
around him: ‘This sort of genius of his for putting himself on a level 
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with his audience is the real reason for the confidence which he 
inspired in the people’.
34
 Yet ‘putting oneself on a level does not 
mean lowering oneself or humbling oneself or becoming stupidly 
familiar. Very far from it.’
35
 He was softly spoken – ‘violent language 
was for him a prohibited weapon’
36
 – with ‘a wonderful intuition’
37
, 
loved to laugh and was a family man. According to Barbusse, Stalin 
laughed like a child, concluding that ‘[p]eople who laugh like 
children love children'.
38
 Thus Barbusse’s Stalin was intelligent and 
humorous, but also modest and low-key.  
Barbusse did acknowledge that Stalin could be ‘severe, even 
ruthless, towards incompetence and inexorable in dealing with 
treachery or sabotage’. As with the other seemingly undesirable 
characteristics, this intolerance was presented as more of a virtue than 
a fault and as a necessary trait in a great leader. Indeed, the statement 
was immediately followed by a ‘but’: ‘But a whole series of cases 
may be quoted in which he warmly intervened in favour of men who 
seemed to him to have been accused without sufficient proof’.
 39
 
Barbusse responded to critics of Stalin by stating that the case was 
simply that ‘He is leader for the same reason that he is successful: 
because he is right’ and recounted telling Stalin that in some countries 
he was seen as acting ‘merely according to his fancy’ and as a 
‘bloody tyrant’. Stalin’s response was to lean back in his chair and 
‘burst into his hearty working-man's laugh’.
40
 Barbusse’s Stalin was 
so definitively not the tyrant he had been portrayed to be that it was 
veritably hilarious to claim otherwise. 
Somewhere between the anti-Stalinists and Barbusse were 
authors such as Bertram D. Wolfe, who was an American scholar of 
German origin and who, for the first half of his adult life, was a 
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socialist and supporter of the Bolsheviks as well as a founding 
member of the American Communist Party. Later in life he drifted 
right and became a leading anti-communist during the Cold War. 
41
 
However, at the time he wrote his book Three Who Made a 
Revolution, the Second World War had just ended and he sought to 
understand the three personalities at the centre of events in the USSR:  
Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky. The book was first published in 1948 and 
represented a turning point in the historiography of Stalin: after 
Trotsky’s book, it was the first to systematically compare and 
critically examine previous historiography in order to consolidate the 
information into the most valid picture possible. Nevertheless, it 
becomes clear that when it came to Stalin’s personality, Wolfe was 
somewhat defeated by the lack of information available to him. His 
research into Stalin’s character was ‘beset with obscurities and 
contradictions at every step’, and he remarked that: 
 
When one writes of a still living man it would surely seem a 
simple matter to put moot points up to him, and then, since no 
man is to be fully trusted as to his own opinion of himself, to 
check his answers against records, the testimony of 
neighbours, friends, associates, opponents. But in Stalin's case 
this is not as simple as it sounds. The versions he himself has 





Despite these obstacles, Wolfe conducted a thorough analysis of the 
works that were more readily available to him, such as the Stalin 
biographies that had been written to date (official and authorised 
works, as well as those of the Georgian memoirists), which led him to 
exclaim: ‘Strange fact: in none of Stalin's biographies does he come 
to life!’
43
 A description of Stalin’s personality was confined to the 
statement that he was the subject of an ‘amazing cult that leaves no 
room for fallibility, or common humanity’, though Wolfe was still left 
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confused by the overall portrait of Stalin the man and found the 
mystery surrounding him ever thickening.
44
 This sentiment was in 
fact replicated in much of the war and post-war Western biographical 
writing on Stalin.  While Wolfe had been a socialist, Stalin’s 
increased direct relevance to the West as a result of the war generated 
a spate of writing in which Westerners became concerned with trying 
to understand exactly who he was. The biographical writings of the 
time betrayed a residual wartime anxiety and the unease of the West 
with the rising power of the Soviet Union and with the man at its 
helm. These works were attempts to decipher who Stalin was, what 
drove him, and what his intentions were. In the simplest of terms, 
they were trying to ascertain whether he was a goody or a baddy.
45
   
The variety of the content of these works demonstrates that in 
this period in the West Stalin could still be both hero and villain. It is 
clear through Barbusse’s work that supporters of the Soviet Union 
saw Stalin as a heroic figure and to some he was even a kind of demi-
God.
46
 This was perfectly illustrated in the closing sentences of 
Barbusse’s ‘The Man at the Wheel’ chapter, which were heavily 
laden with religious terminology:  
 
Although you do not know him, he knows you and is thinking 
of you. Whoever you may be, the finest part of your destiny is 
in the hands of that other man, who also watches over you, 
and who works for you – the man with a scholar’s mind, a 
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Building on Reinke de Buitrago’s identification of positive elements 
in othering, Barbusse’s work can be seen to manifest ‘positive 
othering’, a process whereby positive content far outweighs, or 
entirely eclipses, negative content. Barbusse, for instance explicitly 
elevated Stalin above any other being, differentiating him and giving 
him, as we have seen, an almost divine status, the distinction being 
therefore that Stalin possessed such a wealth of positive attributes 
(and nearly none that were negative) that he was also unlike the self.
 
48
  In this way, the negative aspects highlighted in conventional 
othering are replaced by their opposite, yet there remains a key 
differentiation between the self and the other. Barbusse did not in any 
respect liken himself to Stalin or claim to possess similar traits but 
instead reinforced Stalin’s extra-ordinary skills and character: ‘This 
leader, who had fathomed the secrets of success and had brought them 
to such a pitch of perfection’
49
, ‘[Stalin’s] lightening-like promptness 




All of these depictions of Stalin suggest that the most decisive 
anti-Stalinists of this period were those who were or had been 
sympathetic to Trotsky. Wolfe, whose own political views were 
ambivalent, wavered noticeably in the middle, unable to decipher the 
true character of the man. For Souvarine and Deutscher, however, 
Trotsky provided first-hand experience of Stalin, as well as his close 
relations with, and in-depth knowledge of, the Soviet political scene. 
They, in turn, used this to propagate and develop those ideas of Stalin 
not only as a mediocrity but also as a brutal, untrustworthy and 
destructive leader. In doing so, Stalin as the ideological and 
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intellectual other formed the basis of these three historically 
influential works. 
Nevertheless, it was not only the works by the anti- Stalinists 
that demonstrated othering of Stalin by the West. As highlighted by 
Reinke de Buitrago, othering is not solely manifested through 
negative representations: the difference between the self and the other 
‘can also be described with more positive content, such as admiration 
for certain achievements, or at least some level of recognition and 
toleration. Positive and negative content can vary, and many cases 
show a mélange of elements in a complex relationship’.
51
 This mix 
was in particular reflected in the wartime and post-war literature, 
through which we understand that the experiences of the war and the 
decade following led Stalin to be seen as a component part of an 
impressive and powerful, although not yet necessarily highly 
threatening, other (the Soviet Union). H.C. O’Neill, David M. Cole, 
Walter Duranty and Wolfe were all concerned with the little-known 
man at the head of the Soviet Union and, in turn, were both positive 
and negative in their assessments of him. Duranty, for example, 
described Stalin at once as ‘hard and cruel’ as well as patient, 
determined and eager.
52
 Cole described him on the one hand as a 
‘loyal friend and generous colleague’, yet acknowledged that ‘Woe 
betide them if they do not [work for the general good of the State]; a 





3. On Stalinism 
 
An analysis of how these works approached Stalinism as a regime 
reveals further patterns of othering, some of which again contain 
elements of Orientalist discourse. In the first instance, the most often 
repeated characterisation of Stalinism was as a break from Marxism-
                                                 
51
 Reinke de Biutrago, ‘Introduction: Othering in International Relations: 
Significance and Implications’, p.xv 
52
 Duranty, Stalin & Co., pp.36-38 
53




Leninism, and from Trotskyism, and these are particularly well 
reflected in the works of Souvarine, Wolfe and Trotsky. Souvarine, 
for instance, explicitly stated this by describing Stalin’s leadership as 
a ‘travesty of Marxism’, but also expressed it in the way he wrote 
about the purges, the scale of persecution by the regime and the 
development of the cult of personality. Souvarine’s biography of 
Stalin was first published in French in 1935, with the first English 
edition appearing in 1939. The English edition contained a post-script 
that dealt with events up to 1937, to the extent to which Souvarine 
was able to observe them.
54
 From his vantage point Souvarine stated 
that ‘the year 1937 will be less held in honour as the twentieth 
anniversary of October and the conclusion of the second Five Year 
Plan than in dishonour as the culminating phase of an autocratic terror 
unprecedented in human memory’.
55
 Despite the closeness of these 
events, Souvarine was able to offer his own analysis of the situation. 
He did so in part by noting several key phases in the rise of Stalin: the 
political defeats of Trotsky in 1923, of Zinoviev in 1925, of their 
coalition in 1927, of Bukharin in 1929. He believed that these all 
strengthened the dictatorship although, according to him, these 
defeats, which were followed by harsh reprisals against any remaining 
opponents, were the culmination of earlier developments.
56
 Souvarine 
saw the Kirov murder as a turning point, believing Stalin to be 
responsible though also stating it was an accidental outcome of a 
conflict between factions in high Soviet society, a ‘rivalry between 
two cliques, one of which had been able to arm or guide the hand of a 
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young and fanatical communist.’
57
 For Souvarine, the point at which 
the nature of the leadership was no longer the one that Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks had worked towards was Stalin’s fiftieth birthday 
celebrations on the 21
st
 December 1929. He described the 
extraordinary spectacle:  
 
According to the incense burners of his entourage, all human 
and some superhuman virtues were incarnate in Stalin. His 
modesty, courage and devotion were paralleled by his 
knowledge and wisdom. He was the organiser of the 
Bolshevik Party, the leader of the October Revolution, the 
head of the Red Army, and victor in the Civil War as well as 
in foreign war. He was moreover, the leader of the world 
proletariat. The man of action proved himself as great as the 
theorist, and both are infallible; there is no instance of a 




Souvarine observed these developments: the changes in attitude 
towards the leader, the propagation of cult-like literature, the giving 
of the name of Stalin to not only towns, but now also countless 
schools, factories and barracks.
59
 He repeated those qualities afforded 
to Stalin with irony and in inverted commas throughout the book: 
‘The 117 executions ordered by the 'great and beloved leader' after the 
crime…’ ‘Stalin ‘the adored’…’, ‘But during the interval 'the greatest 
man of our planet' as he is pleased to hear himself called…’.
60
 
Souvarine’s awareness of the cultish nature of Stalin’s regime is clear. 
As for the changes occurring, he remarked that ten years previously 
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there had been celebrations to mark the jubilee of Lenin, the ‘real 
initiator of Bolshevism, the actual founder of the Communist Party, 
the authentic victor of October, the true creator of the Soviet State’.
61
 
It was an intimate gathering, the record of it a ‘modest pamphlet’ of 
30 pages. Souvarine’s reporting of these events is important to 
understanding his Stalinism: it stood well apart from Lenin and 
Bolshevism. It was not a natural continuation of what Lenin had 
started: ‘between 1920 and 1930 a profound change had come over 
the Russian Revolution’.
62
  Souvarine believed Stalinism to be a 
radical departure from what came before, and Stalin himself was at 
the centre of it. This idea was echoed in the other works. For example, 
according to Wolfe, the decisive turning points of the regime that 
distanced it from the revolution were all marked by changes in the 
way in which the history of the revolution, the Soviet Union and 
Stalin were reported.  As Souvarine had, he marked 1929 as the first 
year of Stalin’s absolute rule, the beginning of the cult ‘which 
required the bringing of every moment of his past into accord with his 
present infinite glory’. This was followed by 1935, the year when 
Beria, then head of the Georgian Secret Police, went to work on the 
‘streamlining of the new history’
63
, then by the aforementioned purge 
years of 1936-1938, which altered the way in which memoirs were 
written. The next watershed was the year 1938, when Stalin himself 
took over the task of writing history in the originally anonymous 
official History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which 
now forms Volume XV of Stalin's Collected Works; and the year 
1946, when those Collected Works began to appear with biographical 
and other notes under Stalin's own supervision.  
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Wolfe’s Stalinism shows awareness, even before Stalin’s 
death, of the extent to which the Soviet government was reworking 
and rewriting the history of its leader, and of its revolution. His 
Stalinism was one of deceit, with an almighty cult at its centre which 
cultivated falsity and brutality. For Wolfe, as we understand through 
his use of Abel Enukidze’s story, these two elements were completely 
intertwined: the epicentre of Stalinism was the desperation of Stalin 
to be more than he was.
64
 This, in turn, led to the desperation of those 
around him to offer alternative histories, to glorify their leader far 
beyond that which was natural, with no guarantee whatsoever that this 
would save them from meeting an untimely end. It was this 
historiographical break, which Wolfe termed ‘How History is Made’ 
that provided the first decisive break from Lenin, stating that all 
memoirs, Party documents and reports of pre-revolutionary days that 
were written while Lenin was alive ‘have had to be ignored, explained 




Trotsky’s use of the term ‘Stalinism’ in his biography of 
Stalin - written during the 1940s, in the last few years of his life when 
he had watched the Stalinist regime unfold - can help to understand 
one of the most influential ways in which the regime has been 
interpreted. It provided an efficient method by which Trotsky was 
also able to distance Stalinism from Leninism, Marxism and 
Trotskyism. Throughout the book, the term Stalinism was often used 
to compare the regime with other political regimes or theories – a 
trend repeated in the other works examined in this chapter – and most 
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often in relation or in contrast to Trotskyism. In the book index, 
Stalinism is solely referenced in the format of ‘Stalinism and 
Bolshevism’, ‘Stalinism and Fascism’ or ‘Stalinism and Trotskyism’ 
and finally for Stalinism the reader should see ‘Stalin’.
66
 In the 
context of these comparisons Stalinism was ultimately pitched against 
Bolshevism: one either supported one or the other since Trotsky saw 
Stalin as executing a ‘triumph’ over Bolshevism. It was following this 
triumph that those who had previously been critical of Bolshevism, 
‘such as the Webbs, the Wellses and the Laskis’, had now become 
‘fellow - travellers of Stalinism’.
67
 For Trotsky adhering to Stalinism 
required turning your back on Bolshevism: the former was not a 
theoretical continuation of the latter, nor were there fundamental 
similarities between Stalinism, Fascism and Nazism. Indeed, Trotsky 
stated that the difference between the ‘social base of Stalin’s counter 
revolution’ and the ‘social base of the reactionary movements headed 
by Mussolini and Hitler’ ran parallel to the difference between 
dictatorships of the proletariat, ‘however distorted by Thermidorean 
bureaucracy’ and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, the ‘difference 
between a worker’s state and a capitalist state’.
68
 As for comparisons 
between Lenin and Stalin these were, he wrote, ‘simply indecent’.
69
 
The differences Trotsky established between Trotskyism and 
Stalinism in his writings indicate that he fundamentally disagreed 
with most, if not all, aspects of Stalinism. He was theoretically 
opposed to the notion of Socialism in One Country and the rise of the 
bureaucracy as a ruling class, and he believed Stalin to be an inferior 
politician, intellectual and man. The differences between Trotskyism 
and Stalinism were the essence of Trotsky’s writings. Outside of the 
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context of differentiation, the word Stalinism was barely used: 
Stalinism was the ultimate other. 
Yet for all their similarities, there were some notable 
differences between Trotsky’s and Deutscher’s interpretations of 
Stalinism, and it was these that led Deutscher to conclusions that 
eventually isolated him from the Trotskyists and pro-Stalinists alike. 
Deutscher, while starting out a Trotskyist, came to see Stalinism 
differently. After objecting to Trotsky’s 1938 attempt to launch a 
successor to the ‘morally dead’ Third International, he began 
searching for the answer to why Stalin had succeeded in acquiring 
power and why history had taken the course it had
70
. Deutscher 
concluded that the degeneration of the revolution had been present 
already when Lenin and Trotsky were in positions of leadership and 
power. Further, and even more controversially, he did not see 
Stalinism as a ‘Thermidorian bureaucracy’ - as it was described by 
Trotsky – subverting and arresting the revolutionary development but 
as a bureaucratised revolution itself carrying through that 
development ‘though in distorted form, with the barbarous means and 
semi-primitive outlook of its native surroundings’.
71
 It was through 
the development of these theories that Deutscher became so isolated 
during the first decade of the Cold War: the Stalinists damned him for 
maintaining his Marxist ideals and views on the debasement of the 
revolution. The Trotskyists denounced Deutscher for stating that 
however truncated and disfigured they were, the brutally realised 
achievements of Stalin were in fact revolutionary.
72
  
Deutscher’s tracing of the evolution of the purges and his 
search to understand how they were able to occur are one of the first 
instances in the historiography of an attempt to understand the 
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process itself, and it created links between Stalinism and Leninism.
73
 
Tracing the origins of the purges back to the early 1920s before Stalin 
was even in power clarified one of the ways in which Deutscher 
deviated from the Trotskyists: for him the concept of ‘purging’ the 
party was not a creation of Stalin’s, even if he ultimately changed its 
nature dramatically and gave the concept an entirely new meaning. 
The consequence of this was to give Lenin and Trotsky a certain 
amount of responsibility for what came after. In this sense, he saw 
Stalinism as a deviation from Leninism but did not construct it as the 
definitive other. However, by looking at differences between 
Stalinism and Trotskyism, the traditional socialist perspective and 
Nazism, Deutscher more explicitly summarised Stalin’s departure 
from the traditional Marxist outlook: 
 
It is easy to see how far Stalin drifted away from what had 
hitherto been the main stream of Socialist and Marxist 
thought. What his socialism had in common with the new 
society, as it had been imagined by Socialists of nearly all 
shades, was public ownership of the means of production and 
planning. It differed in the degradation to which it subjected 
some sections of the community and also in the recrudescence 
of glaring social inequalities amid the poverty which the 
revolution inherited from the past. But the root difference 
between Stalinism and the traditional Socialist outlook lay in 





On the other hand, we have seen that Deutscher drew repeated 
comparisons between Stalin and past Russian leaders. This 
demonstrates a dual othering process: firstly, Stalin himself was also 
compared with previous leaders, indicating an Orientalist tendency in 
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 In Said’s Orientalism this is represented by 
historical generalisations based on a common character, which do not 
account for unique contexts and individuals, and by the idea of the 
Orient being unchanging and unchangeable. As a result of this, the 
West has no need to alter its own intellectual models of 
interpretation.
76
 Deutscher’s comparisons suggest that there was a 
general Russian style of leadership and that it was unlikely to change, 
repeating itself through time, right up to and including Stalin. 
Secondly, Deutscher’s theoretical analysis of Stalinism led him to a 
systematic differentiation of Stalinism from Marxism, if not to a 
certain degree from Leninism. This reinforcement of the idea of the 
other’s deviation from the better self (here understood as Marxist or 
Bolshevik) therefore rendered it at once inferior and dangerous. This 
was a process which replicated two of the main ‘dogmas’ of  
Orientalism, as defined by Said, in which the Orient was firstly 
systematically defined as the ‘aberrant, undeveloped, inferior’ other to 
the ‘rational, developed, humane, superior’ West, and secondly that 
the Orient, as a result of its inferior, backward and unchanging nature, 




In one sense, this first Stalinist other emerged still connected to 
Bolshevism and Marxism, since it was often expressed as a deviation 
from these ideologies rather an entity with which they had no 
common ground. However, Trotsky, Souvarine and Deutscher all 
explicitly distinguished Stalin and Stalinism from these. Their 
understanding of the regime enabled them to draw comparisons with 
their own ideological beliefs, and their aversion to Stalin led them to 
construct him as an other. The process through which they achieved 
this has manifested itself in the constant reassertion of his inferior and 
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undesirable traits, and of his break from Marxism and Leninism in 
theoretical matters and matters of practical leadership. 
As well as these individuals distancing themselves from Stalin, by 
highlighting the economic and industrial successes of Stalin’s Soviet 
Union, other works of this time demonstrated othering of Stalinism. 
However, these were more consistent with the constructions identified 
by Neumann in Western othering of Russia during this period, 
notably as a legitimate consideration for a post-capitalist world. There 
was a radical chic in celebrating Russia, perhaps best exemplified by 
the British socialist economists Sydney and Beatrice Webb in their 
works on Stalinist Soviet Union: ‘We do not think that the Party is 
governed by the will of a single person; or that Stalin is the sort of 
person to claim or desire such a position’
78
, ‘Stalin is now universally 
considered to have justified his leadership by success; first by 
overcoming the very real difficulties of 1925; then in surmounting the 
obstacle of the peasant recalcitrance in 1930-1933; and finally in the 
successive triumphs of the Five-Year plan’. The Webbs celebrated the 
Soviet Union as a progressive land of plenty.
79
 Walter Duranty, the 
Anglo-American journalist and great supporter of Stalin, also wrote 
of Stalinism’s success: ‘the fact remains that the [First Five-Year] 
plan laid the firm foundation of a large-scale modern industry in 
Russia’
80
. David M. Cole summarised these varying interpretations of 
early Stalinism of this period particularly well, stating that ‘The future 
historians of twentieth-century Russia will characterize the years 
1928-1934 as the “era of Socialist Construction” or as the “age of 
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4. Exiles and émigrés: writing on Stalinism in the 1930s and 
1940s 
 
Cole’s statement was apt. Indeed, the first and most striking common 
aspect of the works written on Stalin during this period relates to their 
authors and their experiences with the 1917 revolution and the Soviet 
Union, revealing much about the motives impelling these men to 
write about Stalin. The earliest example of this is Eastman, who at the 
time of writing Since Lenin Died had spent the two years leading up 
to Lenin’s death in the Soviet Union.
82
 Bazhanov had escaped the 
USSR, but his activities were closely watched by Stalin. He was the 
victim of several assassination attempts during his life and never 
married, fearing his frequent denunciations of the Stalinist regime 
would leave either him or his wife without a spouse, victims of the 
Stalin’s vengeance.
83
 Bazhanov’s entire life, and his writings, were 
dedicated to raising awareness of the horrors of Stalinism and its 
threat to the West.
84
 Nussimbaum’s mother had been part of the 
underground social democratic movements in Baku before the 1917 
revolution, the very same movement that Stalin had been a key 
provocateur in. Nussimbaum was bitter towards his mother, who he 
felt had ‘poisoned’ his life. However, many of his personal letters 
reveal a displaced bitterness expressed instead towards Stalin: ‘He 
took my homeland away from me, the house, everything’.
85
 
Souvarine’s, Deutscher’s and Trotsky’s political lives were also 
inextricably linked to the Soviet Union. Souvarine was born in Kiev 
in 1895 but his family moved to Paris, and he later became a 
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journalist for the socialist Press. He was actively involved in the 
Comintern: in 1919 he became secretary to the Committee of the third 
International, and a year later became a member of the Comintern. He 
travelled to Moscow and stayed there for several years until he was 
expelled in 1924 because he aligned himself with Trotsky. When he 
returned to Paris the next year, he set up an oppositional communist 
group but eventually also came into conflict with Trotsky, and broke 
with him in 1929.
86
 Trotsky, possibly the most high profile and 
outspoken anti-Stalinist of the time, and indeed the most recognisable 
anti-Stalinist in history, was also a Socialist, Bolshevik and Leninist, 
who was exiled abroad after losing the battle for power against Stalin. 
Trotsky eventually settled in Mexico where he continued to write on 
his nemesis and his regime before his assassination in 1940.
 
Trotsky, 
as Stalin’s opponent in the struggle for power after Lenin’s death, has 
continued to be at the forefront of debate and interest not only due to 
his role and activities during the 1917 Revolution but also thanks to 
his prolific writing.
87
 Deutscher too was directly involved in Soviet 
communism. Around 1926, at the age of nineteen, he joined the 
Polish Communist Party, but he began to voice criticisms of the 
Party’s programme and role as he grew uneasy with the state of the 
revolution in Russia, which he felt was succumbing to the chauvinism 
and backwardness of its national environment. He was expelled from 
the party in 1932, and during the next year he joined the Trotskyist 
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opposition, attempting to generate resistance on the left to the trials 
and terror occurring in Soviet Russia.
88
 
All three wrote their works on Stalin only after they had 
become estranged from the regime. Souvarine withdrew from politics 
and in 1935 published one of the earliest and most influential works 
published on Stalin in the West in French under the title Staline: 
Aper u histori ue du bolch visme .
89
 Souvarine’s book is a 
particularly interesting historiographical work because it was written 
after the beginnings of collectivisation and the Five Year Plans, but 
before the Great Purges of the late 1930s and the rolling momentum 
of the public trials. It is one of the pioneering works on Stalin for the 
wealth of information it contains and for being one of the first 
complete works on the man, his career and his regime.
90
 Trotsky too 
was abroad, exiled in Mexico, as he wrote his biography of Stalin. 
First published in 1947, Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His 
Influence had still been a work in progress when Trotsky was 
assassinated in 1940 by an apparent courier who stabbed him with a 
pick axe. There was a tragic symbolism, Deutscher said, in the fact 
that the blood from Trotsky’s head splattered the sheets of paper on 
which he had written his account of Stalin’s career.
91
 By the time he 
came to write about Stalin, Deutscher too had become politically 
remote. Despite having left the Party, when it came to joining 
Trotsky’s calls for a Fourth International in 1938, Deutscher had 
baulked. His rejection of Stalinism and his divergence from 
Trotskyism led him to be an isolated but eventually influential 
historian. He wrote his biography of Stalin in the late 1940s, and it 
was eventually published in 1949. 
There are two principal ways in which the works of these 
authors are unique in the historiography of Stalin and Stalinism. The 
first is that these writers were publishing works while the regime was 
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still in existence, and quite aside from the way in which they are 
analysed in this study, they are an indication of the remarkable 
awareness that those who had been involved in the Soviet Union had 
of events within it once Stalin’s regime gained momentum. Secondly, 
these writers were not historians, nor political scientists by profession. 
Rather, they were spurred on to research and write on Stalin by the 
evolution of their own experiences and political convictions, moulded 
by their reactions to the Stalinist regime and drawing on those sources 
and resources that they could access in order to write their histories. 
As a result, their source material almost all stems from personal 
experience and direct access to people, events and literature from 
within the Soviet Union. Trotsky, for instance, mostly drew on first-
hand experience. He knew Stalin, Lenin and all of the Bolsheviks and 
Party members well. He had attended meetings up until the late 
1920s, and he understood the dynamics of the party.
92
 As Peter 
Beilharz highlights, Trotsky relied heavily on personal reminiscences 
and employed the first person throughout the book, underlining his 
personal involvement and familiarity with the subject at hand. In fact, 
the depth of Trotsky’s knowledge led him to provide excessive detail 




The young Isaac Deutscher was regarded by the Polish 
Communist Party of which he was a member as a rising star, an 
intellectual with a firm grip of theory, destined to be a key figure in 
the party. As part of the grooming process he was sent to visit 
Moscow in 1931. But rather than strengthening his dedication to 
communism, the trip weakened it. Deutscher had already developed 
some misgivings about trends and practices within his own party. 
When he arrived in Moscow and spent time with party members 
there, he was able to grasp the extent of the ‘passion and bitterness’ of 
the inner party struggle. Furthermore, in visiting Russia in the 
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aftermath of collectivisation, Deutscher became dimly aware of acute 
social tensions.
94
 A biographical article on Deutscher stated that ‘even 
before the Russian journey he had started to gather material for his 
first book.’
95
 This was not the Stalin biography but a publication on 
the Jozef Pilsudski regime, and it suggests that Deutscher was 
‘gathering’ sources both in Poland and on his first trip to Russia. In 
Poland he read the opposition paper which Trotsky had begun 
publishing in 1929, the Bulletin Oppozitsii, in which he found his own 
apprehensions about Stalin being echoed. David Singer dates the start 
of Deutscher’s admiration for Trotsky to this period.
96
  For a brief 
period in the mid-1930s, just around the time that the public trials 
began in Russia, Deutscher joined the Polish Socialist Party, anti-
Stalinists who fought hard to denounce the regime. Deutscher was 
living and fighting against Stalinism as it occurred, aware of what 
was happening inside the Soviet Union. In 1939 he left Poland and 
settled in London. 
 It was not until 1947 that he began the manuscript for his 
Stalin biography, but it was finished only eighteen months later. It 
had been so quick to write because Deutscher had all the data at his 
fingertips. He had been in the thick of opposition in Poland and had 
remained acutely aware of all the events in the Soviet Union, their 
scale and significance. Like Trotsky, Deutscher’s sources were his 
own experiences and involvement in the events themselves, his 
extensive theoretical knowledge and his wide reading. His 
bibliography contains many secondary sources of political histories of 
the Second World War and of the nations involved. He read memoirs, 
the Soviet press and court reports from the trials. The amalgamation 
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of this information allowed him to write one of the most 
comprehensive pre- Cold War works on Stalin and Stalinism.
97
 
Souvarine’s work was also informed by direct involvement 
with the Communist party. After the First World War, Souvarine 
became the international affairs secretary to the Committee for the 
Third International. Souvarine was thorough in his bibliographical 
references. The first French edition of his work on Stalin contained a 
bibliography of no less than twenty five pages containing hundreds of 
sources from inside and outside the Soviet Union. Yet this did not 
even include the sources he used relating to general history and pre-
Bolshevik theoretical works. Nor did it contain the biographies of 
revolutionaries of other schools of thought, nor statistical information, 
diplomatic texts, legislative documentation, monographs, nor the 
‘innumerable pamphlets, journal and press articles which were of use 
to the author’.
98
  While Trotsky had not yet written his biography of 
Stalin, Souvarine referenced many of his articles published from the 
early 1920s through to the 1930s, which covered Trotsky’s time as a 
member and then non-member of the party.
99
 Souvarine’s 
bibliography indicates that he read as widely and as thoroughly as it 
was possible. The sheer volume of his named sources indicates that 
he was able to access the information he needed at this time in order 
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It is clear then that at this stage the major works being 
published in the West were being written by individuals who were in 
some way ideologically or personally invested in the Soviet Union. 
This is also true of other notable works on Stalin which emerged 
during this period, although this personal affiliation was not always 
the result of alienation or opposition. Henri Barbusse was at the 
opposite end of the spectrum to Souvarine and Trotsky. A French 
novelist, journalist and left-wing activist who rose to fame after the 
publication of his graphic anti-war novel Le Feu, which Barbusse 
based on his own experiences fighting in the First World War. He 
also became known for his tireless and vocal defence of the Stalinist 
regime. He joined the Bolshevik Party in Moscow, and later became a 
member of the French Communist Party. A long standing supporter of 
Stalin and the Soviet Union, where he spent a considerable amount of 
time, his biography of Stalin Staline: Un Monde Nouveau Vu A 
Travers Un Homme was published in 1935, the year he died.
101
 
Barbusse and the previous three authors represent the extremes of 
pro- and anti-Stalinism, and yet they share the common characteristic 
of being ideologically and politically tied to Stalin and his regime. 
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5. Conclusion: Trotskyism and the Stalinist other 
 
We have seen that in most of the cases examined here these early 
works on Stalin stemmed from personal political conviction rather 
than academic exercise or wider international political issues, 
although the latter do start to play a certain part in writing on Stalin 
after the Second World War. Trotsky, Souvarine and Deutscher all 
began by supporting the Bolsheviks, yet Trotsky’s loss of power and 
the anti-Stalinism that followed provided those who developed doubts 
about Stalin with an alternative belief to follow, which, importantly, 
did not require a total break from socialism. Since Lenin Died was a 
denunciation of Stalin and defence of Trotsky. Eastman believed that 
Stalin’s actions in the power struggle could be explained by Stalin’s 
own awareness of his lack of Trotsky’s many desirable traits. He saw 
Trotsky bringing to the battle ‘all the powers of his personality, his art 
of objective and concise thinking, his mastery of Marxism, and of the 
method of Lenin, his sensitivity to political facts, and his great literary 
skill’.
102
 In the face of this, Stalin’s only weapon was his ‘brutality’, 
and he used it to deceive and ultimately defeat Trotsky.
103
  In later 
years, Trotskyism became central to constructions of the Stalinist 
other in the works of Souvarine and Deutscher. Although Souvarine 
wrote his book on Stalin before Trotsky, we know that he initially 
adhered to Trotskyism, and through the depth of his research was able 
to expose the problems with Stalinism as early as 1935, before even 
the most intense period of the purges had occurred. Deutscher’s 
reflective effort to understand the success of Stalin eventually led to 
his isolation from both Marxists and Trotskyists, but it was Trotsky 
who allowed him to place his early apprehension about Stalinism into 
an interpretative and conceptual framework. The evolution of Wolfe’s 
feelings towards Stalin was clearer by the time he came to write Three 
Who Made a Revolution: he was a communist still, but he had turned 
away from the Soviet Union.  
                                                 
102






Thus, Souvarine’ and Deutscher’s stance, which produced two 
of the most influential Western works on Stalin and Stalinism of this 
period, stemmed from the opportunity presented to them by Trotsky’s 
theoretical distancing from Stalinism, even if they later diverged from 
one another. Wolfe’s work also came from a deviation from his 
original ideological stance. He did not suggest a particular allegiance 
to Trotsky; nevertheless, Trotsky’s works were heavily referenced in 
his book as he sought to expose the problems of Stalinism. It was 
therefore Trotsky’s thought and work which provided the basis for the 
first ‘self’ to the Stalinist other in Western publications. For 
Souvarine, Deutscher and Trotsky, Stalin and his regime epitomised 
everything which they were not and did not believe in, and their 
reassertions of his personal and political deviancy, inferiority and 
threat represented a clear process of this othering. In the Stalinist 
camp, Barbusse’s and the Webbs’ positive othering also constructed 
Stalin as an other, only in this case one that could be elevated to a 
higher, godlike plane: he was a dynamic, positive and benevolent 
force who not only watched over his people and protected them, but 
who also drove his country forwards. 
Ultimately all of the individuals writing at this time were in 
some way directly affected by Stalin and his regime, and many were 
above all immeasurably bound in their writings by their own personal, 
political and theoretical engagement with Stalin and Stalinism. It is 
through these very first works that the Stalinist other first emerged in 
Western historiography: Stalin was mediocre and unremarkable, yet 
also Machiavellian, cunning and cruel. There was already an 
awareness of the violent and tyrannical nature of his regime, which 
was presented as a gross deviation from Leninism and one which bore 
little resemblance to the socialism that he had envisaged. This 
emergent basic understanding of the nature of Stalinism as brutal and 
repressive and headed by a sly and ruthless leader has largely 
remained intact. Yet with the advent of the Cold War in 1947, the 
terms within which Stalin and his regime were researched and 






Conflict of the Two Worlds: 





1. Introduction: the Cold War 
 
From the end of the Second World War, the foundations of Western 
scholarship on Stalin and Stalinism altered radically. The key to 
understanding the resulting shift in the basis of the constructions of 
Stalin and his regime from the period covered in the previous chapter 
can predominantly be found in the impact of the unique context 
provided by the ensuing Cold War. There have been some thorough 
evaluations of the ways in which the notion of totalitarianism has 
been used by scholars in the West in their assessments of the how and 
why of Stalinism during the Cold War, notably by David D. Roberts 
and Abbott Gleason. Roberts, for instance, explored at length the 
variety of ways in which Stalinist totalitarianism has been interpreted 
in relation to Marxism, Leninism and a specific Russian model of 
history, while Gleason similarly looked at the interaction of Western 
scholars with this term, providing a more succinct summary of the 
evolution of this process over the Cold War period.
2
 Ronald Suny has 
also given a concise assessment of the impact of the Cold War and the 
simultaneous emergence of modernisation theory on the field during 
this period.
3
 Further, there exists a vast body of work dedicated to the 
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notion of totalitarianism itself that explores its contexts and meanings, 
which have evolved over the twentieth century and beyond. With 
these assessments already providing a vast and rich source of 
information on Cold War totalitarian historiography, this chapter aims 
to shed light on one specific aspect of it within the field of Soviet 
studies: the construction of Stalinism as the ‘totalitarian other’. 
 
2. The totalitarian other 
 
The construction of the totalitarian other, Stalinist or otherwise, did 
not begin in the West with the advent of the Cold War. At least a 
decade earlier there were manifestations of this process in other 
forms. For example, Philip Williamson’s analysis of English 
Christian responses to totalitarianism in the 1933-1940 period 
demonstrates how in public political and religious discourse in pre-
wartime Britain the possibility of subordination to totalitarianism 
(here principally Nazism) was seen by many influential conservative 
Christians as unchristian, weak and morally wrong. This, in turn, 
hugely influenced popular opinion towards supporting the war, 
suggesting that well before the Cold War the idea and threat of the 
totalitarian other was being constructed and deployed to strong 
effect.
4
 Later, during the war, Winston Churchill also pitched the fight 
against totalitarianism as the fight for Christian civilisation, in terms 
reminiscent of some of the earliest forms of othering of Russia by 
Christian Europe outlined in the Introduction: ‘Here in this strong 
City of Refuge which enshrines the title-deeds of human progress and 
is of deep consequence to Christian civilisation. . .; here ... we await 
undismayed the impending assault’.
5
 Tom Lawson’s study of the 
response of the Church of England to Nazism highlights, too, how 
Nazism and Soviet communism were already in the 1930s seen as 
innately similar in their ‘totalitarian brutality’ and as a threat to the 
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Christian world. The war with Nazism ‘was a war for Christianity’ 
and, as a result, so was war against Stalinism.
6
 
From the 1940s to the 1960s, however, a political and 
ideological concept of totalitarianism came to the fore and became 
embedded in Western scholarship, framing how Stalinism would be 
studied and interpreted; this was reflected in an exclusive focus on the 
political sphere, named the ‘totalitarian-model’ of interpretation. The 
opening line of Abbott Gleason’s Totalitarianism stated that 
‘Totalitarianism was the great mobilizing and unifying concept of the 
Cold War’.
7
 Implicit in this statement was that the West was being 
mobilized and unified against the great totalitarian other, exemplified 
in many of the works on totalitarianism published in the Cold War 
era, which strove to highlight the striking differences between 
totalitarianism and Western liberal democracy. An example of this 
can be found in The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (1952), where 
Israeli historian Jacob Talmon coined the terms ‘totalitarian 
democracy’ and ‘political Messianism’. Talmon defined the 
totalitarian democratic school as based upon the assumption of a sole 
and exclusive truth in politics. He called this ‘political Messianism’ 
because it suggested a preordained, harmonious and perfect scheme of 
things to which men are irresistibly driven and at which they are 
bound to arrive. It recognises ultimately only the political sphere of 
existence, and widens the scope of politics to embrace the whole of 
human existence. It treats all human thought and action as having 
social significance and therefore as falling within the orbit of political 
action. Its political ideas are not a set of pragmatic precepts or a body 
of devices applicable to a ‘special branch of human endeavour’. They 
are an integral part of an all-embracing and coherent philosophy. As a 
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result, ‘politics is defined as the art of applying this philosophy to the 
organization of society, and the final purpose of politics is only 
achieved when this philosophy reigns supreme over all fields of life’. 
8
 Talmon clearly differentiated this from Western liberal democracy, 
which, on the other hand, assumes politics to be a matter of ‘trial and 
error, and regards political systems as pragmatic contrivances of 
human ingenuity and spontaneity.’ It also recognises a variety of 
levels of personal and collective endeavour, which are altogether 
outside the sphere of politics. The difference between the two is how 
they think of politics. Both ‘affirm the supreme value of liberty’. But 
whereas one (liberal democracy) finds the essence of freedom in 
spontaneity and the absence of coercion, the other (totalitarian 
democracy) believes it to be realised only in the pursuit and 
attainment of an absolute collective purpose. According to Talmon, 
the problem that arises for totalitarian democracy is the paradox of 
freedom, and he questioned whether human freedom is compatible 
with an exclusive pattern of social existence, even if this pattern aims 
at the maximum of social justice and security. The paradox of 
totalitarian democracy, which is not present in liberal democracy, was 
‘in its insistence that they are compatible.’
9
 
In 1951, Hannah Arendt, a German Jewish intellectual who 
had escaped to New York at the start of the war, argued in her hugely 
influential book The Origins of Totalitarianism that totalitarianism 
had been borne of the collapse of the fabric of 19
th
 century society, 
replaced by a mass society in which the state emerged as the only 
force that exerted influence on it. Arendt argued that the taste for 
freedom and striving for distinctive identity has been lost in modern 
society, making it susceptible to the extremes of totalitarianism. What 
characterised the masses from whom totalitarian leaders derived their 
support was their lack of political commitment and what Arendt 
called their ‘radical loss of self-interest’.
10
 Totalitarian parties 
                                                 
8
 J. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London, 1952), pp. 1-2 
9
 Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, p.2 
10




exploited the desire for unity and economic advantage, along with the 
pathologies of isolation and superfluity, and employed terror to 
destroy any lived relations outside the totalitarian web. The most 
extreme version of this world, in which associations and relationships 
between individuals (be they affective, political, economic or 
otherwise) were entirely obliterated and replaced by the sole 




Though highly influential, Arendt’s model did not fit the 
Soviet example particularly well. In 1956 Carl Friedrich and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski offered a new definition of totalitarianism in 
which they attempted to adapt Arendt’s ideas to the Soviet variant, 
basing their notion of Soviet totalitarianism on the Stalinist regime. 
Friedrich himself had previously defined totalitarian society as resting 
on five key principles in a seminal essay in 1953, described by 
Engerman as a ‘touchstone for future scholarship’.
12
 These five 
aspects were an official ideology, a single mass party consisting of  a 
relatively small percentage of the total population passionately 
dedicated to the ideology, a monopoly of means of combat, a 
monopoly of all means of mass communication and finally a system 
of ‘terroristic police control’.
13
 This definition was later elaborated 
when Friedrich collaborated with his student Zbigniew Brzezinski. 
Total control over the economy was added as a sixth element, 
constituting what was referred to as the ‘six-point syndrome’.
14
 
Friedrich and Brzezinski’s conclusions came from an analysis of the 
world around them, and their theory of totalitarianism was founded on 
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their observations of Italian, German and Soviet societies under the 
inter-war and wartime regimes and, in regards to the USSR, also 
during the post-war years. Despite the totalitarian umbrella, Friedrich 
and Brzezinski did not equate fascism with communism, making the 
distinction that while the two were ‘basically alike’, ‘they are 
obviously not wholly alike.’
15
  Nevertheless, they recognised these six 
fundamental, defining characteristics that were distinctive not only for 
the fact of their symbiotic existence in these societies, but for their 
presence in all three, which had emerged in this unprecedented and 
unique form during the same period. Totalitarianism was depicted as 
a static state, in which society was non-existent. While this 
theorisation was resisted by many for its lack of accounting for clear 
societal dynamics and, in the case of the USSR, the changes occurring 
after Stalin’s death that contested the idea of a static and 
unchangeable system, it nevertheless had a huge impact on Cold War 
scholarship on the Soviet Union.  
This makes their construction of the totalitarian other 
particularly relevant to this study. Friedrich and Brzezinski 
highlighted the extent to which totalitarianism was entirely different 
from Western democratic models, remarking that even in diplomatic 
behaviour ‘the democratic states are thus confronted with a pattern of 
behaviour completely at variance with their own’ and suggesting that 
totalitarianism was so pervasive and wide-reaching as to alter the 
norms by which individuals of totalitarian states interacted with 
others.
16
 For Friedrich and Brzezinski there could be no peaceful 
coexistence of a totalitarian dictatorial regime and the rest of the 
world since one principal threat of these regimes was their 
expansionism and their aspirations to a world-wide proletarian 
revolution: ‘peaceful coexistence of the nations peopling this world 
presupposes the disappearance of the totalitarian dictatorships…any 
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relaxation of the vigilance required to face such ideological 
imperialists as the totalitarians is likely to result in disasters such as 
the Second World War or worse.’
17
 In Friedrich and Brzezinski’s 
work, totalitarian regimes were not only excluded from ‘the world’, 
but they also removed the possibility of peace. This suggests that it 
was the elimination of these regimes – deemed expansionist and 
aggressive – on which peace depended, with no allowances being 
made for the role of the formation and repercussions of Western 
foreign policy. 
During this period therefore – and with some manifestations in the 
wartime period – both public and academic discourse on 
totalitarianism used many of the same terms to highlight notions 
central to totalitarianism, most notably coercion, terror, threat and 
danger as the opposite of the Western liberal democratic model and 
its basic tenets of freedom, peace and democracy. In this way they 
provided a theoretical and conceptual basis for the othering of the 
Stalinist Soviet Union on which totalitarian-model Sovietologists 
were able to build. 
 
3. Scholarship and politics: writing on Stalinism in a Cold 
War context 
 
As the world emerged from the Second World War, political tensions 
between the West and the Soviet Union became a dominant influence 
on the foundations of scholarship on Stalin and Stalinism, 
dramatically shifting those on which Trotsky and his contemporaries 
had built their work. With the collapse of the Grand Alliance, wartime 
support and sympathy for the USSR had given way to a powerful idea 
of the danger of communism, and the notion of ‘totalitarianism’ 
entered everyday public and political discourse. On March 12th 1947, 
US president Harold Truman enunciated the Truman Doctrine, in 
which he asked Congress to come to the aid of Greece. It was this 
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speech that also ensured that the term ‘totalitarian’ became 
entrenched not only in American foreign and political policy, as a key 





To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from 
coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in 
establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is 
designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence 
for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, 
however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to 
maintain their free institutions and their national integrity 
against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them 
totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition 
that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct 
or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of 





Earlier in the speech, Truman had also stated that the very existence 
of the Greek state was threatened by ‘the terrorist activities of several 
thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's 
authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern 
boundaries’. This speech in effect marked the beginning of the Cold 
War, which over the next four decades saw the relationship between 
the Eastern Bloc and the Western democracies stretched to breaking 
point. The notion of ‘totalitarianism’, as set out by Truman, and 
elaborated by historical and political theorists, became the foundation 
on which scholarship on Stalin and Stalinism was built and defined 
for many years to come: the formative influences on publications in 
the West became increasingly politicised, and scholarship was no 
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longer predominantly written by exiled Socialists but by professional 
Sovietologists living and working in a world of acute ideological and 
political tensions between the Soviet Union and the West.
20
  
As in the previous period, the scholars whose works feature in 
this chapter were writers of their time and were deeply affected by the 
political climate in which they lived and worked. For example, many 
of the most influential individuals in the study of totalitarianism and 
the Soviet Union were European Jews who had been persecuted, and 
who had often been displaced, fleeing their home towns and 
countries. Arendt was a German Jew born in Hanover in 1906. She, 
her mother and her husband had made a long and extremely difficult 
journey to New York to escape Jewish persecution in Europe in 1941. 
It was the discovery two years later of the horrors of Auschwitz and 
her search to understand how it could have occurred that eventually 
resulted in The Origins of Totalitarianism, published in 1951 after six 
years of research and writing.
21
 Talmon, born in 1916, described the 
experience of growing up as a Polish Jew in the border town of Rypin 
as a unique context in which he was differentiated in terms of his 
religion, yet shared the same nationalist desires of his non-Jewish 
neighbours for a Poland free of German occupation. The influence of 
this time on Talmon’s later writing on political Messianism is most 
strikingly in evidence when he described the particular condition of 
Rypin’s Jews pushing them increasingly towards political awareness 
and even radicalisation: ‘They [the Jews] were caught between two 
Messianic flames, one blowing from Moscow, the other from 
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Jerusalem, the vision of world revolution and the myth of the 
nation’.
22
   
In Sovietology, the convergence of these troubled and often 
traumatic personal lives with the increasing Cold War tension led to a 
scholarship defined both by individual experience and political 
context. Alfred G. Meyer wrote that it was difficult for the later 
revisionists in Soviet history to understand the ‘profound’ effect that 
the hysteria of the Cold War of the 1940s and 1950s had on the 
profession at this time. Teaching was highly politically charged, and 
it was a time when scholars self-censored their facts, findings and 
conclusions, not because they doubted their own work, but in order 
not to discredit themselves politically.
23
 One of the principal critiques 
by the late revisionists of the totalitarian model was this political bias: 
they felt that to the old Sovietologists, scholarship had become more 
about fulfilling the needs of the US government (who pumped 
research funding into Soviet studies) by turning out the necessary 
anti-communist propaganda, than about providing truthful and 
objective research on the subject.
24
 It is perhaps too strong to call the 
early works on Stalinism Western propaganda, yet it is beyond doubt 
evident that the impact of the Cold War on Western governments and 
academic institutions helped to create a rigid interpretative framework 
within which scholarship on Stalinism developed.
25
 
Within this context, the lines between state and academia 
repeatedly became blurred, and there were instances of scholars 
simultaneously occupying roles in both spheres. There are several 
examples of this: George Kennan established the first US 
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ambassadorship in Moscow in the 1930s and later, through an article 
entitled ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’ published in the Foreign 
Affairs journal, he effectively spelled out what would become the US 
‘containment’ strategy in regards to the USSR. This remained at the 
centre of Western Cold War policy for the next 40 years and became 
central to scholarship on the Soviet Union. While he was active on the 
US diplomatic and political scene, he was also an academic and was a 
founding member of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian 
Studies, established in the 1970s, a component of the Wilson Centre. 
The institute itself, however, was constantly pulled between 
scholarship and relevance.
26
 Zbigniew Brzezinski also occupied dual 
roles in academia and politics. Born into a family of the Polish 
nobility, Brzezinski was deeply influenced by the rise of the Nazis 
and the Second World War, after which his family could no longer 
safely return to Soviet-rule Poland. Indeed, he has said that ‘The 
extraordinary violence that was perpetrated against Poland did affect 
my perception of the world, and made me much more sensitive to the 
fact that a great deal of world politics is a fundamental struggle’.
27
 A 
Sovietologist at Colombia from the 1960s, Brzezinski’s policy work 
eventually took over from his academic work: by the mid-1970s he 
had become a policy pundit, before being recruited as an advisor by 
Jimmy Carter, writing policies which mainly focused on increasing 
the stresses on the Soviet system.
28
 
From the 1970s onwards, Richard Pipes too was heavily 
involved in US government consultations on the Soviet Union, 
leading part of a competitive analysis project commissioned by the 
CIA, ‘Team B’. It set out to evaluate ‘conflicting interpretations of 
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the Soviet stance in the world today’, and, in particular in Pipe’s case, 
Soviet strategic objectives.
29
 Later, when Ronald Reagan became 
president, he recruited Pipes as his Soviet expert on the National 
Security Council staff. Pipes’ role lasted two years, during which his 
work made a considerable impact: he contributed, for instance, to 
parts of Reagan’s Westminster Speech, most notably, he says himself, 
the passage on Marxism in which Reagan described the situation in 
the USSR: 
 
I sent essentially one paragraph about Marxism to explain 
what was happening in the Soviet Union. I was astonished 
when it was used because somehow you didn’t expect Ronald 
Reagan to say yes, Marx was right. But he was right in a 
certain sense, (and these phrases are in the speech) that when 
the political system is out of step with the socio-economic 
base you'll find yourself in a revolutionary situation and you 




There was a clear interaction between the US state, academic interests 
and work on the USSR. The situation in the USA at this time 
demonstrates an extreme example of the strong mutual influence that 
can occur between state and academia. Its complexity was 
symptomatic of the world in which it occurred, its repercussions 
wide-ranging and deep for the field of Soviet studies as well as for US 
policy, since who the State recruited (for instance, Pipes and his anti-
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Soviet stance) in turn influenced policy.
31
 Pipes, like Arendt and 
Talmon, was Jewish. His family fled occupied Poland and the Nazis 
in 1939, arriving in the USA in 1940, where they settled indefinitely. 
Pipes himself attributes this experience as one of the most formative 
of his life.
32
 What is most striking about Pipes’ influence on policy at 
this time is his default anti-Russian stance. Pipes himself 
acknowledges that he has often been accused of ‘Russophobia’. 
Defending himself against this, he has stated that he has immense 
respect for Russian intellectuals and for Russian culture, arguing that 
‘I would hardly have devoted my life to studying a people I 
disliked’.
33
 However, his view on Russian political life, most 
influential in his dealings with the US government on their Soviet 
policy as well as being the subject of his academic work, was that 
‘Russians are an intensely personal people who have never succeeded 
in translating their warm human feelings into the impersonal relations 
required for the effective functioning of social and political 
institutions’. 
34
 Hence he believes that they ‘require a “strong hand” to 
regulate their public lives’.
35
 He dislikes this feature of Russian life 
and dislikes ‘the people who implement it’, including Russians ‘who 
hold a public post’.
36
   
In the UK, while the links between academia and state were 
not so deeply politicised, there are also examples of crossovers 
between the spheres. For instance, Robert Conquest studied at Oxford 
during the 1930s after which he crossed over into the governmental 
sphere.
37
 His career has been varied and his activities have been both 
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governmental and academic: during the Second World War he 
worked for the British military intelligence, and after the war he 
worked in the secret Information Research Department, a major front 
in the propaganda war against the Soviets. It was only after this, in 
1956, that Conquest started working as a freelance historian and 
writer, during which time he wrote his most recognised and 
influential work The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties.
38
 
At the same time as the Cold War developed, another 
historiographical trend influenced Western thought: the 
modernisation paradigm. Modernisation theory proposed that 
societies would progressively assume greater control over nature and 
human suffering through developments in science, technology, mass 
education, economic growth and urbanisation. ‘Liberal modernisation 
theory’ was elaborated in the West in opposition to Marxism and 
claimed that the best road to modernity lay through capitalism, with 
no necessary transcendence to post-capitalist socialism.
39
 While the 
modernisation paradigm proposed a universal developmental pattern, 
it differed from the totalitarian model scholarship, which was built on 
clear differences between Stalinism and liberal democracies. As a 
result, it provoked a less drastic opposition to Soviet communism, 
which despite its totalitarian characteristics displayed high levels of 
industrialisation, and health and educational improvements. In this 
sense, it at times provided a kind of moderator to the sometimes 
extreme othering of the totalitarian-model scholarship, and its 
influence can be seen in many of the works that even through the 
othering process recognised the successes of Stalinism.
40
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This multi-faceted context is crucial to understanding how 
Western writing on Stalin shifted from the previous period: from the 
late 1930s onwards totalitarianism as a concept and as a reality was at 
the forefront of Western consciousness. It presented a direct threat, 
both ideologically and physically, to Western nations, and with such 
strong links between academia and government, especially in the 
United States, it became the linchpin of othering of the Soviet Union 
by the West. 
 
4. The Stalinist totalitarian other in Western historiography 
 
The period 1947-1953, which Engerman describes as ‘the heyday of 
totalitarianism’ in public political discourse, marked the birth of 
totalitarian-model scholarship in the Soviet studies field.
41
 The 
USSR’s actions during this period – the cultural rejection of anything 
non-Soviet, the Sovietisation of Eastern Europe and the creation of 
the People’s Republic of China (for which Stalin was widely 
credited), for example – reinforced the notion that the USSR was a 
totalitarian state: it could not be changed from within, it was a direct 
threat to global security and US interests, the state dominated and 
even effaced society, and it was expansionist.
42
 While politicians 
clearly had need for this term, it quickly became as crucial to 
academic writing on the Soviet Union. While even after Stalin’s death 
it remained a central term in policy discussions, the Soviet 
totalitarianism being referred to was largely that of the Stalinist 
                                                                                                                  
characteristics to the other, and indeed this can go so far as to express admiration of 
the other in certain situations. In this case, the totalitarian-model scholars recognise 
and admire many of the industrial, educational and health-sector developments 
under Stalin, which ties in with the modernisation paradigm and suggests it was 
one, although not the dominating, influence on this historiography. 
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 As a result, usage of the term ‘totalitarianism’ became a tool 
with which to construct the Stalinist other in Western scholarship 
during this period. 
The two principal interpretations of the origins of Stalinist 
totalitarianism that emerged during this period stated that it was either 
a complete break from what came before 1917 (and stemming from 
this are two further interpretations that see Stalin as either a 
continuation or a break from Bolshevism/Leninism) or that Stalin’s 
regime was a continuation of a previous Russian tradition of 
leadership. Despite the debates that occurred around these issues, both 
interpretations contain common points on which othering was hinged. 
A common theme across both interpretations was the 
depiction of the Soviet Union and the West as ‘two worlds’. George 
Kennan’s Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (1961) 
exemplified a clear pattern of this method of othering and was 
replicated in many works of this period. In this study of Russian and 
Western relations in the period 1917-1945, Kennan was clear that 
Stalin and his regime represented a definitive other to the West. He 
reinforced this otherness by making systematic reference to the ‘two 
worlds’, communist and non-communist and, like Friedrich and 
Brzezinski, isolated Stalinist Soviet Union from the rest of the world. 
The repeated use of this concept reinforced the idea of it being an 
outsider, and distinctly separate from the West: ‘rendered even more 
difficult the problem which Soviet power in Russia presented for the 
outside world’, ‘Against this background [of Stalin’s lack of 
transparency in foreign relations], even the nature of the antagonism 
between the two worlds tended to become blurred’, ‘It has been my 
hope that … [these] general reflections would help us to understand 
what it was that happened in the relations between Soviet Russia and 
the outside world, and how all this operated to produce the enormous 
disharmony of the present day which we refer to as “ the cold war”’.
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 Kennan’s preoccupation lay with harmonious relations with the 
Soviet Union, deemed impossible with Stalin due to his 
Machiavellian and duplicitous character. Kennan’s Stalin was close to 
Trotsky’s: he was insecure, vain, jealous and vengeful, yet also 
manipulative, shrewd and clever, and the combination of these traits 
led Stalin to become the leader he was. Kennan, however, also stated 
that Stalin’s character was characteristic of the ‘Caucasian mountain 
race’, which gave him ‘an inordinate touchiness, an endless 
vindictiveness, and inability of ever forgetting an insult or a slight, 
but great patience and power of dissimulation in selecting and 
preparing the moment to settle the score’.
45
 This kind of regional 
generalisation is reminiscent of Said’s Orientalism, and since the 
totalitarian-model of interpretation placed the responsibility for 
Stalin’s regime largely in his own hands, this characterisation was 
central to Kennan’s construction of the Stalinist other. 
Nevertheless, unlike Friedrich and Brzezinski, just a few years 
later Kennan suggested that coexistence should be encouraged and 
that it should be the West’s goal to find ways to live with the Soviet 
Union, ‘influencing it, even if this has to be done at the expense of 
our chances for destroying it entirely’.
46
 Robert Conquest similarly 
stated that while it could not be said that political democracy or 
freedom of thought in the Western model were flourishing in the 
Soviet Union, there was still hope that it might evolve in the ‘right’ 
direction.
47
 This Orientalist construction of the West as reformer of 
the Soviet Union suggested that Western liberal democracies 
considered themselves a superior system that could influence or 
rectify the deviant Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Western observers of 
the early Cold War period still clearly implied that the ideal solution 
would be its destruction.  
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The distinction between a necessary peaceful coexistence of 
these ‘two worlds’ – within which a certain level of containment of 
the USSR was nonetheless desired – was repeated regularly in other 
works of this period. Sigmund Neumann partially blamed Europe for 
‘having pushed Russia out of the Western world’ and described the 
Soviet Union and the West as ‘two worlds’.
48
 Merle Fainsod also 
referred to the West as the ‘outside’ world, and in Adam Ulam’s work 
the ‘confines of the free world’ must be protected, since this was 




Ulam also emphasised the vast space between Western and 
Stalinist realities: such were the horrors of Stalinism that they could 
not even be adequately described or imagined by ‘even the most 
arduous Western attempts to depict [them]’. These attempts to do so 
had been rendered ‘feeble and ineffective’ by the 1956 revelations.
50
 
This was echoed by Conquest who highlighted the ‘differences’ 
(Conquest’s emphasis) between Soviet and Western political life as of 
the ‘utmost importance’ in any attempt to understand Soviet life. 
Without them, Western observers were likely to fall into ‘democratic 
reflexes’, as a result of which their work would be ‘practically 
worthless because of this imaginative failure’.
51
 
A more obvious method of othering can be found in Fainsod’s 
How Russia is Ruled, a cornerstone for the totalitarian-model 
scholarship for its rigorous account of the totalitarian regime in place 
under Stalin. Here the otherness of the Stalinist regime was 
systematically reinforced by differentiation through comparison to 
Western democracies and their methods of administration and 
governance: ‘Soviet public administration exhibits attributes which 
sharply differentiate it from the administrative systems prevailing in 
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Western constitutional democracies’, ‘The problem of erecting 
safeguards against the abuse of administrative power is therefore 
conceived differently from its counterpart in Anglo-American 
constitutional systems with their heritage of devotion to personal 
liberty’, ‘Soviet public administration replaces Western constitutional 
restraints on administration by a formidable proliferation of central 
controls of a variety and on a scale without parallel in the West’, ‘The 




However, even more noticeable in Fainsod’s work was the 
profoundly Russian character of this Soviet totalitarianism, which is 
much more closely connected to the historical othering of Russia by 
the West, as set out in the Introduction, and to the Orientalist 
approach. For all of Fainsod’s insights into the subtleties and 
particularities of how communism developed under Stalin, he 
ultimately believed that Stalinism was more or less born of the tsarist 
forms of leadership. Fainsod himself stated that it would be erroneous 
and ‘shallow’ to say that the Russian is ‘congenitally destined to be 
governed despotically or that there is some mystic substance in the 
Russian soul which breeds submission before authority’.
53
 Yet in the 
following paragraph he went on to state that ‘the frame of analysis 
must include as well those distinctive characteristics of the Russian 
historical legacy that have left the Russian people badly prepared for 
self-government’.
54
 Indeed, Fainsod’s account of Stalinist 
totalitarianism was deeply historical:  it took root in the method of 
rule established by the tsars, on which the Bolsheviks then built their 
own organisational and leadership structure. In examining the early 
pre-1917 organisation of Bolshevism, Fainsod suggested that the 
organisational conception that embodied Bolshevism was an 
incarnation of the ‘elitist ideal’, which had been created by the tsarist 
system and that now manifested itself in a kind of upside-down mirror 
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image of the tsarist autocracy:  by the time the revolution came about, 
the small proletariat was dominated by an even smaller Marxist 
intelligentsia, which was highly authoritarian and elitist, and it was 
from here that communist totalitarianism stemmed. For Fainsod, the 




While not a direct replication of the Orientalist strand present 
in Deutscher’s systematic comparison of Stalin’s leadership to that of 
the Russian tsars, Fainsod’s insistence that Bolshevism was based on 
the same elitist principles of tsarist rule and that this itself led to full-
blown totalitarianism indicates a common strand of thought, only now 
constructed around the more contextually relevant issue of 
totalitarianism. In turn, this was a strong assertion by Fainsod of the 
unchanging character of Russian leadership: while tsarism, 
Bolshevism and Stalin’s totalitarianism could be clearly defined by 
varying characteristics and historical contexts, the latter two only 
existed as a germination of the former, evolved within a specific 
context. While early on in the book he remarked that Kennan was 
right to suggest that totalitarianism was a ‘disease to which all 
humanity is in some degree vulnerable’, Fainsod also admitted to 
insisting that ‘Bolshevism has an organic connection with the Russian 
past’.
56
 Despite his statement that ‘cultural determinism carries the 
same dangers as other forms of determinism’
57
, this specifically 
Russian connection was what led Fainsod to construct and reinforce 
Stalinist totalitarianism as a clear other to the West, both historically 
and politically. 
The idea of Bolshevism mimicking tsarism and eventually 
leading to Stalinist totalitarianism showed up in many Cold War 
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publications. Sigmund Neumann, for instance, suggested that ‘in 
many respects, Soviet Russia was czarism, its symbols reversed and 
its ruling elite changed – a pyramid upside down’ and that it inherited 
the Okhrana of imperial rule and ‘its general Asiatic feature’.
58
 
Neumann’s work was overall in keeping with historical and 
Orientalist constructions of Russia, in particular regarding the 
character of Soviet totalitarianism as rooted in ‘the peculiar 
conditions of Eurasian Russia’ possessing a fundamentally Asiatic 
character, ensuring that ‘the centuries-old dualism of western and 
eastern influences is still alive’. In the 1930s, Neumann wrote, the 
Bolshevist Revolution in Russia still preserved her ‘oriental 
character’.
59
 Richard Pipes, too, argued that there was economic, 
social, and political continuity in Russia from the fifteenth century 
through to the Soviet Union. This was exemplified in Russia Under 
the Old Regime where Pipes’ analysis of the tsarist system led him to 
Bolshevism and then eventually Stalinist totalitarianism. For instance, 
he believed that the tsarist model of a police state was put together by 
the Bolsheviks as soon as they took power and that it was 
progressively perfected as a tool for repression. Eventually under 
Stalin’s dictatorship ‘it attained a level of wanton destructiveness 
never before experienced in human history.’
60
 Earlier in the twentieth 
century certain experimental policies by the tsarist government had 
even ‘overstepped the boundaries of police regime and moved into the 
even more sinister realm of totalitarianism.’
61
 Walt W. Rostow also 
saw a Russian character consistent in both tsarist and Stalinist rule 
which, he suggested, existed because ‘the national characteristics of a 
society, created by a very long process, are bound to leave their mark 
on its political techniques – even when political rule is arbitrarily 
imposed’.
62
 While he differed from the Orientalist model in that he 
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saw the possibility for change, and did not consider Russian history to 
be static, he saw Stalinism as an extreme version of autocracy in 




It is therefore evident that the interpretative model which 
suggested that Stalinism was a natural successor to tsarism presented 
a tool for reinforcing Stalinism and the Soviet Union as the other. The 
model that saw Stalinism as a break also demonstrated a form of 
othering, although not as strongly. This was exemplified in the work 
of Harvard teacher Michael Karpovich, who taught Russian 
intellectual history at Harvard from 1927 until his retirement in 
1957.
64
 He focused on pre-1917 history, regarding what had followed 
1917 as unfamiliar, too contemporary for historical judgement and 
lacking in reliable sources.
65
 For Karpovich, Russian history as he 
knew and taught it ended in 1917: the Soviet Union was not a 
continuation of what had come before. He believed in a difference 
between authoritarianism and totalitarianism: the former being the 
kind of regime found in tsarist Russia, and the latter being the Soviet 
regime. The difference was to be found in the attempt by the Soviet 
state to usurp the inner life of its subjects. It wanted not only their 
external acquiescence, but also that of their minds and hearts, an 
‘unprecedented’ dimension (as were many other dimensions of the 
Soviet regime) in the governing of Russia. Karpovich also articulated 
a key theory of the totalitarian model scholarship: that the Soviet 
government was a direct extension of Bolshevik ideology, which 
itself represented a qualitative break from the previous Russian 
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influence of Karpovich on his favourite student Martin Malia is also evident in 
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Sovietologist who taught at Harvard and then Berkeley, Malia’s most significant 






 Stalinism and Bolshevism were a new, 
totalitarian (not authoritarian) other, not just of Europe but also of pre 
-1917 Russia. 
But it was the reinforcement of the notion of Stalinism as an 
extreme version of tsarist autocracy (leading to totalitarianism) - as 
barbaric and threatening, and as being of another world - that bore 
striking similarities to the historical processes of Western othering of 
Russia highlighted in the Introduction.
67
 For Pipes, as for Fainsod, 
Conquest, Deutscher and Neumann, this distinctly Russian Stalinist 
totalitarianism left an enduring stain on the Soviet Union, enabling 






It is clear, then, that expressed both explicitly and implicitly many of 
the works published during the early Cold War period systematically 
presented Stalinist totalitarianism as the other, reflecting both the 
political and personal experiences of many of the individuals writing 
at this time. The works of this era focused particularly on the coercive 
and terroristic methods of communist rule under Stalin, as well as the 
threat of such a state, constructing and reinforcing the notion of the 
‘two worlds’, opposites and opponents. The basis for these 
constructions can be found in writings on totalitarianism around this 
period, such as those of Talmon and Brzezinski, but also in the 
general political context which had immeasurable influence on 
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 This was also represented in the admiration that many travellers of previous 
centuries felt when visiting Russia, where they were impressed by the tsarist 
palaces, finery and so on. In relation to Stalinism, this became admiration for 
industrial and educational successes. 
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 Kennan, Pipes and Conquest all saw Stalinism as an enduring and key component 
part of Soviet communism, and as a result the Soviet Union still manifested a 
milder form of this ‘affliction’ and could never be trusted, or be an ally of the West, 
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scholarship on Stalinism around this period, particularly in the USA. 
At the same time, the development of the idea of Stalinism as a 
continuation of a Russian tradition of leadership demonstrates a 
pattern of Orientalist-style analysis, reinforcing the notion of the 
unchanging national Russian character. More specifically, the 
suggestion by some scholars that Bolshevism and eventually 
totalitarian Stalinism were in fact tsarism turned ‘upside-down’ 
reveals the extent of this perceived similitude. During this era, 
totalitarianism represented the ultimate antithesis to the West, and in 
Western historiography on Stalin and Stalinism, totalitarianism 
provided a new tool with which Western scholars were able to 
construct the Stalinist and Soviet other. 
69
 
 While the basis of these othering constructions shifted 
considerably since the pre- Cold War period, there was continuity in 
the strong personal links between those writing and their subject 
matter that provided a central character to the historiography. The 
previous chapter highlighted the way in which Trotsky’ and his peers’ 
work was informed by their theoretical isolation from Stalin, and 
estrangement from the Soviet Union (or in the case of pro-Stalinists, 
such as Barbusse, their strong personal allegiance). In the early 1950s 
and 1960s, many writers on totalitarianism – such as Talmon, 
Brzezinski and Arendt, for example – were informed by their own 
personal trauma borne of the Second World War and Jewish 
persecution, and their many social, cultural, economic and political 
repercussions. These soon collided with the Western anti-Soviet 
mentality of the Cold War era, and in the USA especially, as 
academics and politicians worked side by side on foreign policy, the 
resulting scholarship on the Soviet Union become deeply intertwined 
with political discourse on totalitarianism and its Soviet variant. This 
explains why, while in the wider profession social history was 
beginning to take hold from the 1960s, the focus in Sovietology 
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remained firmly on the political sphere for around another decade, 
rendering temporarily powerless wider historiographical trends as a 
key formative influence on scholarship, evidence of the strength of 
the influence of political life on academia at this time. This has given 
scholarship on Stalinism of this time a unique and complex nature, 
highlighting once again the deep roots of this historiography and the 
construction of the Stalinist other in the most momentous events of 









The God that Failed: 
Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ and British communist 




1. British communists in context: the rise and fall of the 
CPGB 
 
The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) was established in 
London in the summer of 1920, merging several smaller Marxist 
groups together. One of the major components of the new party was 
the British Socialist Party, the largest Marxist group before the 
Russian Revolution that had been affiliated with the Labour Party. 
With the support of the Comintern, the CPGB tried to affiliate with 
the Labour Party several times in its history and, although coming 
close to achieving this in 1945, was always unsuccessful.
2
 Supported 
by Lenin, the CPGB functioned as a section of the Comintern, from 
which it drew large amounts of funding.
3
 
The CPGB adhered to the Comintern’s ‘Moscow line’ and by 
doing so accepted a practice of democratic centralism in which the 
authority of the international over its constituent parties was explicitly 
established. This was most obvious during the Second World War 
when the CPGB reversed its policy several times as the war 
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progressed, first strongly opposing the war and then, upon the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union, reversing this stance on the 




 After the war, the CPGB suffered greatly from the revelations of 
Khrushchev’s 1956 secret speech, losing thousands of members and 
eventually irreparably splitting through the creation of the New Left.
5
 
In its latter years and most notably due to the politics of the Cold 
War, the CPGB suffered a number of crises in which members were 
strongly divided over Soviet national and international policy. 
Following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and amongst 
growing fractiousness the CPGB was dissolved at the 43
rd
 Party 
Congress in November 1991. Its largest component, the 
Eurocommunists (who had sought to develop communism in ways 
more aligned with Western countries and less with the desires and 
goals of the Soviet Union), went on to form an alternative to the 









 There is a substantial body of work on the creation of the New Left which was an 
important development in British Communist (and general British) history and 
political thinking, and which came about as a result of the speech. After the split in 
reactions to the 1956 secret speech within the CPGB, the New Left movement was 
born. Individuals adhering to the New Left were socialists with no official fixed 
agenda but who called for an array of reforms that were all intended to help make 
socialism a living force in Britain. There are several excellent accounts of the crisis 
within the CPGB which led to the creation of the New Left and an exploration of 
what it signified to former members of the CPGB. See for example: M. Kenny, 
‘Communism and the New Left’ in G. Andrews, N. Fishman and K. Morgan  (eds), 
Opening the Books: Essays on the Social and Cultural History of British 
Communism, Pluto (London, 1995); J. Saville, ‘The 20
th
 Congress and the British 
Communist Party’, Socialist Register, 1976, pp.1-23; W. Thompson, The Good Old 
Cause: British Communism 1920-1991 (London, 1992), pp.108-111;  M. Kenny, 
The First New Left - British Intellectuals After Stalin (London, 1995). Especially 
useful is the chapter ‘The Rise and Fall of the First New Left’. Finally, Margot 
Heinemann gave a succinct survey of the events of 1956 as seen from within the 
Party in M. Heinemann, ‘1956 and the Communist Party’, The Socialist Register, 
1976, pp.43-57. 
6
 Thompson, The Good Old Cause, pp. 215-217.  Additional useful histories of the 
CPGB include H. Pelling, The British Communist Party: A Historical Profile 
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2. The ‘secret speech’ and the creation of a Stalinist other 
 
When Nikita Khrushchev delivered his ‘secret speech’ to a closed 
room at the 20
th
 Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union in February 1956 the repercussions for the Soviet Union and 
communists worldwide were severe. For the first time it was 
acknowledged that there had been grave errors committed by Stalin 
and by those working close to him for the duration of the Stalinist 
regime, most notably during the trials and purges of the 1930s. 
Collective leadership had been abandoned, and a ‘cult of the 
individual’ had developed in its place. Khrushchev’s speech seemed 
to pave the way for change in the Soviet Union and initiated a period 
of ‘de-Stalinisation’, which sought to rectify some of the errors of the 
past. Wrongly convicted ‘enemies of the state’ were released from 
camps and exile, and the government endeavoured to once again 
establish a genuine socialist leadership.  
The Western capitalist nations felt vindicated: communism was 
indeed the evil other they had supposed it to be.
7
 But there were 
severe repercussions for the lives of non-Soviet communists, living in 
countries where their political and ideological convictions were 
deemed dangerous and worthy of persecution and where they 
themselves represented the other. This chapter analyses how this 
affected the way in which Stalin and Stalinism were written about by 
non-Soviet communists, and specifically by British communists in the 
period immediately after the speech, in order to provide a more 
complete and inclusive assessment of Western writing on Stalin and 
Stalinism during this period than is possible by solely examining Cold 
War scholarship. In particular it aims to answer the question of 
whether in this aspect of the historiography of Stalin and Stalinism an 
othering process begins in the aftermath of 1956, as some British 
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 One British Communist reported that his neighbours were ‘laughing their heads 
off’ at the revelations. Another, a university lecturer from Scotland, replied when 
asked about his colleagues’ reaction to the ‘Stalin business’ that ‘They’re not saying 
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communists attempted to distance themselves from the regime they 
had once supported. 
Examining the reaction of British communists to the revelations 
of Khrushchev’s speech within the context of this thesis provides a 
fresh insight into what has been a well-documented crisis within the 
British left. Indeed, placed within the conceptual framework of  the 
Western othering of Stalinism, exploring the nature of British 
communist alignment with Stalin before 1956, the immediate 
response to the ‘secret speech’ and its aftermath allows  us to gain 
increased understanding of the ways in which Stalin and his regime 
were othered by those who had been ideologically aligned with him. 
In a first instance, and as the following section will demonstrate, 
through analyses of not only books but also press materials , this was 
a case of positive othering. From 1956 however, examining British 
communist work as well as press materials allows us to chart the 
evolution of this othering from a form of adulation to one of 
opposition. It provides a unique opportunity to observe the process 
through which Stalin became the other in the eyes of those who had 
previously aligned themselves with him. It further allows us to build a 
more complete picture of Western othering of Stalin during this 
period by broadening the scope of enquiry beyond those ideologically 
opposed to communism, providing a more nuanced and inclusive 




3. Before 1956: Stalin and Stalinism through British 
communist eyes 
 
There is surprisingly little academic, historical or even contemporary 






 In order to understand the nature of British communist 
interpretations of Stalin and Stalinism before 1956 – and therefore 
understand how these interpretations evolved after 1956 – works 
principally relating to the trials of the 1930s are particularly 
informative, as are articles from the daily newspaper of the CPGB, 
the Daily Worker. This paper was originally set up as the official 
organ of the CPGB in 1930. In 1946, ownership was formally 
transferred to a non-party cooperative, the People’s Press Printing 
Society (PPPS). The paper nevertheless remained the acknowledged 
voice of the CPGB until after the fall of the Soviet Union.
9
 It provides 
valuable insight on CPGB members’ views on Stalin and Stalinism, 
which often were not being put to paper in published works. The 
departure from only examining what might be considered 
historiography proper is justified when we consider that by providing 
access to otherwise largely unpublished opinions, the Daily Worker 
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 See K. Morgan, ‘The Communist Party and the Daily Worker 1930-56’ in G. 
Andrews, N. Fishman and K. Morgan (eds), Opening the Books: Essays on the 
Social and Cultural History of British Communism (London, 1995), p. 142. Morgan 
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Daily Worker articles of the 1930s, the defining decade of 
Stalinism, are revelatory about British communist perceptions of the 
USSR. In 1936 the Soviet Union, with the second Five Year Plan 
over halfway along, continued its impressive and relentless drive 
towards becoming a powerful, industrialised super-power. 
Simultaneously the purges and show trials were approaching their 
apex. Nevertheless, coverage on Stalin at this time was entirely 
positive and focused on industrial, economic and standard of life 
achievements. Keen to show the benefits of socialism, advances in 
industrialisation and quality of life in the Soviet Union were widely 
reported in the Daily Worker. This is exemplified, for instance, by 
articles reporting that a British delegation who had visited the USSR 
was ‘particularly astounded with what the Soviet Union is doing for 
children’
11
, or attributing excellent harvests to the success of 
collective farming.
12
 Other articles reported on working conditions - a 
testimonial from a British print worker who went to Russia as part of 
the Trade Union delegation stated that ‘Actual monetary wages 
compare very favourably with the wages of London print workers, at 
400-450 roubles a month’ and suggested that working conditions in 
the Soviet Union were as good, or better than those found in 
London.
13
 To the CPGB it was becoming ‘more and more clear every 
day how well people live in the country of the Soviets’.
14
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Other British communist publications similarly focused on the 
successes of Stalinism. Early in Stalin’s rule, for example, Andrew 
Rothstein (another founding and prominent member of the CPGB) 
had published a pamphlet entitled Russia’s Socialist Triumph in 
which he extolled the virtues of the Five Year Plans. For Rothstein, 
while there were many reasons to admire the achievements of Soviet 
Russia ‘which even the capitalists are forced to acknowledge’, the 
most ‘wonderful’ reason of all was the way in which Russian workers 
‘rebuilt production and economic life generally’ to pre-war levels 
with hardly any outside help.
15
 To Rothstein, as to most communists, 
perhaps the most impressive aspect of the Stalinist Soviet Union was 
the huge technological and industrial advances being made and the 
perceived success of the economy. Rothstein’s pamphlet is awash 
with tables and figures detailing investments, national income, 
metallurgy, transport, education and literacy levels.  
As well as the industrial and economic successes of Stalinism, 
The Daily Worker and other British communist publications also 
reflected British communists’ perceptions of the trials at this time. 
Harry Pollitt, then Secretary of the CPGB, wrote: 
This is not time for sentiment - the sacrifices of certain 
leaders before the Revolution are nothing to the sacrifices of 
the people of the Soviet Union to build a Socialist State as a 
bulwark of peace for the people of the world (…) In the face 
of unparalleled sacrifice the Russian people have established 
their power, have achieved miracles in Socialist construction 
that have aroused the admiration of the world. And all the 
time in their midst a poisonous gang, lustful for power to 
wreck Socialism has been at work. (…) It is not a question of 
what these men did in 1905, it is what they were doing in 
1936 - conspiring with Hitler, Fascist agents, fomenters of the 
assassination of the best sons of the Soviet Union.
16
  
Another article referred to the judicial system of the Soviet Union as 
‘mild’ for letting Trotsky escape abroad and not face the 
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consequences of his actions, as well as those for whom he was the 
‘whipper-in’: Zinoviev and Kamenev.
17
 And when in November 1936 
Stalin gave a speech on the new constitution for the Soviet Union (to 
be adopted that December), the Daily Worker reported that ‘It was a 
speech that will live through history. It showed clearly the shallow 
nature of many of the criticisms from bourgeois observers’. For the 
Soviets and for the rest of the world it opened up ‘new perspectives of 
democracy and freedom’.
18
 The content of these articles was mirrored 
by British communist books of the time. Barrister Dudley Collard, for 
example, wrote an account of Karl Radek’s trial as witnessed by 
Collard himself, who had travelled to the Soviet Union.
19
 Despite 
stating his intention to provide an impartial account of the trial, 
Collard nevertheless wrote that he  ‘wanted to clear up the 
misunderstandings which have arisen about the conduct of political 
trials in the Soviet Union, and which are so detrimental to the good 
relations which should exist between this country and the U.S.S.R.’.
20
 
He believed that the principal reason why many Britons felt unease at 
these trials was due to the way in which they were reported by the 
British press and that many accounts were ‘entirely distorted’, 
perhaps due to miscommunications, but also due to hostility towards 
the Soviet Union, and to the ‘taste of the Press for sensationalism’.
21
  
J. R. Campbell, another prominent and public face of the 
CPGB, similarly regarded the representation of the Soviet Union as a 
dictatorship of the Party as ‘a travesty which is unfortunately accepted 
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by friends, as well as enemies’.
22
 He extolled the virtues of the Soviet 
Socialist state: ‘planned economy has eliminated unemployment’, 
‘State medical service is the admiration of doctors all over the world’, 
and the ‘educational system has evoked the enthusiasm of all who are 
interested in progressive educational developments’.
23
 He believed 




Like Campbell and Collard, Rothstein also wrote about the 
trials though most specifically on those of 1930-31, when the 
Mensheviks were tried for ‘counter-revolution’. Rothstein’s Wreckers 
on Trial gave another insight into how early the CPGB toed the 
Soviet Party line, and he made his stance clear: the Mensheviks had 
‘degenerated’ into ‘espionage, corruption, wrecking and sabotage’, a 
fact which was revealed in ‘all its ugly details’ through the trials.
25
 In 
the end Rothstein warned: ‘The pages which follow throw a flood of 
light on the bitter and relentless hostility of the Imperialists to the 
U.S.S.R. All friends of the Soviet Union, and in the first instance the 
working-class, dare not forget this.’
26
 Later, Willie Thompson 
recounted how the CPGB expressed its ‘collective approbation and 
enthusiasm for these proceedings, illustrated by representative quotes 
from the Daily Worker, and one from Russia Today: ‘No true friend 
of the Soviet Union…can feel other than a sense of satisfaction’.
27
 
Articles on Stalin’s death in 1953 provide insight into how 
Stalin was seen and written about as a man and as a leader. When 
news of Stalin’s illness first reached the public sphere, the Daily 
Worker’s headlines reflected the worry and anxiety with which 
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communists worldwide met the news. On the front page, an editorial 
from the 5
th
 March 1953 entitled ‘May He Recover’ stated that ‘In all 
countries of the world, peace loving people are fervently hoping that 
Joseph Stalin will completely recover from the grave illness with 
which he is now stricken.’
28
   
While the possibility of the death of Stalin himself formed 
part of the dismay, this was also a particularly politically unstable 
time when many had been awaiting peaceful discussions to take place 
between Churchill, Stalin and Eisenhower: Stalin had, in the previous 
few months, agreed to meet with the two Western leaders in order to 
discuss a peace agreement between the three powers. So recently after 
the Second World War the repeated references to Stalin’s role during 
the war suggest that in 1953 his position as a leader was steeped in 
memories of the conflict and its resolution. Stalin was not simply a 
socialist hero, but also a war hero. This idea was particularly well 
illustrated by this editorial, which, after announcing Stalin’s illness, 
moved on to predominantly report on the importance of his role in the 
war: 
Because in the end, the Soviet army smashed the Nazis 
utterly, the war was shortened by many months, if not by 
years. Hundreds of thousands of Britons are alive today 
because the Soviet army ‘tore the guts out of the German 
army’, as Mr Churchill expressed it.
29
  
It is clear that for the British communists Stalin’s positive role was 
only cemented by the Second World War, intensifying their 
admiration for him and leading them to further negate any claims of 
wrongdoing, brutality and coercion. This was highlighted in the same 
editorial: ‘For in spite of the violent propaganda of hate which the 
capitalist Press directed against the Soviet leader, the average man 
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Upon Stalin’s death, the tone of adulation persisted. The Daily 
Worker dedicated a two page supplement to Stalin, a biography not 
dissimilar in tone and content to the official Soviet biographies 
detailing Stalin’s illustrious life as revolutionary and leader.
31
 On the 
same day that the biographical supplement was published, Pollitt 
himself wrote an article for the Daily Worker entitled ‘Eternal Glory 
to Stalin!’, the final paragraph of which concluded with an emotional 
goodbye to Stalin: 
With tear-blinded eyes and a grief we have not the 
language at our command to describe, we swear that 
our Communist Party, and our Daily Worker, will do 
all in their power to pick up that banner of national 
independence that Comrade Stalin spoke about in his 
speech to the 19th Congress, hold it proudly aloft, and 
never allow it to be sullied by any power in the world. 




This statement contained language similar to that found in Soviet 
press, literature and propaganda, and it is undoubtedly surprising to 
witness such emotive language laden with religious connotations 
coming from British communists. This suggests a level of absorption 
of Soviet official language and methods of expression in regards to 
Stalin that provides a stark contrast to other sections of the 
historiography, emphasised by the communists being ideologically 
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It also represents a form of the positive othering process, an 
example of which can be found in the works of Barbusse a few years 
earlier. Stalin was elevated to a status which set him apart from other 
men, and the Soviet Union was often represented as a superior nation 
to Great Britain. This has been exemplified by the comparisons in 
worker pay and conditions, and by the very fact of it being a socialist 
state. Writing about the experience of being a communist in the 
1940s, Eric Hobsbawm explained these apparently extreme 
sentiments, highlighting how, as for the writers of the pre-Cold War 
era, their lives were inextricably bound to Stalin’s Soviet Union:  
At the time it would not have struck any of us as surprising 
that the last words of a dying Party member should be for the 
Party, for Stalin and for the comrades (in those days among 
foreign communists the thought of Stalin was as sincere, 
unforced, unsullied by knowledge and universal as the 
genuine grief most of us felt in 1953 at the death of a man 
whom no Soviet citizen would have wanted, or dared, to call 




Similarly John Saville explained that socialism in the USSR and the 
Stalinist regime became so attractive over the decades following the 
1917 revolution because of the establishment of the Comintern in 
which a shared belief was developed that communists were part of a 
world movement that would achieve, through disciplined leadership, 
revolutionary goals and aims. As time progressed and Stalin’s Five 
Year Plans were underway with positive results yielded, ‘there was 
much which could support these ideas and ideals’.
35
 According to 
Saville, there was a low level of awareness of the true nature of the 
Stalinist regime because there were so few Trotskyists in Great 
                                                                                                                  
article Stalin is again credited with saving the lives of Britons: 'But for Stalin a 
great many of us might be dead. And it may be we owe him our freedom'. All three 
are headlines from Daily Worker, Saturday 7 March 1953, pp. 2-3. From the 9
th
 of 
March onwards there is a column dedicated to Stalin that appears on and off eight 
times over the following weeks, entitled ‘What Stalin Meant to Humanity’. The first 
of these was called ‘Man Who Set Women Free’.
33
 It is clear from these articles that 
Stalin enjoyed the same level of public, and private, adulation that he had come to 
expect and require from his own people. 
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Britain and those that were there were ‘intellectually feeble’. 
Consequently, there were very few within the labour movement who 
appreciated what was happening inside the USSR. Saville believed 
that if war hadn’t arrived in 1939, debates over the trials of 1936-8 
would have led to ‘a clearer understanding of the oppressive and 
bloody regime that Stalin presided over’.
36
 As it was ,however, the 
CPGB continued to support and admire the Stalinist regime 
throughout the 1930s and the war years up to, and in some cases 
beyond, the 1956 secret speech.  
The Daily Worker articles present the reality of British 
communist belief in Stalin, and Stalinism, at the very apex of his 
power. They provide an insight into how different aspects of 
Stalinism were all seen through the same positive and adulatory lens: 
Stalin himself, healthcare, education, working conditions, 
collectivisation, the general mood and happiness of the population, 
perceived popular support for the Stalinist regime and finally the very 
basis of the political system, the constitution. There is not a large 
body of work by British communists on Stalinism in this period, but 
these few we have together with the Daily Worker articles, provide a 
realistic record of how Stalin and Stalinism were thought about and 
written about at this time, and constitute an important part of the 
Western historiography of Stalin and Stalinism.  
This British communist historiography in the period before 1956 
was therefore largely based on the Party political line: under the 
umbrella of the Comintern, the CPGB supported everything that 
Stalin did. It promoted him and his regime not only through the works 
of members of the CPGB, but also through the Daily Worker. 
Stalinism was not only the realisation of a socialist state: it was an 
enormously successful one to be admired, and whose enemies it was 
right to destroy. In the post-war years, Stalin was seen as the architect 
of this admirable nation but also a saviour and a hero whose death 
provoked grief as well as fear for a peaceful future. It is these 
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ideological and practical elements which drove the pre-1956 British 
communist historiography of Stalin and Stalinism to take shape as 
what was a clear opposite to the Anglo-American Sovietological 
works being simultaneously published at this time. 
 







 Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took 
place in late February 1956, and its impact on supporters of Soviet 
communism was huge. A British communist wrote in July 1956 that 
‘The 20
th
 Congress and the no-longer secret report of Kruschov has 
given rise to the greatest crisis of Socialist thought since the birth of 
Marxism’.
37
 The party lost thousands of members in its immediate 
aftermath, some of whom for which the speech not only led them to 




Yet the CPGB failed to engage in honest discussion about the 
revelations. In the public sessions of the Congress, Khrushchev and 
Anastas Mikoyan had already addressed the negative impact of the 
‘cult of the individual’ and the lack of collective leadership under 
Stalin. The general understanding gained from these sessions was that 
de-Stalinisation was an active and important process and that the 
‘mistakes and errors’ of the Stalin years were responsible for the 
repressive acts that had so outraged the non-communist world.
39
 
These were already important developments and paved the way for all 
communists to begin reassessing their interpretations of Stalinism. 
Nevertheless, the Daily Worker put a positive spin on things and 
reported on these initial speeches with enthusiasm and positivity. 
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They were something to be proud of in the face of capitalist criticism. 
Writing on the 25
th
 February, George Matthews published an article 
in the Daily Worker entitled ‘It’s Not a Sign of Weakness to Admit 
Mistakes’, in which he declared that rather than indicate the weakness 
of the CPSU, the admission of mistakes pointed to a strong party and 
one which could only be strengthened by the publicising of past 
mistakes and by the effort made to correct them. In the end, he 
concluded, ‘There is not the faintest shadow of a doubt that after the 
20th Congress the Soviet people and the Party which leads them will 
astonish the world with their deeds.’
40
 Acknowledgement of these 
public speeches and the information they contained about Stalin was 
therefore immediate, as was acceptance of their content. Writing in 
1976, Saville still did not know whether the leaders of the CPGB 
knew the content of the secret speech in the days immediately after it 
took place although he suspected that they must have, since other 
foreign delegates did.
41
  Matthews’ article certainly showed an 
unwillingness to engage with the real issue at hand: not whether the 
CPSU was stronger for admitting its mistakes but what the true nature 
of Stalinism was, as revealed by Khrushchev. How had it been able to 
occur, and how could the CPGB have unquestionably supported it?  
 In the weeks that followed, nothing much was made by the 
official CPGB channels of the contents of the secret speech, creating 
the catalyst for the eventual Party split. On March 13
th
 the Daily 
Worker printed a transcript of a speech Pollitt had just made on the 
20
th
 Congress, in which he acknowledged that some CPGB members 
were concerned about Stalin. He addressed this issue by stating that it 
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was certain that Stalin made mistakes in judgement and policy; 
however, ‘only a man who does nothing never makes mistakes, but 
this does not mean Comrade Stalin did not make a leading 
contribution in peace and war alike, to the development of the Soviet 
Union.’
42
 A few days later, on March 19
th
, an article entitled ‘That 
Khrushchov Speech’ may have led readers to believe the secret 
speech was finally to be acknowledged and addressed. In fact the 
article principally referred to meetings throughout the Soviet Union 
being held to help respond to some of the problems highlighted by the 
20
th
 Congress. It addressed the secret speech, but only insofar as it 
was acknowledged as having raised issues about the cult of the 
individual and lack of collective leadership, with some (vaguely 
alluded to) undesirable outcomes: 
This period of arbitrary rule resulted in many serious mistakes 
and injustices. It led to the Soviet Union being unprepared for 
the Nazi attack. Steps have now been taken to restore justice. 
Innocent people who had been convicted have been 
rehabilitated, while proper control by the Party and the 
Government has been established over the work of the State 
security agencies (…) And whatever the hostile capitalist 
Press may say, this frank discussion of past mistakes is the 
triumphant proof of the soundness of the Soviet Union and 




It was here that the problems of the CPGB truly began. There 
is little doubt that by this point the leaders of the CPGB had a good 
idea of the contents of the secret speech, and they were not being 
addressed in a way which was felt to be adequate by many members. 
It became increasingly apparent to many of these members that there 
was a crucial and critical moral and political problem with many 
layers and dimensions that needed to be engaged with by communist 
parties everywhere. Yet this problem was not being engaged with 
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within the principal forum for discussion that the CPGB possessed.
44
 
By the summer of 1956, with discontent growing among members 
and still no adequate public discussion on the contents of the speech, 
it became increasingly obvious to Thompson, Saville and others that 
there was never going to be a serious debate permitted within the 
confines of party publications and forums.
45
 This ended up being the 
catalyst for change, at least for Thompson and Saville. In July of that 
year, Thompson and Saville launched the first of three issues of a 
discussion journal called The Reasoner. It was considered sin to 
discuss party matters in non-official channels, and the publication of 
this unauthorised discussion journal was met with the extreme 
disapproval of CPGB leaders. Eventually it led to Thompson and 
Saville resigning after multiple discussions with the leaders 
confirmed to them that free discussion was not going to be permitted, 
that critical letters were being refused publication in Party 
publications and that the crisis of the Party would go on. They felt the 









As a result of the creation of The Reasoner, British communist 
historiography of Stalin and Stalinism greatly evolved over a 
relatively short period of time in the months immediately following 
Khrushchev’s speech. The responses recorded within the journal, and 
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indeed the very fact of its creation, allow us to identify and 
understand how an othering process of Stalinism by British 
communists developed and evolved during this period. The principal 
purpose of The Reasoner was to provide the opportunity to discuss 
revelations about Stalinism. Through the letters and articles published 
within it, it is clear that this led to a deviation from the positive 
othering of Stalinism displayed by the Daily Worker and other 
publications before 1956, and in its immediate aftermath. 
The othering of Stalinism began to manifest itself in the letters 
and articles published in the first issue of The Reasoner. In this 
edition there began the identification of the negative aspects of 
Stalinism, of the gulf between myth and reality and of Stalinism as a 
deviant form of socialism.
48
 Most strikingly, notions of morality, 
responsibility and blame were prominent from the outset: ‘our moral 
and political reactions have been so feeble….the weakening of the 
moral basis of our political life necessarily makes less vigorous our 
practical judgements and our practical activity’, ‘the shock and moral 
turmoil engendered by the revelations were the result of our general 
failure to apply a Marxist analysis…’, ‘our irrational approach to the 
Soviet Union …have brought some socialists to the point of doubting 
our integrity’.
49
 By highlighting the moral shortcomings of these 
individuals manifested through their support of Stalinism, these self-
flagellating statements implied the moral deviancy of Stalinism itself.  
This was further exemplified by a letter from the first issue in 
which the author focused on the relationship of the CPGB to 
Stalinism, both before and since 1956. Having himself resigned from 
the party after not being able to ‘stomach the Stalinist methods of 
leadership of the post-war period’, he heavily criticised the CPGB’s 
members’ relationship with Stalinism: ‘you became a generation of 
irresponsible political innocents, relying on the loyalty of your 
members and the solidarity of the working-class  to cover your 
political nakedness when you made nonsense of all previous analyses 
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and policies by overnight changes in the 'line'; ‘You saw every 
question through Stalinist blinkers and presented every situation in 
the same way’ and  ‘Worst of all, you tampered with your own 
conscience so that honest human dealings with political opponents 
and even with your friends - indeed the very idea of 'conscience' itself 
- appeared to you to be 'bourgeois claptrap’’.
50
  
These damning words were exactly the kind of honest and 
open correspondence that the editors of The Reasoner had wanted to 
encourage. Emerging alongside more direct references to morality, 
responsibility and blame was the notion that Stalinism was now 
inextricably linked to the very meaning of what it was to be, and to 
have been, a communist (British or otherwise) at this time: ‘Stalinism 
was not ‘wrong things’ about which ‘we could not know’, but 
distorted theories and degenerate practices about which we knew 
something’.
51
 Similarly, other articles highlighted where the 
responsibility of the Party as a whole, and most especially of its 
leadership, lay in ‘the Stalin business’.
52
 It was blamed for not being 
vigilant and attentive enough to the problems of Stalinism and for not 
being self -critical enough.
53
 It was also responsible for seeming to 
represent Russian rather than British interests,
54
 and some called for a 
new kind of party altogether to avoid similar situations in the future: 
‘Plain English, common-sense, the right of publication within the 
party, differing views: a Communist Party of a new type – that’s 
what’s needed’.
55
 The notion of apportioning blame, either to 
themselves or the Party, was a central theme in the content of The 
Reasoner. Implicit in this process was the notion that supporting 
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Stalinism was wrong, morally questionable and against the values for 
which they stood and for which someone must be held responsible. In 
this way, for the first time, the British communists writing in The 
Reasoner attempted to place themselves not only as different and 
apart from Stalinism, but also as against it. 
Across all three editions, more familiar patterns of othering 
emerge including the emphasis on Stalinism as a theoretical deviation 
from socialism. Stalinism was seen as the corrupter of British 
communism, which had accepted it and welcomed it into its fold.
56
 
Measures had to be taken, Thompson wrote, to eradicate Stalin’s 
degenerate theory and practice from the CPGB, which had lost the 
‘ingredient of humanity’.
57
 It was the destroyer of the first Socialist 
Revolution, thanks to the ‘torture, death and slander [of] many of its 
own best sons’.
58
  An American socialist assessment of Stalinism 
stated that it was ‘quite incompatible’ with socialism,
59
 and while 
Thompson wrote that Stalinism was not ‘wrong things’, he 
nonetheless listed all of the things that were indeed ‘wrong’ with it: 
the theory of the intensification of the class struggle, the theory of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, the military vocabulary employed, the 
attitude to discussion, the theory of the Party and the mechanical 
theory of human consciousness.
60
  
Within this, an emphasis on the differences between Russian 
and British communism emerged. For example, regret was expressed 
that the CPGB did not root itself more deeply in British life and 
‘interpret creatively’ British democratic traditions and that it confused 
the true principles of internationalism with a servile attitude to the 
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 Thompson described the military language of 
Stalinism as ‘strange and offensive’ to the ears of the British working 
class.
62
 John McLeish wrote that British communists had been 
compromised and even humiliated by ‘the exposure of Stalinism in 
our midst’ and that a large number of party members were waiting for 
a public disavowal of Stalinism ‘in our Party’ before applying for re-
admission.
63
 The emphasis on ‘our’ enabled McLeish to stress the 
importance of creating separate, incompatible identities for British 
communism and Stalinism, with the latter as an intruder in, and 
infector of, the former. Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly in this 
context, there is one strong example of Orientalist-style othering in 
the American assessment of Stalinism, which stated that Stalinism 
incorporated methods of oriental despotism – ‘murder, mendacity, 
duplicity, brutality, and above all arbitrariness’, a fact that was no 




In 1956 the Daily Worker and The Reasoner represented the 
opposite of one another. The on-going official stance of the CPGB 
was expressed in the Daily Worker: it ignored the need for discussion 
and refused to acknowledge the need to understand deeply and 
thoroughly the events of the last decades which had occurred in the 
Soviet Union. On the other hand, The Reasoner provided a platform 
for discussion, as it sought to understand Stalinism: understand its 
theoretical and practical dimensions and how it went wrong. Perhaps 
most importantly, its readers sought to acknowledge their own 
personal shortcomings in supporting the regime and the CPGB 
leadership. In this way, it began to distance itself from Stalinism, and 
through the publication of letters and articles over the course of its 
three issues, a construction of Stalin as a moral and theoretical other 
emerged. Most strikingly within this, and what the very existence of 
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The Reasoner demonstrates, is that for the British communists 
Stalinism was inextricably linked with their own individual selves. 
Their desire to understand, write about, question and debate the nature 
of Stalinism came from a personal need to comprehend how they 
could have followed such a regime with approval and remained in a 
Party despite some of their own, albeit deeply buried, reservations.
65
 
The writings of some British communists, and in particular Saville, 
Thompson and Hobsbawm, indeed suggest that being a communist in 
Great Britain in the 1950s was a deeply personal affair. For example, 
Hobsbawm felt it was in some ways a personal destiny: 
Some of us even felt that it [communism] had recruited 
us as individuals. Where would we, as intellectuals, 
have been, what would have become of us, but for the 
experiences of war, revolution and depression, fascism 




In a world where tensions between communist and capitalist states 
were acute, conviction and steely determination had been required to 
stand one’s communist ground. As a result, when Khrushchev’s 
speech came to light, the implications for these British communists 
were enormous, and during the year following the speech, they ‘lived 
on the edge of the political equivalent of a collective nervous 
breakdown’.
67
 There are numerous accounts of the dramatic split of 
the CPGB after the speech not only because for many it delegitimized 
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belief in communism, but also because of the way this development 
was handled by the CPGB. The Party lost over 7,000 members, and 
these events changed the way in which Stalin was written about by 
these and other British communists.
68
 
It is clear from their subsequent writing that until the 1956 
speech Thompson, Saville and Hobsbawm’s ideas on Stalin and 
Stalinism were largely aligned to those of the CPGB, as manifested in 
the Daily Worker and other non-press publications. Indeed, all three 
have written of their allegiance and adherence to party principles prior 
to the speech. For Saville, it was: 
 
an organisation one was proud to belong to…I was fortunate 
enough to be of the generation that established the Communist 
historians’ group and for ten years we exchanged ideas and 





He and Thompson, close friends, allies and eventual co-editors of The 
Reasoner were deeply committed party members.
70
 Hobsbawm 
perhaps best summed up the centrality of the CPGB in the lives of its 
members:  
 
The Party (we always thought of it in capital letters) had the 
first, or more precisely the only real claim on our lives. Its 
demands had absolutely priority. We accepted its discipline 
and hierarchy. We accepted the absolute obligation to follow 
'the line' it proposed to us, even when we disagreed with it, 
although we made heroic efforts to convince ourselves of its 
intellectual and political 'correctness' in order to 'defend it', as 




Consequently, the 1956 historiography was partly an attempt by these 
individuals to atone for their actions by engaging in a thorough 
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analysis of how Stalinism, and their support of it, were able to occur. 
It is a historiography of personal convictions and ideological belief, 
and in the end for some it appears also to be have been a catharsis. 
The Reasoner was borne of Saville and Thompson’s own desire to 
understand what went wrong and to provide a platform for others to 
do so also. They were not atoning for their belief in socialism, for this 
remained their ideological position (and this fact only deepened the 
necessity for understanding), but for belief in the leadership of their 
Party, and in Stalinism, and to this end they constructed Stalinism as 
the other of their own socialism. 
6. Beyond 1956 
 
In the years following 1956, there is evidence to suggest that the 
notions of morality and deviancy from socialism remained central to 
British communist writing on Stalin and Stalinism.  There are 
examples of this in articles published in The New Reasoner, the 
British journal that took over from The Reasoner.
72
 Saville himself 
continued to write of the ‘intellectual degeneracy’ of Stalinism,
73
 and 
much later he wrote that in its Anglo-Saxon version, ‘Marxism…is a 
morality that does not accept ethical justification for unpleasant deeds 
that have to be done.’
74
 Another article in The New Reasoner written 
as a letter to Thompson spoke of the moral revulsion the author felt 
towards the Party.
75
 The resilience of the moral question was further 
demonstrated in the publication by the journal of a 1955 internal party 
memorandum by Imre Nagy, the Hungarian communist politician 
executed by the Soviets for treason in 1958. In it he wrote that it was 
not compatible with ‘public morality’ to have in positions of 
leadership individuals who had been responsible for the torture and 
murder of innocent people and asked ‘Can one speak of the morality 
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of public life when the ‘battle of opinions’ is waged with such 
depraved tools…’.
76
 Twenty years later Malcolm MacEwan, former 
Daily Worker features editor, wrote of members being unable to 
‘stomach’ passing off the “mistakes of Stalininism as the ‘cult of the 
individual’”,
77
 while Margot Heinemann wrote  of the Stalinist 
perversion of socialism.
78
 Much later again, in the 1990s, Hobsbawm 
wrote that Lenin, the older Bolsheviks and ‘not to mention Marx’ 
would have been ‘outraged’ at the kind of system Stalin had been 
trying to achieve.
79
 Hobsbawm also demonstrated the strength of the 
memory of the events of 1956. In 2002 he described the year of 1956 
as ‘traumatic’, writing that: 
Even after practically half a century my throat contracted as I 
recall the almost intolerable tensions under which we lived 
month after month, the unending moments of decision about 
what to say and do on which our future lives seemed to 
depend, the friends now clinging together or facing one 
another bitterly as adversaries, the sense of lurching, 





Referring to the way in which the CPGB had revered Stalin, Willie 
Thompson, historian and CPGB member, wrote in 1992 that  
At a distance of more than fifty years it is impossible to read 
this material - and the Left Book Club examples were more 
restrained than the newspaper articles and pamphlets - without 
a feeling of shame that individuals who were in other aspects 
of their lives humane and upright could have lent their 
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More recent Marxists historians in the West have continued to 
strongly differentiate Stalinism from socialism. For example, Tony 
Cliff’s theory of ‘state capitalism’ suggests that Stalinism was not 
socialism, but in fact a form of capitalism,
82
 and Chris Harman 
distinguished between socialism as embodied by Stalinism, and that 
of classical Marxism.
83
 The necessity for socialists to distinguish 




The articles and works examined in this chapter demonstrate how 
Khrushchev’s 1956 ‘secret speech’ precipitated a fast and dramatic 
evolution of British communist writing on Stalin and Stalinism, from 
the positive othering of the pre-1956 era in the Daily Worker and 
other works to the split in the Party as many members attempted to 
come to terms with the revelations of the speech. While this split has 
been well documented, the analysis in this chapter of the evolving 
way in which Stalin and his regime were conceptualised and 
redefined by British communists during this period has shed a new, 
more encompassing light on Western attitudes towards Stalin. 
Without examining these accounts, an analysis of Western othering of 
Stalinism would, as other surveys of Western attitudes to Russia have 
previously done, remain largely confined to that of anti-communist 
individuals, neglecting the important and relevant information  that 
can be found within the materials examined in this chapter.  Most 
specifically, it has highlighted that notions of morality and deviancy 
became central to the way in which many British communists 
attempted to come to terms with Stalinism and with their own actions 
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and beliefs. This was manifested in the othering of Stalinism, only as 
opposed to the works examined in the other chapters of this study, 
this occurred within a socialist framework through a reinforcement of 
the idea of it as a deviant and degenerate form of socialism, instead of 
a deviancy from capitalist democracy. The question of personal moral 
responsibility both implicitly and explicitly suggested that Stalinism 
was immoral, dangerous and wrong and that coming to terms with 
their own shortcomings was a process through which British 
communists hoped to erase from themselves and socialism the stain 
of Stalinism.  
These writings also demonstrate the deep chasm between the 
works of the Western Sovietologists and those of British communists, 
made especially striking by the fact of them being written during the 
same period.
84
 And while the two may seem to operate and develop 
independently of each other, the works of these British communists 
would in fact deeply affect the totalitarian-model school in other 
ways, impacting on the direction in which Western scholarship on 
Stalin and Stalinism would develop. Indeed, the gulf between British 
communist writing and that of the totalitarian model scholars 
becomes all the more relevant to the historiography of Stalin and 
Stalinism when we consider the future impact on the field of British 
communist historians’ work on social history. Hobsbawm highlighted 
the huge leaps forward they had made in this area, and for him there 
was little doubt that they can largely be credited with the rise of 
‘social history’ in Britain as a field of study, especially with what is 
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termed ‘history from below’.
85
 In particular, they were greatly 
concerned with plebeian ideology, the theory underlying the actions 
of social movements: it was, wrote Hobsbawm, ‘still largely 
identified with historians of this provenance, for the social history of 
ideas was always (thanks largely to Hill) one of our main 
preoccupations’.
86
 The origins of the work and thought of the 
displacers of the totalitarian-model vision in the field of Soviet 
studies in the West – the social historians and their revisionism – can 
be found in the works of the Marxist historians of the 1950s and 
1960s, which provided radically new interpretative frameworks 
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Morality and blame: the revisionist debates of the 1980s 
 
1. Introduction: the rise of social history in the 1960s and 
1970s 
 
The first two decades of the Cold War had seen the emergence of a 
public political and academic discourse focused on the totalitarian 
nature of Stalinism that had set the Soviet Union apart from the 
Western democracies. By the mid-1960s, however, the post-war 
generation of baby boomers had grown up into adolescence and 
young adulthood in a world of nuclear and ideological threat – one in 
which Soviet communism was evil and Western countries were the 
defenders of freedom and democracy. However, a consequence of 
living with constant reminders of ideological as well as physical 
threat was the emergence of a largely anti-war generation and one 
which eventually would turn on its governments to fight for exactly 
what their states were fighting against: where Soviet communism had 
been seen as the ultimate threat, it was now being perceived by some 
as an alternative way of coping with the problems that the West was 
dealing with at this time.  
Increasing doubts about the purpose of the Vietnam War and 
the way in which the USA carried it out also came to the fore during 
this period, and there were, in particular, two significant issues for its 
critics: the first was that no one ever had a clear or credible idea of 
why the United States was so committed to it. Secondly, it appeared 
to show the US as an aggressor, not as a country that only responded 
to direct threats to its existence, as standard Cold War ideas 
suggested.
1
 This was especially exemplified by the student unrest of 
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1968, itself a symptom of a wider generational malaise.
2
 This malaise 
spread through all spheres of life, but most of all through those areas 
which were particularly politicised, notably academia.  
One way in which this manifested itself was in a new focus on 
the social sciences.
3
 Despite originating in the nineteenth century, the 
social sciences, and especially their role in historiography, did not 
come to the fore until after the Second World War.
4
 The disasters of 
the first four decades of the twentieth century compelled scholars to 
attempt an understanding of these crises that ranged across not only 
the political but also social, economic and culturally orientated 
disciplines.
5
 One of the most influential of the academic journals 
which emerged in the twentieth century was the French Annales, 
which had been founded by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch in 1929.
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Union in the twentieth century’, p. 33. In an article on Carr, Isaac Deutscher wrote: 
‘If he had chosen to epitomize his work in some epigrammatic motto he might have 
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Classes and Through the Utopian Dreams of its Bolshevik Revolutionaries, and 
How These Revolutionaries in The End saved Russia by Giving up Their Quixotic 
Delusions and Learning Arduously and Painfully the ABC of Statecraft.' See I. 
Deutscher, ‘Mr. E. H. Carr as Historian of Soviet Russia’, Soviet Studies, Vol.6, No. 
4, April 1955, pp. 337-350, p. 340. Despite being so often described as a 
Realpolitiker par excellence, his ideas led him to his own Utopia, albeit a vague, 
undefined one, of which he said: ‘I suppose I should call it ‘socialist’. See T. 
Deutscher, ‘E. H. Carr – A Personal Memoir’, New Left Review 137 (Jan. – Feb 
1983), pp.78-86, p.86 
4
 For an overview of the emergence of the social sciences during the Enlightenment 
see J. Harvey, ‘History and the social sciences’ in S. Berger, H.  Feldner and K. 
Passmore, (eds.), Writing History: Theory and Practise (London, 2010), p.82 
5




In the Preface to the first issue addressed to their readers, Febvre and 
Bloch stated ‘we have long been aware of the wrongs that can be 
caused by a divorce that has now become conventional…We aim to 
challenge these very devastating schisms’.
6
 The divorce to which they 
referred was the separation of different disciplines in the study of the 
past: their principal concern with the historical profession was the 
overwhelming majority of historians placing the state, politics and 
great men at the centre of research of the past without drawing on 
other equally relevant disciplines, such as economics, geography, 
anthropology, or sociology, for instance.
7
 The promotion of social 
sciences was far reaching and finally gave a voice to social history in 
a traditionally political history and political science dominated sphere.  
It was not until the 1960s and 1970s, however, that social 
history truly came into its own with the appearance of academic 
journals such as The Journal of Social History (1967), Social History 
(1974), German Geschichte und Gesellschaft [History and Society] 
(1975), and History Workshop Journal (1976).
8
 The rise of the social 
sciences meant that there was increasing academic interest in moving 
away from traditional narrative orientated, state-focused studies of the 
past, as had been exemplified in Soviet studies by the totalitarian- 
model of interpretation.  
In the 1960s, the increasing general focus on the social 
sciences took hold of the Annales, and more generally historians 
increasingly looked upon history as a science, one that could be 
studied, like all sciences, quantitatively.
9
 Within this new focus on 
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Historiography Reader: Western Sources (London, 2009),  pp.188-189 
7
 The Annales historians advocated not only an international, multidisciplinary 
approach to history but also more radically one that was a break from the traditional 
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data, results and the desire to approach history as a pure science, an 
important concept was implicit: that it was possible for the practice of 
writing history to be relatively objective and be a documentation of 




2. Revisionism and the ‘new cohort’ in the study of Stalinism 
 
In the field of Soviet studies, the rise of social history in the wider 
profession and the changing global context manifested themselves 
through a rejection of the Cold War totalitarian-model paradigm and 
through a reassessment of interpretations: firstly of the 1917 Russian 
Revolution and then of Stalinism.
11
 It was becoming clear that the 
totalitarian model of interpretation could not account for the dramatic 
changes to the Soviet system that occurred under Nikita Khrushchev. 
These changes, which traditional Sovietology could not have 
expected nor predicted, forced the profession to re-evaluate its 
previously established conventional wisdom. From the late 1960s 
                                                                                                                  
Goff, ‘Is Politics Still the Backbone of History?’ in F. Gilbert and S. R. Graubard, 
Historical Studies Today (New York, 1972), p.338 
10
 This kind of research had a primarily social science focus, with the use of 
demographic data becoming more widespread, for instance. For an example of this 
in studies on Stalinism see Sheila Fitzpatrick’s extensive use of data, and literature 
relating to data and quantitative research in S. Fitzpatrick, Education and social 
mobility in the Soviet Union 1921-1934 (Cambridge, 1979).  This may help to 
explain Fitzpatrick’s call for objectivity in the field in the 1980s. See, for example 
S. Fitzpatrick, ‘Afterword: Revisionism Revisited’, The Russian Review, Vol. 45, 
No. 4, October 1986, pp. 409-413. On the nature of social history more specifically, 
see E. J. Hobsbawm, ‘From Social History to the History of Society’ in F. Gilbert, 
and S. R.  Graubard, Historical Studies Today (New York, 1972), p. 3. Incidentally, 
Hobsbawm here also quoted G. M. Trevelyan’s expression ‘History with the 
politics left out’, referring to the second type of social history Hobsbawm identified, 
which also appears in the title of Geoff Eley’s Russian Review article cited in this 
chapter. See G. M.  Trevelyan, English Social History ( London, 1944), as quoted 
by Hobsbawm, ‘From Social History to the History of Society’, p.3 
11
 Read states that the underlying reassessment of the Russian revolution centred on 
suggesting that the October revolution was not a simple coup from above and that 
Lenin and the Bolsheviks did have a certain amount of popular support. The 
deformations of the early Soviet regime were thought by some to not be the 
inevitable result of the application of Marxist principles but the result of the 
conditions under which the regime was born, notable economic collapse, civil war 
and political intervention by all of Russia’s neighbours and all the great powers. 
Most revisionists challenged the continuity theory and were careful to distinguish 




significant modifications in interpretation were underway.
 12
 These 
were the beginnings of ‘revisionism’. 
Advocating a social history based approach, the revisionist 
movement in the Western historiography of Stalinism took place 
predominantly in the 1970s and 1980s and provoked the most 
impassioned, lively and at times aggressive debates observed in the 
field to date. The debates centred on the question of the place and 
prominence of politics and society in the study of Stalinism. Where 
Sovietologists had focused exclusively on the primacy of the state as 
an organ that exercised complete control and terror over the 
dominated masses, revisionists called for increased research into 
social processes and dynamics and into the interaction of state and 
society, arguing that the latter was far from an inert mass but in fact a 
complex and dynamic body.  
Two waves of revisionism can be identified. ‘First generation’ 
revisionists included Moshe Lewin, Stephen F. Cohen, Alec Nove 
and Robert C. Tucker. While they still supported the centrality of 
politics and ideology to the study of Stalinism, they called for greater 
breadth in the field and highlighted the necessity for studies of Soviet 
society. It is Lewin who is often regarded as the doyen of the first 
wave of revisionism. Discussing the publication of Lewin’s first work 
in the 1960s after the domination of the totalitarian model, Nick 
Lampert described it as having ‘the quality of a revelation’. Lewin’s 
works enabled readers to understand, for the first time, the complex 
nature of the relationship between political and social developments 
in the Soviet Union. They were appreciated not only for these 
revelations after years of Sovietology dominated by political bias 
(and, as Lampert points out, the prevailing ignorance of the West 
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For example, Lewin’s collection of essays The Making of the 
Soviet System was an in-depth exploration of the Soviet life 
examining aspects of Soviet society that had largely been 
unaddressed. It attempted to piece together the lives and times of the 
Soviet people in ways that had not been done before. Despite this 
being one of Lewin’s social-history orientated works, its multi-
dimensionality is evident. While pleading for increased scholarship 
on the social history of the Soviet Union, Lewin did not discount the 
importance of political history in Soviet and Stalinist history: 
 
The Soviet social system and its political regime are far from 
being sufficiently well known or understood. Facile 
assessments abound but too many errors are being committed, 
too many assessments were and are shallow, not just for the 
good of scholarship but also for the good of politics and for 




Both Lewin and Cohen argued against the continuity between 
Bolshevism and Stalinism, and Tucker’s analysis of the reality and 
depth of post-Stalin change led him to conclude that Bolshevism had 
no longer existed in the Soviet Union since Stalin’s ascent to power 
and that post-Stalin change had in fact been a ‘movement to 
reconstitute the political system of Bolshevism’.
 15
 
The ‘second generation’ revisionists were lumped into a group 
widely referred to as the ‘new cohort’, a term coined by Sheila 
Fitzpatrick in 1986 that caught on despite being largely rejected by 
those who were meant to be a part of it.
16
 This was mainly because 
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between them they held a variety of stances on the question of how 
research in the field should proceed.
17
 Indeed, a generally-applied 
term such as ‘revisionist’ was in this case misleading. It suggested a 
uniform interpretation of a revised area of scholarship by a group of 
historians unified in their interpretation and conclusions. In the case 
of the historiography of Stalin and Stalinism, this could not have been 
further from the truth. Certainly, this revisionism had been true to its 
name: it had in every case been a reappraisal and reinterpretation of 
previous scholarship, its methods and ideas. However, beyond this it 
was so diverse that it acquired many subdivisions advocating different 
methodologies and interpretations.  
The term ‘revisionist’ has tended to denote anyone who was 
not of the totalitarian model school, a large umbrella under which 
smaller clusters, or individual scholars, must be sought out.
18
 
Nowhere was this lack of cohesion more obvious that in the 1986 and 
1987 discussions which took place in The Russian Review.
19
 Sheila 
Fitzpatrick’s article ‘New Perspectives on Stalinism’, which 
suggested removing politics from the study of Stalinist society, 
                                                                                                                  
agendas varied, they extended the questioning of the totalitarian model to the 
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provoked a lively, impassioned and at times belligerent discussion 
between a number of prominent scholars of the field.
 20
 These 
discussions provide an illuminating and accurate representation of the 
state of flux of, and the conflict in, the field at this time.
21
 While each 
of the participants found some points in common with a colleague - if 
not so often with Fitzpatrick - these sixteen articles demonstrated the 
variety of positions held during this period on the subject of research 
into Stalinism. The historians themselves addressed this issue in the 
1987 edition of The Russian Review. Roberta Manning and Jerry F. 
Hough, for instance, highlighted the varying interpretations of 
Stalinism present not only in the debates between totalitarian-model 
historians, but equally between those within the revisionist 
movement.
22
 Hough identified five separate types of attacks on the 
totalitarian model, highlighting the contrasts and similarities between 
them, while Manning examined the differences between the first and 
second generation revisionists.
23
 Here she drew attention to the 
relative ideological proximity held by the first-generation revisionists 
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such as Lewin, Cohen and Tucker to the traditional Sovietologists  
(they continued to use a ‘top-down’ interpretative framework ) as 
compared with the later second-generation revisionists, of which she 
considered herself part, and who were by now beginning to produce a 
much more ‘detailed, complex, and nuanced view of Stalinism’.
24
   
Those named as members of the ‘new cohort’ were keen to 
point out the lack of accuracy in placing them all under the same 
umbrella. William Chase rejected the suggestion that he was part of 
this group at all, rebuking Peter Kenez for having stated in 1986 that 
he was, and for being a ‘critic of the revisionist school [who] does not 
know who belongs to the group’. 
25
 Hiroaki Kuromiya noted that 
‘insofar as I can judge, no single view on Stalinism unites the new 
cohort’ and that some of the commentators on Fitzpatrick’s article had 
misrepresented the cohort as a ‘cabal of Fitzpatrickists’. He 
commented that she would have legitimate reason to declare ‘à la 
Marx that she was not a Fitzpatrickist’.
26
 Manning also stated that the 
second generation of revisionists were by no means confined to the 
‘new cohort’ named in the 1986 discussions and that in fact many 
disagreed with Fitzpatrick’s suggestion of practising pure social 
history in research on Stalinism.
27
 Finally, Lynne Viola found herself 
surprised to learn that she was part of this cohort and rejected her 
apparent membership on the grounds that there was ‘no clearly 
identifiable cohort’ and that she agreed with some of the previous 
criticism levelled against it in the 1986 discussions.
28
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 Aside from a manifest disapproval of the term ‘new cohort’, 
there was a striking and as yet unstudied feature of the discussions 
found in the two issues of The Russian Review that was concerned not 
with the content of work published in this period but rather the way in 
which the ‘new cohort’s’ work was received by older scholars. 
Indeed, the overtly negative and at times hostile reactions to the new 
revisionist agenda suggest that these debates provided a vector 
through which notions of responsibility, blame and morality were 
able to be both implicitly and explicitly expressed in relation to both 
Stalin and his regime and new scholarship on Stalinism.  
 
3. History with the politics left out?29 
 
The question at the centre of these articles appeared to be, on the 
surface at least, based on the role, scope and nature of social history 
in the context of research on Stalin and Stalinism, constructed as 
responses to Fitzpatrick’s article in the 1986 issue. This was 
exemplified in a first instance by the immediate responses to the 
article in the same issue.
30
 Stephen F. Cohen, for example, was deeply 
concerned that Fitzpatrick’s suggested new agenda would lead to the 
‘new cohort’ ‘closing one or both eyes to a major dimension of that 
social reality – the prolonged mass terror of the Stalin years’,
31
 stating 
that that Terror was also a social phenomenon, from which social 
processes associated with collectivization, industrialisation, 
urbanization, and upward mobility could not be separated.
32
 Geoff 
Eley too was concerned that ‘the desire of revisionists to drive a 
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polemical wedge between themselves and the older literature 
threatens to close their access to some basic insights’ and suggested 
that by neglecting the overall context of the coercive state and 
political culture of Stalinism revisionists would be discarding ‘the 
baby of analysis with the bathwater of the model’.
33
 He concluded 
that unless Fitzpatrick and her revisionists came to terms with the fact 
that the social history of Stalinism begins in the ‘explosive juncture’ 
of cultural archaism, societal transformation and statist 
bureaucratisation, then the idea that Stalinism had some social as well 
as political dynamics would remain a ‘banal discovery’.
34
 Peter Kenez 
stated that the revisionists’ view of Stalinism as ‘humdrum politics’ 
and of the Soviet government  being just like any other government 
operating in difficult circumstances was ‘utterly contrary to all 
evidence’.
35
 He concluded his damning assessment of revisionism by 
stating ‘[t]o me, the revisionists’ views are so outlandish that I 
wonder what makes them see the past the way they do. To that I have 
no answer at all.’
 36
   
The 1987 issue produced a greater balance of responses, at the 
centre of which remained the question of the place and scope of social 
history in the study of Stalinism. Daniel R. Brower, for example, 
suggested that ‘the methods of structural social history ought to 
remain secondary in the study of that period’.
37
  William Chase 
focused on the problem of producing pure social history on a period 
where any studies on societal changes and social mores, attitudes, 
behaviours and relations must necessarily deal with state policies and 
politics in general. As a result, despite his support for the introduction 
of social history to the field, Chase had ‘trouble supporting 
Fitzpatrick’s desire to see scholars write social history devoid of 
politics.’
38
 Robert Conquest discussed the ‘implicit distortion of the 
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broader picture’ engendered through neglecting politics and more 
specifically the Terror, and J. Arch Getty asked how social historians 
could possibly neglect the state and still produce a reliable picture of 
society.
39
 Hiroaki Kuromiya discussed the importance of the Terror to 
the study of Stalinism, agreeing to its centrality while stating that he 
was ‘inspired’ by Fitzpatrick’s research agenda.
40
 Similarly, Manning 
and Viola advocated a social history approach that did not neglect 
politics or the Terror.
41
 Gábor T. Rittersporn provided a defence of 
Fitzpatrick’s work against Cohen’ and Kenez’s critical articles, asking 
‘What is the context of terror if not the working of the system – the 
ultimate subject of the ‘new cohort’?’.
42
 Chase best expressed the 
crux of the debate when he stated that 
 
Getty, Rittersporn, Manning, Solomon, Viola and Fitzpatrick 
do not write social history as that term is understood and 
applied by historians of western Europe and America. 
Fitzpatrick’s work on cultural revolution and on education and 
social mobility are often cited as examples of social history, 
but in reality they are studies of selected socio-political 




The apparent principal drive of these articles, and a common point to 
all, was therefore the discussion of the extent to which politics could 
be left out of the study of Stalinism, with the majority of the 
participants suggesting that while a social history of Stalinism was 
undoubtedly necessary, as was an eventual revisionism in the field in 
the years following traditional Sovietology, it was necessary that 
politics and the Terror remain part of that history.
44
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4. Whose fault? Stalinism and the locus of blame 
  
These articles, however, suggest more than just concern with defining 
the interpretative framework for scholarship on Stalinism: the 
responses to a suggested removal or subordination of politics in social 
history research unveiled a clear and fundamental moral dimension to 
the argument.  
In a first instance, this was manifested by unease with where 
to place responsibility and blame for Stalinism if Stalin, politics and 
the Terror were to be removed from consideration.
45
 Kenez, for 
instance, suggested that the revisionists’ claim that - because the 
Bolsheviks possessed neither a well-functioning Party machinery nor 
an extensive coercive apparatus - society consented to this form of 
government was an extraordinary leap which ‘absolve[s] the 
leadership from responsibility for mass murder.’
46
 He argued that, 
whatever the factions and disorganisation within the Party apparatus, 
these were ‘hardly an excuse’ for the millions that were murdered, 
suggesting that according to him the appropriate placing of blame was 
an endeavour more important than finding a possible explanation for 
the Terror.
47
 In 1987 Alec Nove, too, discussed the question of 
Stalin’s responsibility, arguing that while he most likely did not will 
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the Terror and that he could not have been personally involved in 
every single daily decision made by the Kremlin, Getty was wrong to 
suggest that Stalin was not involved with the arrests of Politburo 
members.
48
 He concluded that while social history research into the 
1930s was highly desirable, the field must not ‘turn the revolution 
from above into a revolution by consent, or Stalin into a pawn of 
“radicals”, or caricature the past efforts of historians to understand the 
complexities’ of this period.
49
 Tucker too was cautious about 
removing Stalin’s role from Stalinism. Discussing the difficulties of 
using the term ‘Stalinism’, he asked whether it signified the sum of 
Stalin’s deeds while in power, or the events of his time in power.
50
 
This concern with defining Stalinism points to another instance of 
questioning where the blame for it lay. Tucker suggested that Stalin 
himself could not be removed from the equation: his character was 
central to the regime. To take it into account was to ‘illuminate the 
man’s drive for despotic power, the ways he went about obtaining it, 
and the uses he made of it.’
51
 To omit Stalin would be a sure formula 
for blundering in the ‘forest of facts’ of the 1930s and beyond, 
including Cold War and post-war foreign relations.
52
 
Providing the most balanced and least combative response of 
the 1986 articles to Fitzpatrick’s article, Alfred G. Meyer highlighted 
this preoccupation in placing the blame for Stalinism in the correct 
place. Stating that all attempts to exorcise the past or part of it implied 
‘celebrating, glorifying or whitewashing’ some part of it, he 
addressed the locus of blame in regards to émigré and samizdat 
writers, Khrushchev’s discourse on Stalin and Stalinism, and 
Solzhenitsyn’s work, which he suggested all in some way attempted 
to free a certain party from guilt.
53
 The revisionists presented 
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‘something of a mirror image’ to these: by demonstrating that Stalin 
was not as much in control as the totalitarianism school asserted, they 
were ‘to some extent absolving him from blame for some of the 
cruellest episodes of the Stalinist era. This does not, of course, lessen 
the pains of these episodes, but places the blame elsewhere’.
54
 Meyer 
recognised that neither the totalitarian school nor the revisionists 
denied that terrible things had happened under Stalin; their argument 
was ‘only over who is to be blamed for them’.
55
 
The defensive responses of the revisionists in the face of 
Kenez’s criticism in particular demonstrate the contentiousness of this 
issue. Getty pointed out that ‘as early as page 9 of my book, I gave 
Stalin “primary responsibility” for these events [the Terror and the 
purges]. No western scholarship has suggested otherwise’.
56
 
Kuromiya stated that ‘[o]f course, Stalin is to be blamed’; however 
revisionist research was less concerned with blaming Stalin than with 
explaining how and why ‘dreadful things’ happened and in what 
contexts.
57
 He concluded by asking ‘[d]oes such an interest stem from 
the concern to whitewash Stalinist politics or “exorcise the ghost of 
Stalin?” I think not’.
58
 Rittersporn warned of the limits of 
‘commemorative historiography’, noting that every commentator on 
the Fitzpatrick article in 1986 had suggested that writing on the 1930s 
must preserve the memory of the epoch’s atrocities and ‘condemn’ 
those who perpetrated them.
59
 Manning commented that by extending 
the questioning of the totalitarian thesis to the pre-war Stalin era, 
including the period of the purges, revisionists eschewed the political 
goals espoused by many American Soviet specialists ‘who are unable 
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to conceive of scholarship other than an enterprise undertaken to 
“indict” and/or “rehabilitate” particular individuals or movements’.
60
 
Manning also criticised Fitzpatrick for suggesting that only the state 
or society were capable of shaping the historical process, therefore 
implying that responsibility for the regime could only lie in one of 
those two places.
61
 She defended second generation revisionists 
against accusations of seeking to ‘rehabilitate’ Stalin, arguing that 
only by adequately and thoroughly testing the totalitarian model in 
detailed studies of events, social strata and levels of government 
could it be determined whether Stalin ‘all by himself in all instances 
determined everything’.
62
 Finally, Viola responded to accusations of 
absolving Stalin by stating that not only was she ‘not in the business 
of absolution’, but she also had not worked on the era of the purges.
63
 
A central characteristic of the debate on social history was 
therefore an urgent concern with the question of whether or not the 
revisionists’ work would in some way absolve the political 
leadership, and Stalin himself, of the horrors of Stalinism, and the 
revisionists’ responses to this concern.  
 
5. Blame and the moral dimension of the revisionist debates 
 
What does this preoccupation with the locus of blame tell us about the 
nature of these discussions? Writing on the concept of blame, D. 
Justin Coates and Neal A. Tognazzini suggest that blaming involves 
evaluating. When we blame others, we see them as having dropped 
below some standard that we accept (or perhaps that we think they 
should accept), whether of excellence, morality or respectful 
relationships. Coates and Tognazzini note that the judgements made 
are ‘tinged with normativity’ and because of this they carry a certain 
force: they are the sorts of judgements we would rather not have made 
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 The moral character of blame has been highlighted by 
others. T. M. Scanlon defined blame as an action taken to indicate 
something about the person being blamed that impairs one’s 
relationship with them, and to understand that relationship in a way 
that reflects this impairment. In most cases, to decide that a person is 
worthy of blame, they must have behaved wrongly and in a way that 
is considered to fall below normative moral standards.
65
 Angela M. 
Smith supported this idea when she argued that moral protest is the 
crucial element of blame, suggesting that there are two distinct but 
related aims to it: the first is to register the fact that the person 
wronged did not deserve to be treated in this way by challenging the 
moral claim implicit in the wrong-doer’s action. The second is to 
prompt moral recognition and acknowledgement of this fact on the 
part of the wrong-doer and/or the moral community.
66
 Finally, George 
Sher has also emphasised the primacy of the moral dimension in 
placing blame, arguing that when we blame someone we imply that 
their actions have been morally defective.
67
 
The moral character of allocating blame and its centrality to 
that process is clearly manifested in these debates, both in regards to 
Stalin and to the work of the revisionists. This was firstly exemplified 
by those concerned with the ‘whitewashing’ of Stalin’s regime by the 
‘new cohort’.
68
 Kenez suggested, for instance, that denying the 
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importance of state intervention in the life of society meant that, 
consciously or unconsciously, they ‘de-demonize Stalin and his 
Politburo’.
69
 On the subject of the ‘inevitable’ moral dimension of 
research on Stalinism, he went on to question the moral integrity of 
the revisionists, commenting that ‘[i]f the stress on terror betrays a 
certain moral sensibility, so does the denial of its significance’.
70
 In 
our understanding of the attribution of blame, Cohen and Meyer’s 
accusations of revisionism ‘obscuring and minimizing’ the Terror and 
placing the blame elsewhere than on Stalin implied that not only was 
Stalin to blame for the horrors of Stalinism, and therefore morally 
defective, but the revisionists themselves were too for ‘absolving’ 
him.
71
 The choice to publish these frank and at times bitter criticisms 
of Fitzpatrick and the ‘new cohort’ also suggests that they sought 
recognition from, and a challenge by the field of these shortcomings, 
constituting an appeal to the ‘moral community’, as described by 
Smith. 
In their application to both Stalinism and to revisionist 
scholarship, the dual dimensions of morality and blame continued to 
manifest themselves in the responses to the 1986 articles. On the one 
hand, we have seen that the ‘new cohort’ were quick to reject any 
claims that they were removing responsibility from Stalin, thereby 
refuting the inferiority of their own moral standards. On the other 
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hand, they were highly critical of the moralising tendency present in 
the criticisms of their work. In her immediate response to the 1986 
critics, for instance, Fitzpatrick commented that one of the ways in 
which dealing with the Terror should be avoided was the repetition of 
familiar data cited from familiar secondary sources, ‘framed by 
restatement of familiar moral judgements that might as well also be 
put in quotation marks. There is something of this in Cohen’s 
commentary’.
72
 She also noted the problems with ‘counter-
moralizing’, meaning a consistent but generally unacknowledged 
effort to divert blame for terror from the regime. Acknowledging that 
counter-moralising was a trap for revisionists, she highlighted that it 
implied acceptance of the terms of debate set by the moralisers 
(presumably here she is referring to Cohen and Kenez in particular), 
‘together with a degree of cautious defiance of their intimidatory 
tone’. This was no-win situation for the revisionists and ‘no good for 
scholarship in general’. What was important was making the 
distinction between counter-moralising and the critical examination of 
sources and data.
73
 In 1987 Chase also turned accusations of scholarly 
shortcomings back on the critics, suggesting that since Cohen and 
Kenez misrepresented the revisionists’ work ‘one must conclude that 
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what they were really doing was using their commentaries to reaffirm 
their hatred of Stalinism and sublimating their moral indignation with 
that system into an unjust condemnation of those who seek to clarify 
our understanding’.
74
 Referring to Cohen’s criticisms, Getty 
commented that it was surely possible to write about important 
specialised subjects, such as education, factory workers, social 
mobility and even the workings of Party organisations, without 
‘putting statements of moral outrage, however justified, on every page 
and without making these topics mere subsets of the Great Terror.’
75
 
Getty reserved his harshest criticisms for Kenez, however, the ‘most 
frightening parts’ of whose remarks were his defence of demonology 
as a historical method and his ‘explicit proposal for an ethics test in 
Soviet history’, concluding that ‘one does not need demonology to 
comprehend history and society.’
76
 Kuromiya similarly stated that 
Kenez clearly demonstrated his wish to keep the study of Stalinist 
politics in the realm of demonology, revealing his desire to impose 
his own interests and interpretations upon other histories.
77
 ‘Even 
more alarming’ than this however was what Getty termed Kenez’s 
‘obsession’ with measuring the moral quality of authors and their 
studies of the Stalin era, finding his remarks ‘offensive, insulting, and 
unscholarly’.
78
 On the same subject, Kuromiya noted that while it was 
necessary to be sensitive to the moral dimensions of the subject, ‘such 
an unwarranted allegation on the part of well-established senior 
scholars would only help intimidate the less established historians and 
drive them out of the field’.
79
 
Stemming from the debate on the role of social history in 
studies of Stalinism, the notion of morality thus became central to 
these arguments on two levels. Firstly it related to the immorality of 
Stalinism and the need for its recognition, without which Stalin and 
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the leadership would be absolved of responsibility. Secondly, it 
related to the immorality of the revisionists’ work in reducing or 
removing the focus from the political dimensions of Stalinism, and 
the Terror. In turn, the revisionists’ responses to this accusation also 
acquired morality as a central theme. 
 
6. Conclusion: the revisionist debates and Western attitudes 
towards Stalin and Stalinism 
 
As Rittersporn pointed out, ‘To a large extent, this debate is not about 
Soviet history, but about Western mentalités’
80
; indeed, these debates 
are revelatory about the way in which Stalin and Stalinism were 
viewed at this time. In a wider sense, these articles are an insight into 
shifting definitions of the nature, and level of responsibility, of 
something deemed ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ at this time. The introduction of 
revisionist ideas in which Stalin himself might not be solely 
responsible for the dynamics and actions of the Stalinist state and for 
which bureaucratic forces and tensions could partly be to blame (as 
Getty was arguing in The Origins of the Great Purges
81
) were 
reminiscent of the idea of the ‘banality of evil’ Hannah Arendt had 
controversially expressed in 1963 after witnessing the trial of Adolph 
Eichmann, an SS officer whose job it had been to organise the 
deportation and evacuation of many European Jews under Nazi rule.
82
 
For Arendt, Eichmann had been a totally ordinary man fulfilling his 
role as a functionary. He became so involved in the task at hand and 
the daily banality of completing this task that he completely lost track 
of what was right and wrong.
83
 Eichmann’s evil was banal because it 
was borne of completely mundane anxieties and considerations. 
Arendt argued that Himmler had capitalised on this particular kind of 
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individual: an ordinary man who would sacrifice ‘his beliefs, his 
honor, and his human dignity’ in order to protect his wife, children, 
salary and pension.
84
 The problem for those judging Eichmann at his 
trial was that he was not an obvious monster: ‘the trouble with 
Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the 
many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, 
terrifyingly normal.’
85
 In the early 1970s, the notion of the ordinary 
individual being capable in certain circumstances of abhorrent acts 
had been exemplified in the astounding results of Philip Zimbardo’s 
Stanford Prison Experiment which highlighted how quickly notions 
of human compassion and equality could disintegrate.
86
 None of the 
revisionists claimed that Stalin was an ordinary man, yet the idea that 
multiple processes, stresses, tensions and dynamics at work in the 
Party and the leadership led to the Terror, the purges and the extreme 
nature of Stalinism share common ground with Arendt’s analysis of 
the banality of evil, and the results of the Zimbardo’s experiment. 
Shifting notions of where the responsibility for violence and coercion 
lay, and the responses to these shifts, were at the heart of the Russian 
Review debates. 
  We have seen in the previous chapters that the concepts of 
inferiority, danger, difference, deviancy, and indeed morality had all 
been central to the constructions of the Stalinist other. Thanks to the 
debates in the Russian Review examined here, we can see that through 
the clashes between scholarly generations it generated, the period of 
revisionism produced a construction of the Stalinist other in which 
morality and blame became the dominant hinges on which this 
construction was made. This has been exemplified in this chapter in 
two ways. The first, representing a typical pattern of othering, was the 
recognition and reinforcement by all, revisionists and non-revisionists 
alike, that there were undeniable and grave moral failings in the 
Stalinist regime and that Stalin himself was at least largely if not 
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entirely responsible for these. Stalinism remained the other in this 
period through its failure to live up to the West’s moral standards and 
was universally reinforced as such in the debates.  
An unexpected outcome of this was that by diminishing 
Stalin’s responsibility, or seeming to neglect these grave moral 
failings, the ‘new cohort’ revisionists by extension also took on an 
immoral quality in the eyes of their critics. Their neglect or refusal to 
attribute the locus of blame to where the older scholars demanded it 
be placed meant that they, as well as Stalinism, were presented as the 
other in these debates. For example, Cohen, Kenez, Meyer and 
Conquest were at pains to point out the differences between their own 
research agendas, interpretative paradigms and moral integrity, and 
those of the revisionists. It is a most striking characteristic of these 
debates that the same concepts of morality and blame were used to 
construct both Stalin and Stalinism, and the ‘new cohort’ revisionists. 
This demonstrates how significant the Western construction of the 
Stalinist other was to the totalitarian model scholars and some first 
generation revisionists, as well as the deep effects of the global 
context of this period, itself once again in a state of change and 
upheaval. It is for this reason that what began as a discussion on the 
place of social history in the field of Soviet studies acquired such a 
passionate, argumentative, controversial and at times bitter nature.  
As social history became displaced by cultural history in the 
wider profession from the late 1980s onwards, and as the Soviet 




those of the previous periods examined in this thesis, persisted in 
post-Soviet writing on Stalin and Stalinism?
87
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history. The kind of social history practiced by the revisionists (and by social 
science historians within the historical profession), which investigated social 
processes such as social mobility and group dynamics, often with the use of 
quantitative data alongside empirical research, was no longer deemed sufficient. 
Historians were now working on incorporating anthropological dimensions into 
their research. In her article on history and anthropology in the 1980s, Natalie Z. 
Davis identifies four ways in which anthropological works can be of use to 
historians: ‘close observation of living processes of social interaction; interesting 
ways of interpreting symbolic behavior; suggestions about how the parts of a social 
system fit together; and material from cultures very different from those which 
historians are used to studying’. See N. Z. Davis, ‘The Possibilities of the Past’, 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 12, No. 2, The New History: The 1980s 
and beyond (II) (Autumn, 1981), pp. 267-275, p. 267. Putting into practice these 
benefits, history writing began to focus on the smaller details of everyday life and 
the anthropological origins of these elements: this also became known as 
‘microhistory’. The microhistorians had several methodological criticisms of social 
science history, namely that the latter deprived the past of its qualitative aspects and 
left it without a human face. In an attempt to remedy this, microhistorians rejected 
the social sciences’ focus on anonymous structures and processes. See Iggers, 
Historiography in the Twentieth Century, pp.116-117. Gentilgore states that if we 
consider previous kinds of dominant histories, such as economic, political or social 
as macrohistory, microhistory provided a way of small-scale data, now considered 
to be a necessary part of the historiography of a subject, to relate to the larger-scale 
– macrohistory. Furthermore it allowed a new way of describing and analysing the 






Friction in the archives: revolutions and counter-
revolutions in the post-Soviet historiography of Stalin 
and Stalinism  
 
 
1. The ‘Archival Revolution’ 
 
The advent of glasnost’ and perestroika in the late 1980s and the 
eventual demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 created several 
important interpretative and contextual shifts which impacted the 
Western historiography of Stalin and Stalinism. 
1
 Firstly, the end of  
the Cold War meant the end of the ideological warfare between 
Russia and the West which had become so central to scholarship on 
Stalin and Stalinism, and on the Soviet Union. Secondly, the opening 
of the Soviet archives provided researchers of Russia and of the 
Soviet bloc with access to documentation on a level that had been 
until then unfathomable. Thirdly, there was now an end to Soviet 
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An assessment of publications since 1991 suggests the emergence 
of some general themes in the structure and production of works on 
Stalinism. In the first instance, sudden access to vast amounts of 
documentation has changed the way in which works on Stalin and 
Stalinism have been formatted, placing the document as the central 
element to the work, rather than the scholarly argument. Secondly, the 
collaboration of Russian and Western scholars and Western 
institutional collaboration with the archives themselves have emerged 
as significant trends, as exemplified by the works published in the 
Annals of Communism series.
 3
 This series exemplifies both trends but 
is especially useful in demonstrating the new usage of documents. 
Many of the books contain an introduction in which the editors set out 
contexts and questions as well as their own conclusions as to what the 
documents demonstrate; the documents are only accompanied by 
short explanatory paragraphs. While the introductions set out 
specifically what the editors believe can be gained from the 
documents, and while they may not alter the actual concepts and ideas 
being discussed, these works provide an illustration of the 
development of a noticeable trend of using the documents as the 
principal actor.  This to a certain extent can remove from focus the 
main ideas and arguments that to date had been the most prominent 
elements of the works, suggesting that access to these documents has 
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in some cases allowed historians to strip back on argumentative 
content, to present the documents, comment on them, but ultimately 
let them speak for themselves.
4
 Since there had been little accessible 
archival data, and little scholarly interaction between Russia and the 
West until glasnost’, these were all radically new ways of acquiring 
and publishing information from the Soviet era in the post-Soviet 
world, and they help us to understand to what ends this 
documentation has been used and the variety of research the archives 
have enabled.  
The ‘archival revolution’ refers not only to the gradual opening of 
the Russian state archives from the late 1980s onwards but also to the 
general increase in access to local records, oral testimonies, and 
private documents throughout the Soviet Union.
5
 Since the early 
1990s, part of Stalin’s personal collection, fond 558, has been made 
available in the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History 
(RGASPI) and more recently online in the form of the Stalin Digital 
Archive (SDA). The variety and volume of official papers in this fond 
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chronology of the archival revolution and an overview of some of the kinds of 
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have revolutionised research on Stalin’s leadership. They document 
his foreign policy, his industrialisation and collectivisation policies, 
and his economic policy over the course of his time in power. 
Correspondence between Stalin and his closest colleagues – Lazar 
Kaganovich, Lavrenti Beria, Nikolai Yezhov and Vyacheslav 
Molotov, for example – reveal the communications which decided 
arrests, torture, and executions during the period of the purges.
6
 The 
documents also include hundreds of annotated memos, manuscripts 
and speeches passed between Stalin and his colleagues, which have 
helped to understand the extent of Stalin’s decision-making in all 
matters of government over the course of the regime.
7
 Some files of 
the NKVD were also declassified in the State Archive for the Russian 
Federation (GARF), allowing access to hundreds of thousands of 
documents on the organisation, deployment and action of the police 
over the course of the Soviet period. 
As well as allowing access to the information contained in fond 
558, the accessibility of a huge variety of documents in the many 
Soviet archives, both in Moscow and locally, have allowed research 
to occur on all aspects of life under Stalinism, from local party 
activity to music and film. The displacement of social history by 
cultural history in the wider historical profession has been facilitated 
in the field of Soviet studies by the declassification of personal 
records, such as memoirs, diaries and correspondence that have 
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 See J. A. Getty’s introduction to, and information on, the Stalin Digital Archive 
site itself: www.stalindigitalarchive.com. The RGASPI archive contains tens of 
thousands of documents relating to all aspects of Stalin’s leadership (the SDA alone 
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enabled researchers to begin to construct a picture of ‘everyday’ 
Stalinism: the reality of life during the Stalinist regime, how Soviet 
citizens lived, worked and played, as well as how they viewed and 
interacted with the state. 
8
 
There have been some thorough surveys of the theoretical and 
methodological changes in research on Stalinism resulting from the 
archival revolution.
 9
 Yet there are questions which have emerged 
from the analysis of the impact of this event on post-Soviet 
historiography that require further attention: what hopes were 
established by scholars for the field at the outset of this event? How 
have works on Stalin and Stalinism changed since the archival 
revolution? Have the archives allowed for a greater diversification of 
the field, and has a new common research agenda emerged in the 
twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union? And, finally, 
what does post-Soviet research tell us about Western attitudes 
towards Stalin and Stalinism? 
 
2. The conceptual counter-revolution and its critics 
 
Writing from the early post-Soviet period shows that the archival 
revolution encouraged retrospective, and introspective, tendencies, as 
scholars reflected on the state of their field. These tendencies are most 
noticeable in the 1990s when some scholars sought to revisit the past 
historiography. In anticipation - and sometimes trepidation - of the 
potential revelations that might arise from the archives, they 
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questioned the direction in which it would travel in a post-Soviet era. 
Previously central notions such as morality and the use of the 
totalitarian model of interpretation in the study of Stalinism remained, 
for a time at least, at the fore, while alongside them new issues 
relating to the usage of archival material emerged.  
The concern with the moral issue was exemplified in 
Catherine Merridale’s survey of developments in the field between 
1989 and 1991 in which she suggested that the principal issue in the 
field in 1993 was that it was still impossible to not find oneself in a 
‘moral swamp’ when discussing the purges.
 10
 In the works she had 
reviewed for the article, Merridale noted that the Stalinist period 
emerged as one of ‘total gloom’ under which nothing was gained. 
While this notion lent itself to popular acceptance, the question at 
hand was in fact much more difficult. The question of morality, 
passionately debated in the 1986 and 1987 Russian Review articles, 
remained for Merridale the most important and largest obstacle for the 
field to overcome. For the future she predicted that many ‘Stalinisms’ 
would emerge, as historians battled to understand it. Merridale hoped 
above all for scholarly integrity, that ‘historians of Russia will at last 
enter a debate with their colleagues which is not overwhelmingly 
predicated on judgements about good and evil, individual dictatorship 
and totalitarianism.’
11
 The resilient contentiousness of this issue was 
demonstrated when over a decade later Conquest stated that “One of 
the strangest notions put forward about Stalinism is that, in the 
interests of ‘objectivity’ we must be – wait for it – ‘non-judgemental’. 
But to ignore or downplay the realities of Soviet history is itself a 
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judgement and a very misleading one.”
12
 In his memoirs, Richard 
Pipes also defiantly stated that he felt no need to apologise for having 
expressed judgement of historical phenomena since he was not 
dealing ‘with inevitable natural phenomena but with the consequences 




As well as underlining the on-going moral issue, the opening 
of the archives at once reignited arguments for and against 
totalitarian-model frameworks, and produced hopes for a new kind of 
scholarship that would turn its back on the old totalitarian versus 
revisionist argument. Steve Smith highlighted this in 1994 when he 
criticised the field for being largely - indeed ‘depressingly’ - 
unadventurous, returning time and time again to the same questions.
14
 
This situation had been created by a desire to debunk myths of 
Sovietology and pressure to produce research and publications to 
specific institutional requirements in the quest for tenure and high 
ratings in research assessment rankings.
15
 Stephen Kotkin, having 
noted a post-Soviet return to politics-focused research, also wanted 
the ‘blunt instrument’ of the totalitarian model to be cast aside in 
order to be able to study ‘how the goals and techniques of social 
welfare, as well as their accompanying terrain of social identities, 
helped constitute forms of power and resistance that existed under a 
variety of political regimes’.
16
 For Kotkin, Stalinism was more than 
simply a history of dictatorship and non-capitalism, and he suggested 
that the ‘microstructures and microprocesses’ of welfare needed to be 
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examined with finer analytical tools than those used to date.
17
 
Merridale too criticised writing on Stalinism for remaining as yet too 
focused on the Terror: whatever the focus of the historian, ‘the purges 
themselves remain a major obstacle to lucid analysis’.
18
  
Yet despite the call to abandon totalitarian and politics-
focused research, the opening of the archives has also led some 
scholars to debate the problems associated with the usage of social 
history. In particular, the issue of ‘fragmentation’ in historiography 
has emerged as an on-going concern. The term can be understood as 
the process in which cultural and social historians overspecialise and 
fragment histories, which leads to ‘breaking things down’. This 
results in very specialised and specific studies, the idea being that 
eventually, accumulated, these would piece together to create the 
bigger picture. Criticism of this process suggested that this method of 
analysis leads to the existence of social history for its own sake and 
that by removing it from the larger structural context it becomes 
peripheral and, while interesting, unable to engage with the wider, 
more substantive issues: ‘For some, social or cultural histories have 
missed the point; in looking for the needle, they have missed the 
haystack. Omitting or ignoring the state, politics, and ideology 




The issue of fragmentation (although not necessarily referred 
to using this specific term) had already been addressed in the Russian 
Review debates of 1986 and 1987 when many scholars reacted 
strongly against the notion of studying Soviet society without taking 
into account the influence of the state.
20
 In the post-Soviet period, 
these concerns endured.  For example, while introducing an article by 
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Sheila Fitzpatrick in 1993, the editor of the Russian Review revisited 
the debates of the late 1980s, attempting to ascertain whether they 
continued to be relevant.
21
 The place and the limitations of social 
history in the study of Stalinism remained at the forefront: 
‘Fitzpatrick's findings do not negate all previous scholarship on the 
politics of Stalinism, they simply put it in a much more complex 
setting and remind us that "society" develops with laws of its own 
even when the heavy hand of the state asserts itself most vigorously’. 
22
 In the same year, writing on post-Soviet scholarship on the Soviet 
Union, Dominic Lieven also broached the issue, writing that ‘as with 
most historical schools, the social historians provide many new and 
useful insights. The danger only comes if they threaten to monopolize 
the field.’
23
 Mark Sandle also questioned whether it was right that 
social and cultural historians had been criticised for generating the 
fragmentation process and whether these ‘new directions’ (i.e. studies 
of history from below) ‘illuminate or obfuscate’ research. According 
to Sandle’s conclusion, one of the most positive outcomes to date 
(1995) was the willingness of researchers to use the vast new variety 
of sources available to them, not only from the national archives and 
national press but also from local archives, local press, interviews, 
songs, folklore and cinema. This compelled historians to ‘re-examine 
and rethink the old politico-historical narratives, and to consider how 




The trepidation demonstrated by some in the face of the 
archival revolution has also manifested itself through the issue of 
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 For example, Getty noted that while it helps the 
historian that the Soviet government recorded everything they did, the 
official language of these texts does not begin to illuminate the 
cruelty and suffering inflicted on the Soviet people, meaning we are 
always at risk ‘of presenting a terrible human drama in humdrum 
bureaucratic language’.
26
 Getty set out another ‘less obvious’ issue: 
that the move from a paucity to an embarrassment of riches for the 
historians of the Soviet era has meant that historians have had to pick 
and choose which documents they use and run the risk of leaving 
something important out. Indeed for Getty, the main obstacle with the 
publication of The Road to Terror, for instance, was whether they 
would publish, and then find a vital piece of information that either 
supported or contradicted their findings.
27
 However , Getty did not 
mention the principal problem highlighted by many others: the 
reliability of the sources. Alter Litvin and John Keep have noted that 
one of the key problems of historians working with the Soviet 
documents is to determine how reliable and authentic they are, and 
this view is echoed around the field through a general awareness that 
the content of the sources should not and cannot be taken at face 
value. Smith was already warning of this fetishisation in 1994, 
although for him it was more a question of restricting creativity and 
innovative thinking in the field rather than a question of reliability of 
the sources.
28
 Kotkin also referred to the retreat into ‘archival 
fetishism’ as one of the two paths younger scholars in the field have 
taken, the other being that of the familiar polemics of totalitarian 
versus revisionist models, or social versus political history. 
29
 It is 
noteworthy, however, that while in 2007 Hiroaki Kuromiya still 
identified taking archival documents at face value as a real problem 
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within the field, in 2001 Oleg Khlevniuk felt that researchers had 
already overcome their main obstacle: to remove unrealistically high 
expectations of what would be found in the archives, suggesting that 
this ability to have overcome archival ‘over-expectation’ and to use 
these sources as historians would have used previously accessible 
sources ‘has to be considered one of the most important results of the 
decade.’30  
Therefore in the early post-91 period the balance between 
careful use of documentation, social and political history, their 
interpretative frameworks and their limitations proved central to 
reactions to the archival revolution in the 1990s and to the suggestion 
of possible directions for future research on Stalinism. 
 
3. New era, old agendas? Soviet-era scholarship in a post-
Soviet world 
 
While the archival revolution has had a clear and tangible impact on 
the way in which works on Stalin and Stalinism have been researched 
and structured, the question of the evolution of interpretative 
paradigms in the post-Soviet era remains complex. Smith, Kotkin and 
Merridale called for a move away from old arguments between social 
and political historians. But have old agendas and research themes 
persisted? And if so, have new ones been able to emerge alongside 
them? Access to documentation might have been expected to displace 
some previously made assertions about the Stalinist regime, such 
were the varying and at times radically different interpretations put 
forward during the Soviet era.  In fact, the post-1991 pattern largely 
suggests that, far from forcing some scholars to abandon earlier 
conclusions, the new source material has in part been used to 
reinforce old agendas.  
In works where the document has taken precedence, this idea 
leads to the question of the extent to which the editors were also the 
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secondary ‘authors’ of these works. As editors themselves have 
pointed out, due to the enormous volume of information now 
available, they are obliged to be selective. Nevertheless, the notion 
that using archival documents helps to remove the possibility of bias 
or agenda-pushing is deeply questionable. The problem lies in 
whether the documents dictate the content and direction of the edited 
volume, or if it is the editors’ careful choices which reflect the 
realities which they are hoping to demonstrate. The claim, for 
example, by the Annals of Communism series that it does not promote 
certain interpretations is reflected in the variety of subjects on which 
it has published and of editors who have contributed to the collection. 
At the same time, amongst works from both within and out-with this 
series, there are examples of the editors clearly using documents to 
promote the same arguments they had in the Soviet period. For 
example, in his 1985 work The Origins of the Great Purges Getty 
made what were perceived as controversial claims that the Terror was 
not minutely planned by Stalin but was in fact the result of 
bureaucratic tensions within the Party that led to many unanticipated 
outcomes. After his post-1991 archival research, Getty identified 
some errors from his previous analysis. In an interview in 2009 he 
stated that he was wrong to suggest that there was no communication 
between local police and the State. He in fact found that not only did 
they interact, but they also competed for power. 
31
 However, it is clear 
from the The Road to Terror, that Getty used the archival documents 
that became available to him to further develop the ideas he presented 
in Origins. In The Road to Terror Getty states that allocating all 
blame on Stalin for the Terror, as had been widely done until that 
point, amounted to coming ‘perilously close to falling into the literary 
genre of fairytales, complete with an evil and all-powerful sorcerer 
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working against virtuous but powerless victims’.
32
 According to 
Getty, it was not only a top-down police operation but a question of 
people denouncing those all around them: while Stalin certainly 
started the violence, he could not be seen as the sole causing factor.
33
  
To what extent does this suggest Getty has used the archives 
to continue to push his argument? According to Getty, ‘because of the 
nature of the sources’, the book focuses on the Politburo and the 
nomenklatura elite that supported it.
34
 These selected documents 
certainly support Getty’s argument: they are chosen from plenum 
speeches of the Central Committee, Politburo and nomenklatura 
correspondence, but also suicide notes from denounced party 
members, Politburo resolutions, Stalin speeches, and arrest orders of 
Party members. They reflect well the tensions within the party. This is 
particularly well exemplified by the Secret Central Committee letter 
on the Kirov assassination, dated 18
th
 January 1935. For Getty, 
despite the fact that it ‘turned the heat up on present and former 
dissidents’, the letter was not a call for terror.
35
 Getty suggests instead 
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that this document implies that Kirov’s alleged assassins (Zinoviev 
and his followers) had been captured and had therefore been dealt 
with. Further, he notes that a party purge did not happen until nearly 
five months later.
36
 A letter relating to an incident which might 
otherwise be thought of as a vital piece of documentation regarding 
the start of the Terror is used by Getty to demonstrate why it is not.
37
 
There are similar instances of pre-1991 agendas being 
continued in Fitzpatrick’s Everyday Stalinism. Fitzpatrick’s Soviet era 
work centred on the notion that society was not an inert mass, 
terrorised and suppressed by the Stalinist regime. While she agreed 
that there were many victims of the regime, Soviet society was also 
dynamic, responsive and interactive, and many benefited from the 
Stalinist state. Her most controversial notion, perceived by some as 
reducing the significance of coercion and the Terror, was that certain 
social elements – such as grievances, pressures, sources of support 
and response – must have shaped the State’s policy, put it under 
pressure, constrained and modified some its actions.
38
  
In her later post-Soviet work there is a continuation of these 
ideas, supported by the documentation she found in the archives. 
Everyday Stalinism, for instance, examines the daily lives of those 
living in the USSR of the 1930s. It is not a study of how or why the 
Terror occurred; its focus is entirely on the daily experiences of the 
‘Homo Sovieticus’ who emerged during the Stalinist era, and 
specifically during the era of the Terror. The complexity of life at this 
time, illuminated by Fitzpatrick’s research, helps to support her 
earlier interpretations of life under Stalinism. Indeed, Fitzpatrick 
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seeks to understand what ‘normal’ (for, she says, it was neither 
normal by their or our standards) life was in Stalinist 1930s. The 
picture she has built throughout the work, thanks to archival 
materials, demonstrates the complexity of this society, a far cry from 
the inert, brutalised masses the totalitarian-model school had depicted.  
While her account undoubtedly highlighted the extreme 
difficulties of life under Stalinism (and this indeed was part of the aim 
of the work) Fitzpatrick’s sources – archival documents, press 
articles, interviews
39
 – also bring to life the society she had 
determinedly argued existed, in the face of much criticism, in the 
1980s, supporting her previous assertion that there was more to the 
state-society relationship than Cold War Sovietology had suggested.
40
 
Fitzpatrick’s research into these many layers of societal activity, and 
the picture she constructs of society under Stalin demonstrate how she 
has utilised the archival revolution to develop and strengthen her 
argument that the interaction between state and society was not only a 
one way, top down persecution (though it was this too), but that 
society could exert influence on, and provoke anxiety for the State 
itself, even if at the origin the State had created the conditions for this 
to occur. 
                                                 
39
  In Everyday Stalinism, Fitzpatrick has used information from archival 
documentation from RGASPI and GARF, other state archives, such as RGAE 
(which deals with documentation relating to the economy) and RGVA (which deals 
with war documentation), as well as some local archives, such as those in 
Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk. She has also drawn on many Russian newspapers and 
journals of the 1930s.  
40
 For instance, her depictions of the many people who were obliged to live a double 
life in order to conceal any potentially damaging aspects of their past help to 
demonstrate this: these individuals constructed separate private and public personas, 
but the lines were blurred, and the desire to become the public persona could result 
in the internalisation of that persona. The efforts, strategies, denunciations and fears 
of discovery associated with this process created a whole sub-culture of its own: the 
building of a new life, wrote Fitzpatrick, was sometimes ‘a complex effort of the 
whole family, using many different ploys’, and the psychological strain of 
concealment has often been emphasized by those who took part it in it. For 
Fitzpatrick, the most important consequence for the state of having so many 
potential ‘enemies’ stigmatised for a variety of reasons was the concealment on a 
large scale of social origin and identity. This, she said, was the aspect that weighed 
most heavily on the political leadership, who assumed that a person stigmatized was 
automatically the enemy. See S. Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in 




It was not only the revisionists who continued to argue their 
Soviet-era positions, and indeed the totalitarian-model scholars also 
continued to fight their corner. For example, Robert Conquest has 
continued to develop his earlier account and interpretation of 
Stalinism. His influential 1968 book The Great Terror had interpreted 
the purges as a means for Stalin to acquire absolute power. He did so 
by using a particular, specific form of despotism, sacrificing the 
nation and the Party.
41
  With the opening of the archives, and the end 
of the Soviet Union, Conquest published a 40
th
 anniversary edition of 
the book. It is clear not only from his suggestion for an updated title 
for the  new edition (‘I told you so, you fucking fools’
42
), but also 
from its content that Conquest remains dedicated to his initial 
findings: ‘though inviting some amendments on a few points, the 
period’s history as given here has been substantially validated’.
43
 He 
defended his position that Stalin was the principal architect of the 
terror:  
 
the nature of the whole purge depends in the last analysis on 
the personal and political drives of Stalin…If Stalin’s personal 
drives were the motive force of the Purge, it is also true that 
his ability to conceal his nature was the rock on which all 
resistance to the Purge foundered. His opponents could not 





For Conquest, the new documentation only confirmed that ‘the 




Martin Malia too stuck to his long-held views on the centrality 
of ideology to the Stalinist regime. In 1990 Malia had published an 
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article anonymously in the American journal Daedalus which 
predicted that the Soviet Union could not survive perestroika and 
glasnos’t. He argued that in a system such as the Soviet one ideology 
was the key:
46
Once this ideology is fundamentally questioned by the 
elite, the regime cannot survive. Malia likened the ideological belief 
in the Soviet Union by its ruling elite to myth-making, suggesting that 
once the mythical foundations were questioned, the regime 
collapsed.
47
 Eschewing the opposing view of many revisionists, Malia 
was one of few in the field who emphatically believed that reform 
was not possible. Demonstrating the tenacity of the idea of the 
centrality of ideology, he noted that ‘communism is not reforming, it 
is disintegrating’.
48
 One of his major works, The Soviet Tragedy, not 
published until 1994, was the long-awaited result of a lifetime’s work.
 
49
  It reflected what Malia had fundamentally felt throughout his life 
and career and was the result of a long development of his own theory 
on the nature and course of Russian and European history: the key to 
understanding the Soviet regime was ideology, and especially the 
primacy of ideology and politics over social and economic factors. 
Like Karpovich, as well as Pipes and other totalitarian-model 
scholars, he believed Stalinism to be the natural successor to 
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 In the opening sentences of The Soviet Tragedy he 
stated that 
 
The negative fact of Sovietism emerged only progressively, as 
the dictatorship of the proletariat turned first into the 
dictatorship of the Party and then into the dictatorship of 
Stalin, and finally as the resulting totalitarian system expanded 




Richard Pipes similarly continued to argue for the continuity 
between Leninism and Stalinism, with the latter being an unavoidable 
product of the former, the two retaining the same ideological and 
political foundations. Pipes’ work on the Soviet Union began in the 
fifties, but it was not until the early nineties that he published a two-
volume history of the Russian revolution. Here, in the face of years of 
revisionism in the field, Pipes stood his ground. In his 2005 book A 




In theory, one can conceive a Trotsky, Bukharin, or Zinoviev 
grasping the torch from the dying Lenin and leading the 
Soviet Union in a different direction than Stalin. What one 
cannot conceive is how they could have been in a position to 
do so, given the realities of the power structure at the time of 
Lenin’s illness. By throttling democratic impulses in the Party 
in order to protect his dictatorship, and by imposing on the 
Party a top-heavy command structure, Lenin ensured that the 
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man who controlled the central party apparatus controlled the 




Writing about the unlikelihood of a ‘new orthodoxy’ based on the 
work of social and cultural historians gaining any funding or 
patronage leverage in American institutions, Dominic Lieven aptly 
summed up Pipes’ position when he commented that ‘from behind 
Harvard's mighty ramparts Richard Pipes, formidable scholar and 
crusader, can thunder his message with complete disdain for the 
pressures of government and fashionable opinion.’
54
    
  It is clear, then, that regardless of all the research directions 
this new era might have afforded researchers, old constructions, 
interpretations and agendas remain. The works of these scholars, 
whose careers have spanned both the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, 
demonstrate the tenacity of pre-archival revolution, and pre-
revisionism, interpretations of Stalinism. They have utilised new 
access to source material not to radically reassess their findings, but to 
consolidate them and push them forwards into the new era.  
 
4. History with the politics left in: post-Soviet scholarship on 
Stalin and the Terror 
 
As exemplified by writing in the early 1990s, some scholars had been 
concerned that too much attention was still being given to the Terror 
in the late 1980s and very early 1990s, yet in 2011 Oleg Khlevniuk 
wrote that in the post-Soviet period ‘The history of terror and the 
Gulag deserves detailed analysis, as it occupies the most significant 
place in the historiography of Stalinism’.
55
As a project that sets out to 
publish on diverse and wide-ranging topics, the Annals of 
Communism series can help to assess whether the field has moved 
away from terror-centric research. Out of the 30 published or soon to 
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be published works of the Annals of Communism series, over half 
(18) relate to the Stalinist period.
56
 This is not necessarily surprising: 
after all, the Stalinist regime was in place for the majority of the 
Soviet period and has as a period arguably elicited the most interest. 
Are post-Soviet works principally concerned with the Terror within a 
totalitarian model framework, as feared by Merridale and Smith in the 
early 1990s? There is undoubtedly still a certain amount of focus on 




 Firstly, the opening of the archives has allowed prominent 
topics such as the Terror to be reassessed more accurately, justifying a 
continuing focus on them in research. This has been particularly well 
exemplified by the work of Paul Gregory and Stephen Wheatcroft. 
Gregory’s re-examination of Stalinist state organisation has allowed a 
far more accurate and complete understanding of the way in which 
the dictatorship orchestrated repression and the Terror than had been 
previously possible. Thanks to the archival revolution ‘there are now 
enough chinks in this armour [the unavailability of sources] to write 
such an account’.
58
 Wheatcroft too has challenged previous 
scholarship on Stalinism through new information found in the 
archives, stating that when secret archives become available for the 
first time ‘it would be remarkable indeed if there were no radical 
challenges to the traditional view of history’.
59
 For example, 
Wheatcroft has argued that archival materials demonstrate that the 
1932-1933 famine was not provoked by the Soviet authorities and 
that the suggestion that they had not taken any steps to improve the 
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situation was incorrect. Indeed, through newly acquired data on grain 
harvests at this time, he and Robert Davies argue that it was the 
amount of grain available in those years, rather than its distribution, 
that was the immediate cause of the famine. This challenged the 
traditional view that Stalin deliberately withheld grain, and especially 
Conquest’s argument that the famine of 1933 was deliberately carried 




Correspondence made available from the opening of the archives 
has also been widely used – especially in the Annals series – to 
attempt to determine the nature and scope of Stalin’s leadership. This 
has been done by using the letters and telegrams written between 
Stalin and some of his colleagues. For instance, Dimitrov and Stalin 
1934-1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives  examines Stalin’s role 
in the Comintern, where Dimitrov was Secretary General from 1934 
until 1943. It concludes that overall Stalin was a ‘sphinx’ in the 
affairs of the Comintern: the highest authority, but who was often 
brief in his attentions to Comintern business, delegating decisions to 
others or making short scribbling instructions, even where major 
policy change was occurring.
61
  The Stalin-Kaganovich 
Correspondence 1931-36 examines correspondence between Stalin 
and Lazar Kaganovich, one of Stalin’s most highly trusted deputies. 
This project aims to understand the dynamics of power, and how 
Stalin governed his country through the watershed years of 
collectivisation, mass industrialisation, and the beginnings of 
repression. Finally, Stalin's Letters to Molotov 1925-1936 similarly 
seeks to examine the dynamics between Stalin and his colleagues, as 
well as the scope and nature of the role he actually played in the 
running of the Soviet Union at this time. From Stalin’s 
correspondence with Molotov, the editors conclude that Stalin was 
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completely engrossed in foreign affairs during this period and was 
generally totally consumed by politics.
62
  
As well as through the continuing volume of research being done 
on the Terror and Stalin’s leadership, the focus on the political aspect 
of Stalinism has also manifested itself in an interest in Stalinist 
ideology, rejecting the argument that Stalin had little political thought 
worth writing home about – a tendency which is also a manifestation 
of the influence of the cultural historical approach, as it seeks to 
understand the way in which Stalin thought. Erik van Ree, for 
instance, has argued that, far from having no doctrine at all, Stalinist 
ideology contained ‘a strong inner coherence’ that ultimately took the 
form of a ‘curious brand of revolutionary patriotism’ in which 
Stalinism remained part of the Marxist and revolutionary nationalist 
universe imported from Western Europe in the nineteenth century.
63
 
David Brandenberger too has looked at the primacy of ideology in 
Stalinism, arguing that Stalin used Russian national heroes, myths and 
imagery to mobilize popular support during the Second World War. 
This ‘national bolshevism’ ended up eclipsing proletarian 
internationalism as the central tenet of Stalinist ideology. The most 
intriguing repercussion of this, argued Brandenberger, was that this 
‘ideological coup’ was the catalyst for the formation of a mass sense 
of national identity within Russian-speaking society between the late 
1930s and early 1950s, ‘the most cruel and difficult years of the 




The interest in Stalin himself has also acquired renewed vibrancy, 
with the publication of several biographies of Stalin which emphasise 
his centrality to the regime, as well as the idea of him as an evil and 
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all-powerful leader. The overall concern with understanding the 
nature and scope of Stalin’s role in the running of the regime indicates 
that Stalin himself, both on a professional and personal level, is still 
considered by many to be central to the history of this period and that 
the appetite for research into this topic has not waned despite the 
advent of social and cultural history.  For example, Simon Sebag 
Montefiore’s bestseller Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar portrays 
Stalin as the evil ‘red tsar’: brutal, cruel, yet fascinating, idiosyncratic 
and enigmatic. He was a man who played sinister psychological 
games with his ‘courtiers’ and the architect of the horrors of his 
regime. In a somewhat paradoxical juxtaposition, the archives have at 
once allowed Montefiore to engage with the ‘everyday’ tendency of 
cultural history (in this case relating to the Kremlin and its most 
central characters) while promoting an image of Stalin borrowed from 
the pre-revisionist era.
65
 Robert Service’s Stalin biography similarly 
depicts Stalin as the evil genius, a despot and ‘warlord’ who was also 
intellectually adept,  and who, for example, at times had challenged 
Lenin and who was a voracious reader.
66
 There is perhaps something 
to be said for the commercial value of these Stalin-centric works, and 
the general public’s fascination with ‘horrible histories’, and with 
cruel, ‘evil’ leaders. What makes them tick? What unusual foibles or 
faiblesses of the terrible dictators can we uncover? Montefiore’s book 
was perhaps so commercially successful thanks to all the small, 
unlikely, curious human pieces of information it offered. 
67
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And yet, despite this wealth of new material helping researchers 
to construct a more complete version of Joseph Stalin, there have 
been no startling new revelations about his life or character, nor any 
radical departures from the Stalin depicted in the first biographies of 
the 1930s and 1940s. Stalin remains an enigma, since he left no 
personal diaries or particularly personal correspondence. He also 
remains the powerful, brutal, mysterious and unforgiving leader he 
has always been portrayed to be. These characteristics are so 
ingrained that they have not been revised nor challenged in the post-
Soviet era, only built upon, expanded and brought to life with those 
everyday details that have more recently become available.  The focus 
on different aspects of Stalin’s life may have shifted in this era, but 
the fundamental interpretation of Stalin’s character has remained 
largely static.
68
 The release of Stalin’s correspondence, of the 
documents detailing the minutiae of his leadership and of the 
memoirs and diaries of those around him have ensured a renewed 
focus on Stalin and his leadership by scholars of the post-Soviet era. 
This demonstrates the resilience of some of the characteristics of the 
totalitarian-model, although the issue of morality seems largely to 
have been removed in favour of a more candid and/or documentary-
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style approach to the details of Stalin’s leadership and political 
regime.  
One notable exception to this is The Black Book of Communism, 
which has examined in small and torturous detail the crimes 
committed in the name of communism, arguing that the level of its 
criminality and destruction have been diminished due to the shadow 
of Hitler’s Nazism.
69
 In his foreword to the book, Martin Malia 
suggested that a moral approach focused on the criminality of Soviet 
communism was now needed in order to yield a truer understanding 
of it, an approach endorsed and adopted by the book’s lead author 




Yet despite the tenacity of some aspects of the totalitarian-model 
of interpretation and of pre-Soviet era revisionist agendas, there has 
unquestionably been a vast increase in the scope of research.  While 
the focus remains to an extent on Stalin and the advent of the Terror, 
its wider social and cultural repercussions and dynamics are also now 
being given due attention. There has been, for example, a noticeable 
increase in ethnicity, nationality and regional studies of societies 
within the USSR.
 71
 There has also been a notable growth in research 
on everyday life under Stalinism, a result of the increasing influence 
of cultural history. While we have seen that Fitzpatrick had long 
argued the existence of a dynamic and deeply complex society during 
this period, this was one of the areas most lacking in our 
understanding of Stalinism, especially regarding the interaction of 
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state and society. Since the archival revolution, it is one which has 
been developed considerably:  Orlando Figes, Fitzpatrick and Lynne 
Viola have all published works detailing ‘everyday’ Stalinism, 
examining the reality of life under the regime, its impact on 
individuals and social groups and the way in which these groups 
themselves reacted to Stalinism.
72
 The archival revolution has 
therefore also allowed historians to fulfil some of what Merridale and 
Smith had hoped for: an increase in research on Stalinism that does 




5. Stalin and the West in the post-Soviet world: the 
modernity debate 
 
Over the course of the Soviet period, clear patterns have emerged that 
suggest that Western writers and scholars used various concepts on 
which to hinge their constructions of the Stalinist, and Soviet, other.  
Since the Soviet Union became a historical object as of 1991, 
                                                 
72
 See O. Figes, The Whisperers: private life in Stalin’s Russia (London, 2007); S. 
Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after 
Collectivization (Oxford, 1994); S. Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life 
in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s, (Oxford, 1999); L. Viola (ed.), 
Contending with Stalinism: Soviet power & popular resistance in the 1930s (Ithica, 
2002); S. Davies and J. Harris (eds.), Stalin: A New History  (Cambridge, 2005). 
73
 There are still opposing views as to the nature of state-society interaction borne 
from evidence found in the archives. This is highlighted by Hiroaki Kuromiya who 
stated that this new research (that of Fitzpatrick, Viola and Davies, for example) has 
meant that the concepts of resistance to and rebellion against the Stalinist state have 
become legitimate parts of the history of this era, and they reflect the apparent 
realities described in newly available documentation. However, others (for example 
Jochen Hellbeck, Igal Halfin and especially Kotkin’s work Magnitogorsk, Magnetic 
Mountain. See also further along in this chapter) have found that many Soviet 
citizens strove towards the true Soviet identity as prescribed by the Stalinist regime 
that was dedicated to the good of the public, and to the extinction of a private 
sphere independent of the public. This means that the regime had achieved what it 
desired: there was no longer a private sphere as the Soviet citizen was incorporated 
‘heart and mind’ into the public sphere. The Soviet citizen learnt how to speak, act, 
look and importantly think Bolshevik. These two interpretations have been termed, 
respectively, the ‘resistance school’ and the ‘subjective school’. See Kuromiya, 
‘Stalin and his era’, pp.722-723. These are of course two extremes of interpretation, 
and Kuromiya admits so himself: applied to specific aspects of the state-society 
relationship, they can seem apt, but to apply them to the general makes them less 
useful and less representative. Nevertheless, the emergence of such schools 
demonstrates that research into this area has grown so much as to necessitate 




however, it has become more difficult to identify patterns of othering 
specific to Stalin and Stalinism in Western historiography. 
Constructions of the Stalinist other have at times become absorbed in 
the umbrella terms of ‘Soviet Communism’ or the ‘Soviet system’ 
that encompass the revolution, Stalinism and its legacy as scholars 
moved beyond trying to understand what Stalinism was to 
understanding how it happened.
74
   
 For example, replacing ‘totalitarianism’ as the key 
characteristic of the Soviet Union, Pipes’ post-Soviet work on the 
Revolution highlighted the centrality of the notions of ‘failure’ and 
‘tragedy’. He articulated the idea of Soviet communism as a 
fundamentally flawed system when he wrote of the ‘incontrovertible 
failure’ of the Russian Revolution in 1991 and the ‘unfolding tragedy’ 
borne of the 1917 Revolution.
75
 Pipes felt many times that he wanted 
to ‘admonish’ the protagonists of this revolution and make them stop 
and think as they rushed towards catastrophe.
76
 The notion of tragedy 
was so central to Malia’s thinking that his history of socialism in 
Russia is entitled The Soviet Tragedy. He emphasised that rather than 
‘going wrong’ at any given point, such as at Stalin’s accession to 
power, the revolution was doomed to fail from the very beginning: 
indeed, he suggested that scholars had been asking futile and 
misguided questions as to how and when the revolution had gone 
wrong, when it fact it had been wrong from the start.
77
 However, 
Malia’s work has also shown the resilience of a more obvious pattern 
of othering the Soviet Union when he emphasised the primacy of 
ideology in building the socialist state: the ideological basis of Soviet 
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socialism was that it should be in every respect non-capitalist. This 
interpretation set Stalinism, and the resulting Soviet system, as the 
clear inferior and antithesis of Western capitalism. For Malia, this 
meant that Stalinism produced a sickly, grim version of modernity 
and one that was ‘a very poor imitation of the real thing’, 
counterproductive in almost every sphere: economically, culturally 
and morally.
78
 As a result, today’s Russia  might be industrial and 
urban but this did not mean it partook in the ‘full complex of 
modernity’, describing Russia’s industrial sector as being ‘essentially 
non-competitive in the modern world market’ and comparing it to 
‘some Third world country’ exporting raw materials.
79
  
 The question of the nature of Stalinist modernity is at the 
centre of two of the strongest trends in post-91 writing on Stalinism. 
On the one hand, ‘neo-traditionalist’ scholars argue that Stalinism 
was an alternative form of modernity based on ‘archaicizing’ 
phenomena, such as petitioning, patron-client networks, the 
mystification of power and its projection through display, although 




On the other hand, the question of Stalinist modernity has at 
times led to a kind of rapprochement between Stalinism and the 
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West, characterised by arguments of the ‘modernity school’ (this 
school, represented by scholars such as Kotkin and Hoffmann for 
example,  generally suggests that the stereotype of modernity based 
exclusively on Western experience is inadequate, and points to the 
Soviet example as an important alternative form), which have 
suggested similarities between Stalinism and Western capitalism. 
Like Malia, Kotkin has placed ideology at the centre of the Soviet 
socialist experiment. Kotkin’s study of Magnitogorsk led him to 
believe that Stalinism had constructed a socialism that was the ‘anti-
world to capitalism’.
81
 Socialism derived its entire identity from 
capitalism and competed with it in every sphere, even when the 
USSR started to be at a disadvantage. Socialism’s attempts to match 
capitalist modernity failed, and it was this which propelled it towards 
its ‘own, dramatic, self-liquidation’.
82
 In this sense, Stalinism was 
clearly an other of the capitalist democracies. However, Kotkin also 
highlights that the construction of Magnitogorsk in particular, and 
Stalinism more generally, nevertheless demonstrated a way of 
thinking and a set of practices that shared ‘a great deal’ with other 
industrial countries, all of which developed forms of social regulation 
and the welfare state.
83
  
Similarly, David L. Hoffmann has argued that while the 
history of modern Russia has been written as a ‘history distinct from 
that of the West’’
84
, not all elements of Stalinist culture were derived 
from socialist ideology, suggesting that Stalinist culture contained 
ideas, concerns and debates that were common to modern European 
culture more generally. In fact, he wrote, ‘the very notion of 
reshaping societies was a defining feature of European modernity’.
85
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Arguing against the primacy of ideology, as suggested by Malia and 
Kotkin, Hoffmann stated that it would be wrong to draw too sharp a 
distinction between modern politics and socialist ideology since 




These perceived similarities between Soviet and Western 
modernity are illustrative of a change in which a comparative 
framework with the West can provide the possibility for a deeper, 
more encompassing but not necessarily differentiating analysis of the 
Soviet system, and they are unique to the post-Soviet era. This can be 
related to the Soviet Union becoming a historical notion, leading to a 
fundamental change in the context of Western-Soviet relations. The 
historiographical trends that have emerged in the post-Cold War era 
leading to works such as Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and 
the Last Man or Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations 
and the Remaking of World Order, for instance, focus on 
‘civilisations’ and the ways in which they are relating to, and 
interacting with, each other in the current era.
87
 The scholarship 
produced since the end of the Cold War and the demise of Soviet 
socialism suggests there has been little need to continue to reinforce 
Stalinism, totalitarianism and socialism as the other in Western 
historical writing. While in a post-9/11 world we might have expected 
the kinds of ideas on clashing civilisations present in Huntington’s 
work to resonate more loudly, trends in writing on Stalin and 
Stalinism are in fact more reflective of Fukuyama’s argument that 
liberal democracy would become the only form of government for all 
states. Indeed, politicisation of scholarship on Stalin and his regime 
had become redundant in a world where the West has been awaiting 
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Russia’s own transition to this method of government. New 
discussions on Stalinist modernity relate to this idea too: they are now 
less about the clash of civilisations, and more about the demise of a 
previously othered civilisation and the effects of this demise on a 
relationship which had previously been based on a clash. However, as 
Putin’s Russia looks increasingly unlikely to adopt a liberal 
democracy in line with the West’s expectations in terms of freedom 
of speech and human rights, for instance, there is a real possibility 
that the notion of clashing civilisations may once again become 
central and, in turn, shift the focus of writing on Stalinism and the 
entire Soviet era in coming years. 
The emergence of the term ‘civilisation’ applied to Stalinism 
highlights the cultural, rather than political or social, approach to 
Stalinism that has appeared since 1991. For example, both Kotkin and 
Igal Halfin look closely at the culture of Stalinist ‘civilisation’, and it 
is this cultural historical approach that has allowed them to argue for 
the importance of mentalities, belief systems and self- identity 
formation in shaping the experience of the Terror and of the Stalinist 
regime.
88
 For example, Kotkin suggested in Magnetic Mountain that 
Stalinism ‘was not just a political system, let alone the rule of an 
individual. It was a set of values, a social identity, a way of life’.
89
 He 
exemplified this most saliently in his chapter ‘Speaking Bolshevik’, 
in which he demonstrated the extent to which this act had become 
second nature to Soviet citizens.
90
 Knowing how to ‘speak Bolshevik’ 
–to publicly display loyalty to the state at all times - was the only way 
to succeed, or even get by under Stalinism. Without this ability, 
Soviets were ‘functionally “illiterate”’, and living under Stalinist rule 
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would be difficult and dangerous.
91
 Halfin has used a similar 
approach, focusing on the notions of identity and culture in his 
examination of the ways in which the identity of Soviet communists 
was so invested and imbedded in the Soviet experiment that they 
became complicit in their own demise under Stalin. Through his 
analysis of the autobiographies of communists on trial in the Soviet 
Union during the show trials, Halfin argues that, once embedded in 
the tissue of power, the ‘messianic dreams that structured the 
Communist discourse and provided it a frame of moral reference that 
set standards of conformity could not be easily curbed’, even when 
their most horrific implications began to assert themselves.
92
  
This new focus in research on Stalin goes beyond the 
examination of political and social systems, and even beyond outward 
social behaviours and the ‘everyday Stalinism’ that, for example, 
Fitzpatrick had revealed. These attempts at defining the belief 
systems, identities and culture attached to Stalinism are an attempt to 
get inside the communist ‘soul’ (a term Halfin uses in his work) in 
order to understand how it was perceived, understood, experienced, 
supported, survived (or not) and resisted by those who lived through 
it. This, in turn, leads to a far greater understanding of how the 
Stalinist regime was able both to function in an everyday capacity, 
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Writing in 1995, Mark Sandle observed that despite the intense 
activity around the archives, no dominant paradigm in writing on 
Stalin and Stalinism had yet emerged. From 2013 it seems that this is 
also largely the case. There are several reasons why this may be: 
firstly, scholars who passionately defended their interpretations of 
Stalinism during the Soviet period have continued to do so well after 
the opening of the archives, using new documentation carefully to 
support their ideas, be they Sovietologists or revisionists.  
While there has been a continued focus on the Terror and 
Stalin’s role in the running of the regime, the new post-91 generation 
of researchers of Stalinism have used the vast amounts of information 
released from the archives to research such a wide range of aspects of 
it, and achieved such an expansion of our knowledge and 
understanding of these aspects, that it would be impossible to state 
that an identifiable orthodoxy on the question of ‘what happened’ 
during Stalin’s reign has emerged. The breadth of expansion of the 
field has, for now at least, precluded the possibilities for a consensus, 
as the realities of ‘everyday ‘Stalinism, nationality, ethnicity, 
economy, culture and modernity and all other aspects of life under the 
Stalinist regime are being vigorously investigated, thanks to the 
documentation released during the archival revolution.   
As the Soviet Union became a historical notion, so the context 
of Western-Soviet relations changed. The scholarship produced since 
the end of the Cold War and the demise of Soviet socialism suggests 
there has been little need to reinforce Stalinism, totalitarianism and 
socialism as the other in historical writing, since such politicisation of 
scholarship has become redundant. Iver B. Neumann’s identification 
of a political ‘learner’ identity constructed by Europe for Russia in the 




tendencies in Western international relations discourse on Russia, are 
not replicated as clearly in historical writing.
93
  
Nevertheless, some resilient patterns of othering remain. In 
some cases they seem to be a hangover from the Cold War era (as we 
have seen, for example, in the works of Malia, Pipes and Conquest). 
In other cases, the demise of the Soviet Union has made way for 
similar ‘learner’ identity writing as proposed by Neumann, although 
in the case of historians of the Soviet Union its central character 
seems not to patronise, but rather to analyse why the democratisation 
process has been so problematic, often highlighting the negative role 
the imposition of Western values and expectations has played in 




Therefore, twenty years after the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, the field of Soviet studies, and specifically that of research 
into Stalin and Stalinism, presents itself as a field in which a 
multitude of interpretations, approaches and agendas are developing. 
Although there has been some clarity reached on certain issues thanks 
to the opening of the archives (for instance, there is a general 
understanding thanks to the NKVD order no. 00447 that Stalin 
ordered the purges), what has emerged from the archival revolution is 
a field of ever expanding scope in which individual scholars are able 
to pursue research on virtually any aspect of Stalinism they choose. 
This accounts for both the tenacity of Soviet-era agendas and the 
continued focus on the Terror, Stalin and his leadership, as well as the 
diversification of the field into new areas of cultural history, social 
history, nationality and ethnicity.  
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Set against the backdrop of the previous periods examined in 
this study, the historiography of this period demonstrates at once a 
continuation of, and a break from, what came before. Where in the 
previous periods clear trends in writing and interpretation emerged 
that were hinged on Western perceptions of Stalin and Stalinism, the 
post-Soviet era proposes a multitude of foci , interpretations and 
accounts of Stalinism, suggesting a confused, or at least disjointed, 
perception of Stalinism by the West. On the one hand, it remains for 
some the Stalinist totalitarian other, whilst to others it more closely 
resembled Western capitalist modernity. Yet what is striking about 
this period is that despite the huge wealth of information now 
available relating to Stalin and his regime, and the variety of 
explorations constantly adding layers and nuances to our 
understanding of them, our very basic perception of their nature has 
not shifted. There has been very little alteration since those first 
publications in the 1930s to the basic facts that the regime was 
coercive and violent, and that Stalin himself – an enigmatic and 
ruthless leader - was in large part, if not entirely, responsible for it. 
This has persisted in the post-Soviet era. As a result, the continued 
and indeed revived research on Stalin and his leadership and this 
largely universal acceptance of the nature of his regime suggest that 
previous perceptions of Stalin and Stalinism as the immoral, deviant, 
dangerous antithetical others of the West persist. However, the 
commonalities in the articulation of these perceptions in the new 







Stalin in biographical writing 1932-2013: a case study of 
the historiography of the young Stalin 
 
 
1. Introduction: official Soviet versions of Stalin’s youth 
published in the West 
 
It is perhaps because Stalin was already 46 when he came to power 
that the study of his very early life, before his days as a revolutionary 
in Georgia when he was a young boy and an adolescent, may seem a 
comparatively poor historiographical area. In fact, a closer 
examination of biographical works published on Stalin in the West 
from the early 1930s until the present day does much to displace this 
assumption: the historiography surrounding Stalin’s early life is rich 
and varied and often full of conflicting information. This is 
particularly evident when comparing both official and unofficial 
versions of Stalin’s youth published in the West. 
Official Soviet versions of Stalin’s life were published by the 
Kremlin while Stalin was in power, and they serve as a useful basis 
for comparison with what was being published inside and outside of 
the Soviet Union. They also provided information for Western writers 
on Stalin and Stalinism, if only at times through their lack of accuracy 
and transparency, and indeed were often referred to in these terms by 
those writers. In 1938 Stalin’s first official biography was produced 
and published by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.
1
 His early life was 
covered in the two short opening paragraphs of the book. It stated his 
date of birth, the name, social status and professions of his parents 
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and the dates at which he began and finished the various stages of his 
education.
2
 While the biography went on to thoroughly recount his 
adult life as a revolutionary and politician, any further details of his 
childhood were omitted. This official biography was not the only 
work to keep the subject of Stalin’s early life to a minimum: it is 
difficult to find anything written or approved by Stalin that addressed 
his youth in any depth. In the instances where it was written about, 
there are large discrepancies between what was being stated and what 
we now know about Stalin’s early life in Gori and in the Theological 
Seminary of Tiflis.  
Stalin’s own and approved accounts of his childhood depict a 
poor but stable and contented early life: he was born Joseph 
Vissarionovich Djugashvili on 21 December 1879 in the Georgian 
town of Gori. His father Vissarion (Beso) was a Georgian cobbler, 
and his mother Ekaterina (Keke) came from a family of bound 
peasants. Together the three of them lived a simple, poor and 
relatively quiet life.
3
 The official biographies were highly 
representative of the regime during which they were written. There 
are common characteristics amongst them: the information they 
contained about Stalin’s childhood was sparse, although 
unsurprisingly more plentiful regarding his Seminary days since it 
was then that he discovered Marxism. They all stated the same key 
dates and basic facts about Stalin’s birth date and place and provided 
only the most basic information about his parents. The work of the 
Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Joseph Stalin – A Short Biography, and 
the earlier pamphlet put together by several of Stalin’s colleagues 
(Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze and Enukidze) under the 
title The Life of Stalin – A Symposium, are especially sparse on 
information regarding Stalin’s early life. Similarly to the Marx-
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Engels-Lenin Institute biography, The Life of Stalin’s first page 
simply states:  
 
Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin (Djugashvili), Georgian by 
nationality, was born in 1879 in the town of Gori, Tiflis 
Province. His father, of peasant origin from the Didi-Lilo 





Stalin and his sympathisers rarely elaborated beyond this, and it was 
just as rare that anyone should press him on the subject. The only 
recorded occasion of him addressing the question of his childhood 
directly was during his interview with the German journalist Emil 
Ludwig. At a time when all information about Stalin was heavily 
checked and edited by his entourage and by himself, the Ludwig 
interview was published almost exactly as it had happened, with only 
a couple of minor stylistic corrections.
5
 This work is of particular 
relevance in the historiography of Stalin’s childhood because it was 
the only time he was questioned directly in a public forum about his 
early youth. Ludwig asked him: ‘What led you to become a rebel?  
Was it, perhaps, because your parents treated you so badly?’ Stalin, 
somewhat surprisingly, did not dodge the question: 
 
No. My parents were uneducated people, but they did not treat 
me badly by any means. It was different in the theological 
seminary of which I was then a student. In protest against the 
humiliating regime and the Jesuitical methods that prevailed 
in the seminary, I was ready to become, and eventually did 





 It was no accident that so little information was offered: throughout 
his entire life, Stalin barely revealed any details of his childhood, 
though the reasons for this can still only be speculative. Public 
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knowledge of an unhappy childhood, and the psychological damage it 
may have done to him, could have given him a vulnerability or 
inspired a loss of confidence he did not want and could ill afford. 
Aside from the difficulties of his family life, Stalin might have further 
wanted to conceal the fact that his upbringing and education were 
entirely based around the Orthodox Church. Although it was no secret 
that his mother was religious, he never publicly alluded to the faith he 
had as a boy.
7
 This aspect of his childhood was certainly glossed over 
in the official biographies. For example, in both Life of Stalin, and 
Joseph Stalin: A Short Biography Stalin’s attendance to the Church 
School in Gori was only mentioned within a biographical chronology 
detailing key dates of his early life, and no further details were given.
8
 
It was only when describing Stalin’s time at the Theological 
Seminary of Tiflis that the official biographers gave more detail, since 
this was the time that marked the beginning of Stalin’s life as a 
Marxist and a revolutionary. Stalin himself described life in the 
Seminary as his reason for joining the Georgian social-democratic 
circles, and this is reflected in these official biographies. Where his 
childhood was only afforded a few sentences, his time in the 
Seminary was highlighted: it did not touch on the more personal 
aspects of his youth, but instead highlighted in Soso Djugashvili the 
virtues that the Soviet people would want out of their leader and 
successor to Lenin: belief in Marxism and rejection of the Church and 
Imperial institutions. The Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute dedicated two 
pages to life in the Seminary, emphasising that it was a hotbed of 
underground political activity and that ‘The Jesuitical regime in the 
seminary aroused in Stalin a burning sense of protest, which 
intensified his revolutionary sentiments, so that at the age of fifteen 
he became a revolutionary.’
9
 It described how in 1897 Stalin became 
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the leader of the Marxist circles in the Seminary and how in August 
1898 he officially joined the Tiflis organisation of the Russian Social-
Democratic Labour Party, becoming a member of the Messameh 
Dassy Group, the first Georgian Social-Democratic organisation, 
which in the period between 1893 and 1898 played a ‘certain positive 
part’ in the propagation of Marxist ideas.
10
 Once again, the Emil 
Ludwig interview was quoted, in which Stalin asserted that he joined 
the revolutionary movement at the age of fifteen, having become 
acquainted with the works of Marx and Engels.
11
 The work written by 
Stalin’s colleagues also goes into slightly more depth, although does 
not date the beginning of Stalin’s interest in Marxism until 1897, 
which is no doubt closer to the truth.
12
 Indeed, aged fifteen Stalin 
was, depending on whose dates you followed, either still at Gori 
Church School or in his first year of the Seminary. Miklós Kun 
suggests that at this point Stalin had not even taken the entrance exam 
for the Tiflis Seminary and that there is ‘not a single’ authentic source 
verifying that Soso had been in any way connected to the small group 
of Russian Marxists working in Georgia before his arrival in Tiflis.
13
 
This certainly seems to be the case: there were no references in the 
Georgian memoirs of the young Soso having any links outside of Gori 
or his small group of friends from the town, and no biographers since 
have unearthed any information proving otherwise. At this time, the 
works of Darwin, Marx and Plekhanov were incredibly difficult to 
acquire and the works of Lenin almost impossible to come by. 
Furthermore, fellow Seminarists, such as Iremashvili, indicated that 
from his third year onwards at the Seminary, Soso began to 
voraciously devour all kinds of books on nature, politics, economics 
and history, which he had smuggled into the seminary and read by 
candlelight. Prior to this period, however, there is no evidence of this 
kind of activity.
14
 Yet, as Kun highlighted, these small issues were of 
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no concern to the official Stalin historian: their aim was not to recount 
a truer version of events, but to create a myth that would strengthen 
Stalin and his regime.
15
 In both the official works mentioned above, 
Stalin was expelled from the Seminary for propagating Marxism.  
How far were these biographical writings not only influenced 
by the particularities of the Stalinist regime, but also by wider trends 
in biographical writing?  The official and sympathetic biographies 
published on Stalin in the West are reminiscent of ‘ur-biographies’, as 
described by Hermione Lee.
16
 These ‘primal forms’ of biography, 
such as biblical stories and other very early accounts of lives, contain 
all the information about births, dates, lives and deaths of subjects and 
emphasise certain features while entirely ignoring others. They often 
present amazing ‘facts’ without any qualification or demurral, and 
they want to impress the reader with the sense of a personality or an 
event of importance. All are interested in the effects of a life on 
others, whether disciples, victims, a nation, or posterity.
17
  Equally, 
such ‘facts’ and omissions were present in the official Stalin 
biographies: there was a clear lack of information on family life, yet a 
high emphasis on revolutionary activity at a young age. For example, 
Lavrenti Beria stated that Stalin led eight revolutionary circles while 
still a teenager, but no explanation of how he achieved this under the 
conditions at the Seminary was given. The hugely varying official 
accounts of Stalin’s early revolutionary activities all hoped to impress 
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However, it is the unofficial versions of Stalin’s life which 
reveal much about the lives and times of those writing about Stalin 
and the changing Western approaches to him as a man and as a leader. 
The examination of the evolution of the Western historiography of the 
young Stalin provides a case study for biographical writing on Stalin 
over the whole period of study that assesses the changing ways in 
which Stalin himself has been viewed by the West. Within this, the 
extent of the impacts of the key influences on writing set in this thesis 
can also be evaluated.  
 
2. The two Sosos 
 
The historiography of the young Stalin begins with the publication in 
Germany in 1932 of Joseph Iremashvili’s book Stalin Und Die 
Tragödie Georgiens, which provided the most vital of the early 
sources of biographical information on Stalin specifically relating to 
his very early years, and which became a foundation for the 
biographical works which came later.
19
 Iremashvili was born in Gori 
                                                                                                                  
dark bruises on the skin around them’ (p.11) and his father as ‘a good man...he did 
really everything he possibly could for him [Stalin]’ (p.11). The adolescent Stalin 
‘[when he] grew taller, he was rather frail in appearance; his features were very 
delicate and he had an intellectual head with abundant thick hair, as black as ink. 
The slimness of youth accentuated the Georgian oval of his face and the somewhat 
languid eye of his race. This young militant presented a mixture curious enough 
because it was almost perfect, of the intellectual and the worker. Not very tall, 
narrow-shouldered, with a long face, a small bear, rather heavy eyes and a thin 
straight nose, and with his flat cap worn a little to one side on his plentiful black 
hair - that is what he was like then, this conqueror of multitudes, this upsetter of 
worlds.’ (p. 18). 
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around the same time as Stalin, and they became friends and 
playmates from a young age. Keke, Stalin’s mother, even went so far 
as to call him her ‘other Soso’, because he was such a frequent a 
visitor to the Djugashvili home.
20
 The two Sosos went to the same 
school, sang in the same choir, and eventually both of them ended up 
at the Theological Seminary of Tiflis. Having been firm friends in 
their childhood, the young men continued to be on amicable terms 
throughout their time at the Seminary. Afterwards, Iremashvili 
became a schoolteacher ,as Stalin embarked upon his revolutionary 
career. Edward Ellis Smith claimed that Iremashvili even ended up 
teaching Stalin’s firstborn son, Yasha, before the 1917 Revolution.
21
 
Yet even the oldest of his friends could not escape Stalin’s 
persecutions: as early as May 20
th
 1921, Iremashvili was arrested by 
the Bolshevik secret police operating in the Caucasus under Stalin’s 
direction. Later, Iremashvili’s sister Aneta personally saw Stalin on 
the matter of her brother’s imprisonment, and in one of his few acts of 
compassion Stalin released his old friend. However, this was not the 
end of the affair: Stalin then despatched another old schoolmate to try 
and recruit Iremashvili to the Bolshevik cause. He refused and, along 
with sixty-one other Georgian prisoners, was subsequently deported 
to Germany on October 11, 1922.
22
 
Iremashvili’s account was a detailed look at the Djugashvili 
household and gave unparalleled insight into what life there might 
have been like. Iremashvili was warm about Ekaterina (Keke), 
Stalin’s mother: he described her as a loving and attentive mother and 
friendly to Stalin’s schoolmates. Soso was lanky, sinewy and 
freckled, with an aquiline nose. His face was narrow, elongated and 
pockmarked. His eyes were dark, bold and vivid. He was also a 
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typical school bully: he was physically stronger than other boys and 
confident that he would win any fist fight. He dared his fellow pupils 
to disagree with him.
23
 Of Vissarion (Beso), Stalin’s father, he gave a 
rare physical description: he was a heavy-set man of imposing 
appearance, with thick black eyebrows and a black bristling 
moustache, who habitually wore the conventional Georgian tchoka, 
blue trousers thrust into knee-length boots, and a fur cap. He 
described him as heartless, violent and a drunk. Beso habitually drank 
away his wages, so much so that the responsibility of the rent as well 
as supporting the family as a whole eventually fell solely upon Keke. 
He mercilessly beat his son and wife.
24
  
Along with this rare insight into the Djugashvili home, one of 
the most important contributions that Iremashvili’s work made to 
knowledge of this time of Stalin’s life was by giving account of life in 
the Seminary at the very time when Soso was evolving into a young 
Marxist revolutionary. Iremashvili’s recollections of the monotony 
and austerity of those days has provided a vivid image of what life 
was like within the Seminary walls and how such an atmosphere was 
conducive to Stalin becoming involved in the underground social-
democratic movement. Seminary life was sad and monotonous. The 
Seminarists felt like prisoners and were despondent and sullen. 
Whenever ‘youthful temperament’ manifested itself, it was swiftly 
suppressed by the monks. There was a strong anti-Georgian feeling 
instated by the Rectors: all Georgian literature and newspapers were 
forbidden, and the Tsarist police often carried out inspections to 
ensure this rule was being adhered to.
25
 This period of Stalin’s life, 
and specifically the elements that characterised his time in the 
Seminary, are of particular significance since it was this experience 
that actively drove him into the arms of the Marxist underground 
movement: 
 
                                                 
23
Iremashvili, Stalin Und Die Tragödie Georgiens, pp.11-12 
24
 Iremashvili, Stalin Und Die Tragödie Georgiens, p.12 
25
 Ibid., pp. 16-17. We can only speculate as to whether this anti-Georgian feeling 




In protest against the humiliating regime and the Jesuitical 
methods that prevailed in the seminary, I was ready to 
become, and eventually did become, a revolutionary, a 





For its ground-breaking insight into the Djugashvili household 
and life at the Theological Seminary, and also because of his 
credentials as a contemporary of Stalin, Iremashvili’s memoir has 
been used in the works of a range of biographers from the 1930s until 
the present day. Even after the opening of the archives in the 1990s, 
this important testimony of Stalin’s early life by his childhood friend 
has remained a vital and irreplaceable primary source. Given Stalin’s 
later extreme reticence to make any of these details public, this 
memoir has been a rare and essential source to those investigating 
Stalin’s youth, and the detail with which it reported was in stark 
contrast to the official publications that were being released inside 




3. Emigrés, exiles and socialists: the early works, 1932-1947 
 
Iremashvili’s book was especially significant in this historiography as 
from it there stemmed several other accounts of Stalin’s early years in 
the period preceding the Cold War. Reflecting the trend in the larger 
historiography, those writing about the young Stalin in this era, and 
especially in the period preceding the Second World War, were 
émigrés, exiles, escapees and socialists who had become estranged 
from Stalin’s Soviet Union. Focusing specifically on Stalin’s youth 
reveals the way in which this particular facet of biography on Stalin 
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was built upon from the small amounts of information offered by 
Iremashvili and the other Georgian memoirs over the course of the 
period of study. As the period moved through and beyond the Second 
World War, an increasing number of Western socialist and non-
socialist writers also began writing on Stalin. As this thesis has 
already shown, this was largely due to an increased concern with the 
nature of Stalin as leader of the USSR. 
The first issue faced by writers on Stalin in the West in this 
period, and one replicated throughout the majority of the period of 
study, was the problem of source accessibility and reliability, with the 
only available sources being the Georgian memoirs and the official 
biographies. Leon Trotsky and Bertram D. Wolfe were the first to 
employ a systematic and productive analysis of these few first-hand 
sources available to them in order to construct an accurate picture of 
Stalin’s childhood. Trotsky’s writings make an important contribution 
to the historiography of Stalin’s childhood, principally because his 
method for examining the facts around Stalin’s childhood provided a 
comprehensive comparison of sources. Trotsky himself remarked of 
this method that while it may have been an inconvenient way of doing 
things, the ‘epoch of lies’ in which he found himself left him no 
choice: one of the principal aims of the ‘gigantic factory of lies’ that 
was the Kremlin was to manufacture a new biography for Stalin, and 
as a result all sources had to be held up for analysis.
28
 Trotsky did this 
by referencing, amongst others, the official biographies, Iremashvili’s 
and other Georgian memoirs, Boris Souvarine and Emil Ludwig, 
relying heavily on Iremashvili, who he believed to provide the most 
reliable and complete source of information.
29
 Boris Souvarine too 
referenced Iremashvili and the accounts of a couple more of Stalin’s 
schoolmates, but was similarly disparaging about them. Iremashvili’s 
book, for instance, was ‘too suspect to be accepted by serious persons 
without confirmation of the contents’.
30
 As a result, his chapters on 
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the young Soso in Gori and at the Theological Seminary were short 
and did not provide any new information.  
Similarly, Bertram D. Wolfe’s later biography was, after 
Trotsky’s, the earliest example of a consolidation of all previous 
historiography, which was critically examined in detail in order to 
attempt to construct the most likely version of the events of Stalin’s 
childhood and youth. Wolfe also directly tackled the question of the 
highly conflicting information found in official and non-official 
literature, explaining where the methodological difficulties lay in 
trying to piece together this part of Stalin’s life (or indeed any part of 
his personal life). He called all previous works – those of Trotsky, 
Lavrenti Beria, Emilian Yaroslavsky and the Georgian memoirists  – 
‘shadowy and insubstantial’
31
 and believed the official biographies 
were more notable for what they left out than what they put in. Wolfe 
was one of the first writers on Stalin’s life to acknowledge the 
problem of sources in the Soviet Union, identifying one of the 
principal challenges facing the historian of the Soviet Union as 
finding relevant documentation that had not been locked away or 
destroyed; the ‘mountains of documents, general histories, party 
histories, memoirs’ that Wolfe described as banned or burnt.
32
 He 
tackled another main challenge to the historian: 
 
In the Soviet Union, state agencies are the sole publisher, 
entrust the task, direct the writing, dictate the approach, the 
conclusions, censor, edit, correct, publish, market at wholesale 
and retail, purchase for schools, libraries and institutions, 
reward, recall, condemn, replace, destroy. Account after 
account has received the imprimatur and been declared 
official, only to be publicly denounced, or quietly withdrawn 
in favour of a different version within a year.
33
   
 
This is a valuable insight into the ever increasing awareness in the 
West of the nature of the Stalinist regime. Wolfe was writing in the 
1940s, after the Second World War, after the Terror and not so long 
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before Stalin’s death. His book suggests that by this time for writers 
who had links with the Soviet Union, who had researched, lived or 
worked there, the mystery surrounding the nature of the regime had 
started to lose its hold. Wolfe’s acknowledgement of the difficulties 
facing a biographer of Stalin is the first example of a Western-born 
historian engaging with this historiography and its context. His 
analysis was deepened by his attempt to construct a complete picture 
of Stalin’s childhood and youth, not simply by picking the parts out of 
biographies to whose authors he was politically sympathetic, but by 
holding all the accounts up against each other, and trying to deduce 
the most likely version of events. In this way, he analysed the 
accounts of Trotsky, Iremashvili, Ludwig, Yaroslavsky, Beria, 
Barbusse, The Marx-Lenin-Engels Institute, the various authors of 
Life of Stalin – A Symposium, as well as other Georgian memoirists 
and Stalin’s own Collected Works. Wolfe’s deductions are mostly 
expected: he discounted, or used highly selectively and cautiously, 
those accounts that were clearly extensively edited and severely 
biased, and ended up largely relying on Iremashvili. 
Wolfe’s early foray into a critical analysis of the 
historiography of Stalin’s youth provided a key turning point in 
reporting this period of Stalin’s life: no longer would a simple 
collation of all the primary sources be adequate. They would have to 
be analysed, compared, and assessed for bias, editing and censorship. 
An analysis of Stalin and his rule began to take shape, not simply as a 
statement of facts, but as a line of questioning as to how and why this 
man came to be the type of leader he was. Here, in effect, we see the 
apparition of the secondary sources on Stalin’s early life, and key 
themes emerged in the depiction of Stalin during this period. These 
emergent themes demonstrate the continuity between constructions of 
Stalin as an adult and as a child in this era. As highlighted in Chapter 
1, the adult Stalin was at once mediocre, coarse, unsophisticated, yet 
also sly, Machiavellian, determined and cruel. These themes were 
repeated in writing on Soso as a schoolboy and young Seminarist, 




ingrained the sense of inferiority and resentment of the Georgian 
people. 
Trotsky’s influential construction, for example, of Stalin as 
dull, talentless and mediocre was at the centre of his biographical 
writing, and this method of constructing Stalin as the inferior other 
manifested itself just as clearly in his writing on the young Soso 
Djugashvili as it did on the adult Stalin: according to Trotsky, far 
from the brilliant young boy his sympathisers chose to portray him as, 
he was in fact neither the talented singer, artist, sportsman or student 
he had been claimed to be, and he went on to become none of these in 
his adult life.
34
 He was, in actual fact, an entirely average schoolboy. 
Robert Service suggested that these ideas were in fact commonplace 
amongst Stalin’s political opponents at the time – Mensheviks and 
Socialist-Revolutionaries – many of whom could see nothing more to 
Stalin than his adequate administration skills.
35
 Similarly, as a 
supporter of Trotsky’s theory regarding Stalin’s mediocrity, 
Souvarine had also developed this angle in his writing on the young 
Stalin: ‘His reading and the teaching at school provided him with the 
rudiments of education: neither have left visible traces in his writings 
and speeches. In that, he was unlike any other notable revolutionary 
of modern times’.
36
 Souvarine went on to assert that there was no 
great mystery to Stalin, and certainly nothing of interest hidden in his 
childhood. The regime he went on to create was not the fruit of ‘early 
meditation, or of a great premeditated plan’.
37
 
Iremashvili was the first to note how Beso’s brutality affected 
the young Soso: the boy soon began to extend his hatred and thirst for 
vengeance against his father to all those who had, or could have, any 
power over him.
38
 During the 1940s, further interpretations of Stalin’s 
early life, and the role that it might have played in his adult character 
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and the nature of his regime, also began to emerge. For instance, 
Eugene Lyons wrote in 1940: 
 
Consider how many torturing resentments young Soso had 
been born into and acquired. He was in the lowest stratum of a 
conquered and despised race. As soon as they were old 
enough to know anything, boys in Transcaucasia knew that 
they hated the Russian gendarmes, soldiers, and gold-braided 




Throughout his chapter on Stalin’s youth, Lyons accentuated these 
feelings of hatred and frustration, which were bred in Georgian boys 
like Soso, describing the feuds and vendettas they were constantly 
involved in, even within their own families. He wrote that, in a 
culture of ‘fierce resentments’, young boys cultivated an inner pride, 
‘the secret pride of persecuted people’, which sustained them. To this 
must be added Soso’s private hatred of his unhappy home, of his 
father’s brutality, of his own crippled arm and of his mediocrity in 
school.
40
 In this way Lyons’ consolidation of all the negative 
elements of Soso’s young life were for the first time brought together 
with the intention of demonstrating that Stalin’s psychological 
tendencies could possibly have their roots in this early part of his life. 
Deutscher similarly provided an early amateur psychoanalysis, 
though he focused on the social aspect of Soso’s negative feelings. 
Soso’s sense of inferiority, against which, according to Lyons, he 
cultivated his ‘secret pride of persecuted people’, was what shaped 
him and later spurred him on:  Soso felt socially inferior and, though 
bright and with common sense, he was not refined, imaginative or an 
intellectual. In this way, wrote Deutscher, he differed from his peers, 
such as Lenin and Trotsky. Soso was the son of peasants, and even in 
the Church he would not have climbed far. He took this sense of 
inferiority with him to the Socialist underground and beyond. 
41
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Many of these works are also the first references to Stalin’s 
physical deformities, such as his pockmarked face and withered arm. 
Trotsky noted his pockmarks, webbed toes and withered left arm, as 
recorded by Souvarine and some official police records, although 
surprisingly found these of little interest.
42
 Deutscher also pointed out 
the childhood origins of these physical attributes, writing that after 
falling ill with smallpox at the age of six ‘his face remained 
pockmarked’ and, shortly after developing an ulcer on his left hand, 
he could no longer ‘bend his arm at the elbow’.
43
 Lyons depicted him 
as ‘the unhandsome, sulking, handicapped boy’ of Keke’s heart.
44
 
Wolfe wrote that the smallpox attack left Stalin’s ‘swarthy skin oily 
and pockmarked’ and that his other distinctive marks were the 
‘joining together of two toes of one foot’, and some accounts reported 
that his left arm was ‘slightly atrophied’.
45
 Trotsky and Wolfe 
disagreed on the origins of the withered arm. Trotsky believed it to be 
the result of ‘alcoholic heredity on his father’s side’, further proven 
by the webbed toes.
46
 Wolfe disagreed, calling this statement ‘pure 
speculation’, suggesting instead that it was only mildly incapacitated, 
probably due to a childhood attack of ‘infantile paralysis’.
47
 In yet 
another suggestion, Deutscher attributed it to blood poisoning 
resulting in an ulcer on his left hand, an illness which, like the 
smallpox, had nearly killed the young Soso.
48
 Lyons claimed Stalin 
‘was born with his left arm partially paralysed and two toes grown 
together unnaturally’.
49
 Yet while all these works refer to Stalin’s 
deformities, they are not given extensive attention and do not seem to 
form a key part of the construction of the young Stalin. 
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Much more prominent is the way in which, by its inevitable 
focus on his ethnic origins, the historiography of Stalin’s childhood 
also relates to the constructions of Stalin as the Georgian, Asiatic or 
non-Russian other. In this period, Trotsky, for instance, saw little of 
the Georgians’ ‘gaiety, sociability and forthrightness’ in Stalin’s 
character.
50
 Instead, he considered the notion of ‘Asiatic’ as applied to 
Stalin, stating that Leonid Krasin, the first to call Stalin an ‘Asiatic’, 
was referring to ‘that blending of grit, shrewdness, craftiness and 
cruelty which has been considered characteristic of the statesmen of 
Asia.’ Bukharin, he wrote, later shortened this appellation to ‘Genghis 
Khan’.
51
 However, Trotsky stated that due to its location, Gori and 
therefore Stalin were not technically Asiatic, despite the latter’s 
propensity towards those characteristics deemed typical. Instead, 
Trotsky likened Stalin’s temperament to that found in the 
Mediterranean countries and the Balkans, characterised by a rare 
combination of the more common ‘lazy shiftlessness and explosive 
irascibility’ with the more uncommon ‘cold natures, in whom phlegm 
is combined with stubbornness and slyness’.
52
 In this respect, Stalin 
may not have been Asiatic, but he was certainly not Russian. Later in 
the book, however, Trotsky described Stalin’s method of rule 
(specifically relating to the cult of personality) as demonstrating that 
‘his ambition had acquired an untutored Asiatic cast intensified by 
European technique’, again removing any Russianness from Stalin’s 
method of leadership.
53
 Deutscher too highlighted Stalin’s Eastern 
origins, even if he later compared Stalin to previous Russian 
leaders.
54
 Keke, for example, ‘possessed the infinite patience and 
submissiveness of the eastern peasant woman’
55
 and Gori was a place 
where both in legend and in reality Georgians had fought against 
Russians.
56
 Eugene Lyons presents the clearest example of depicting 
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Stalin through emphasis on his Asiatic character, stating that ‘A dark-
visaged, pock-marked, slow-moving Asiatic dominates the landscape 
of world affairs to-day’.
57
 He was further described as an ‘Asiatic 
despot’, although for Lyons this meant he remained ‘true to the 
ancient Russian pattern’, rather than differentiating him from 
Russians,
58
 and Stalin’s Georgian heritage meant he had been born 
into a ‘slothful society shot through with hatreds’.
59
 The Georgians 
were ‘tough, crafty, patient’, and their historical submission to the 




 As well as demonstrating these common themes in 
biographical writing on the child and adult Stalin, these biographies 
also demonstrate a turn away from the ur-biographical style of the 
official publications, more in keeping with wider historiographical 
trends of the twentieth century. The twentieth century’s overarching 
trend in biographical writing distanced itself from the earlier kind of 
eulogistic account based on highly selective and often inaccurate 
information. In the previous century, the biographer’s task had been 
to narrate a great life. He or she was an ally of reputation, and even of 
legend, something distinctly recognisable in the official works. 
However, non-official works during the Soviet period worked to 
establish a more reliable and complete picture of Stalin and were 
consequently more aligned with biographical trends. This was partly 
due, in the first half of the twentieth century at least, to a notably 
adverse reaction to Victorianism: an age of anti-heroism that aimed to 
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expose a subject’s most innermost life and thoughts and with it their 
weaknesses.
61
 This was manifested in these biographies by attempts 
to understand Stalin’s nature and temperament by delving into his 
youth. There was also a moral dimension to biographical writing in 
the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, 
which saw an emphasis on the strengths and failings of personalities, 
in a way which seeks to allocate blame for certain events or 
decisions.
62
 This tendency is clearly present in biographical writing 
on the young Stalin, where Trotsky, Deutscher and their 
contemporaries have identified in Soso the same characteristics they 
ascribed to the adult Stalin in their damning assessments of his 
personality, ideology, leadership and regime. 
 
4. From the Cold War to Perestroika 
 
The period from 1947 to perestroika encompassed enormous changes 
within the Soviet Union, as well as in terms of its relations with the 
West. Yet Stalin’s death in 1953 at the height of the Cold War, the 
ensuing process of de-Stalinisation, the Khrushchev and Brezhnev 
eras and the Cold War itself in fact had little impact on the 
historiography of Stalin’s youth. This for the most part did not stop 
Western historians and political scientists from tackling the issue of 
Stalin and Stalinism. However, the global political context meant that 
during the Cold War the focus shifted strongly towards understanding 
the nature of Stalinism as a regime, the Stalinist leadership and Soviet 
communism more generally. This was exemplified by the extreme 
politicisation of the field in the early Cold War era, its focus on 
Stalinism as totalitarianism and the later debates within the field 
relating to the nature of the regime and its leadership that emerged 
from the revisionist challenge.
63
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As a result, there were only three notable works relating to the 
biography of the young Stalin (and indeed of the adult Stalin) 
published throughout this whole period. The first two were those of 
Svetlana Allilueva, Stalin’s daughter. Twenty Letters to A Friend and 
Only One Year, which provided for the first time in thirty or so years 
a relatively viable primary source on Stalin’s childhood.
64
 Allilueva’s 
works have been used extensively as sources by historians since their 
publication, as they gave an unprecedented first-hand, candid account 
of the man behind the politician: not Stalin as a leader so much as 
Stalin as a father, husband, son and friend. Svetlana’s accounts were, 
apart from the Ludwig interview, the only record of Stalin himself 
referring to his parents: 
 
He sometimes told me about his childhood. Fights, coarseness, 
were not unusual in the poor, half literate family, in which the 
head of the household drank. The mother would beat the boy, 




Perhaps her most valuable contribution to the development of ideas 
surrounding her father’s youth, however, was her claim that he was 
never religious, even as a youngster and that the result of this was that 
the effects that his religious education had on him were the reverse of 
those intended: ‘extreme scepticism of everything “heavenly”, of 
everything “sublime”. The result was total materialism, the cynical 
realism of an “earthly”, “sober”, practical and low view of life’.
66
 
Allilueva believed that, instead of acquiring faith, Stalin came to be 
two-faced, a hypocrite and a bigot, and it is to his religious education 
that she linked much of what came later: 
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I am convinced the parochial schools in which he spent more 
than ten years played an immense role, setting my father's 





The accounts of Stalin’s innermost family life that were offered by 
Allilueva in both her books and her own interpretation of the role of 
his youth in the formation of his character were key contributions to 
this historiography. Her recollections of her father’s few stories of his 
childhood helped to legitimise the memories of the Georgian 
memoirists and provided a rare account of Stalin himself speaking, to 
the best of our knowledge, truthfully about his parents. 
In addition to Allilueva’s books, a Georgian memoir on 
Stalin’s childhood was published in Paris in 1979: Joseph 
Davrichewy’s Ah! Ce  u’on rigolait bien avec mon copain Staline. 
Davrichewy provided an invaluable source for many of the same 
reasons as Iremashvili had: he grew up with Soso Djugashvili in Gori, 
went to school with him, played with him and knew the Djugashvili 
family well. His memoirs also contained an added layer of interest: 
Davrichewy’s father Damian, the police chief of Gori when the boys 
were young, had been rumoured to be Stalin’s biological father. 
68
 
Davrichewy addressed this issue early on in his book, stating that he 
could neither confirm nor deny the claims and that it remained Keke’s 
secret. He did state, however, that it was ‘more than intimate relations 
which linked my father to the very pretty Kato Djugashvili, who, by 
the way, was no man-eater’.
69
 It is clear that Davrichewy was not 
ashamed of the possibility that he might be Stalin’s half-brother: he 
happily entertained the claims, and perhaps through this cryptic 
sentence about Keke and Damian’s relations he hoped to continue to 
propagate the mystery, as well as the second-hand fame it afforded 
him. This suggestion is further supported by Davrichewy highlighting 
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how different Beso and Soso were, heavily hinting that something 
was amiss. He wrote of their opposite personalities and physical 
appearance - weak and bland versus strong and measured - and 
Beso’s rumoured impotence, concluding that ‘never before have we 
seen a sheep father a lion. It was a mystery, and it still remains 
unexplained…’.
70
 His overall description of Beso was as a ‘puny, 
brutal little man, insipid, with a temper, and most especially, 
jealous’.
71
 As with Iremashvili, Davrichewy described the heavy 
drinking and the beatings that characterised Beso’s interactions with 
his family. As for Soso, Davrichewy depicted him as a typical young 
boy who enjoyed romping around with his friends and being 
mischievous, but also recounted how pious, though also volatile, Soso 
was.
72
 Physically, he was described only in terms of not resembling 
his father.  
Allilueva’ and Davrichewy’s new insights into Stalin’s early 
life helped to complete a picture otherwise completely hidden by 
Stalin himself and to corroborate Iremashvili depictions of Beso’s 
brutality. Assuming their accuracy, they also exposed Stalin’s lie to 
Ludwig that his parents did not mistreat him. The tracing of this one 
element from Stalin’s childhood – his father’s brutality –provided a 
highly illustrative and summarising example of the influence and 
challenges presented by the drip feed of information from the Soviet 
Union. From Iremashvili to Allilueva, it took forty years filled with 




The trend for employing psychohistory in historical writing that 
occurred in the 1960s and 1970s is also reflected in the historiography 
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 As we have seen, Lyons and Deutscher made some of 
these first forays into Stalin’s psychology, but it was not until 1974 
that Robert C. Tucker’s Stalin as Revolutionary made a first 
concerted attempt to understand Stalin’s mind and the origins of the 
brutality of his rule. Tucker suggested that it was in response to 
Beso’s drunken violence that Stalin developed the ‘vindictiveness that 
would characterize him later in life’
75
 and that Keke’s unconditional 
admiration for her son meant that Soso grew up ‘taking such 
admiration as his due, expecting to be idolized and to be worthy of 
it.’
76
 Tucker believed that comprehending Stalin meant understanding 
that for him people were classed either as friends or enemies. If a 
given individual was neither friend nor foe, he was still potentially 
one or the other, and for Stalin this was always a fact of ‘cardinal 
significance’.
77
 The roots of this defining feature of Stalin’s ‘mental 
world’ were to be found in his childhood. According to Tucker, 
character and culture coalesced and reinforced each other in this way 
of perceiving others: Soso was a ‘gifted and unusually sensitive’ boy 
who had been scarred by early experiences, including his father’s 
brutality. He had emerged as a ‘hardened, vigilant youngster with a 
self-idealizing tendency, on the one hand, and a vengeful streak and 
indomitable will to fight and to win, on the other.’
78
 Combined with 
the Georgian setting of his childhood and its ‘Russifying overseers’, 
these elements gave Stalin a ‘ready-made hostile division of people 




Tucker also highlighted that in his adult life Stalin actively tried to 
repress his Georgian mannerisms. He did this, for instance, by 
                                                 
74
 See, for example, B. B. Wolman (ed.), The Pyschoanalytic Interpretation of 
History (New York, 1971) ,which exemplifies this trend in a series of essays which 
tackle specific historical subjects through a psychoanalytical approach  (including 
Stalin), as well as the challenges of merging the historical and psychoanalytic 
disciplines.  
75
 R. C. Tucker,  Stalin as Revolutionary 1879-1929: A Study in History and 
Personality (London, 1974), p. 73 
76
 Ibid., p.76 
77
 Ibid., p.425 
78
 Ibid., p.425 
79




speaking Russian in a low, monotonous voice, which he further 
softened at points when his Georgian accent would be the most 
noticeable.
80
 It was perhaps his attitude towards Yakov, his son from 
his first marriage, which showed most explicitly how little he enjoyed 
being reminded of his Georgian origins. When Yakov arrived in 
Moscow and joined his father’s household in the 1920s after being 
brought up in Georgia, he was a living reminder of Stalin’s past. He 
looked and dressed like a Georgian and had trouble speaking Russian. 
Probably for this reason Stalin disapproved of him, and of him 
coming to Moscow.  He was so contemptuous of him that when 
Yakov, in despair over his father’s hostility, attempted to commit 
suicide, Stalin ridiculed him for bungling the attempt, exclaiming: 
‘Ha! He couldn’t even shoot straight!’.
81
 Tucker’s psychological 
analysis of Stalin attributed this contempt towards Yakov as a 
manifestation of the repressed feelings of shame and self-contempt 
that he felt about being Georgian, feelings that he could not bear to 
feel in regards to himself and so experienced as disdain for his son.
82
  
Daniel Rancour-Laferriere similarly took a psychohistorical 
approach, describing his study of Stalin as a ‘psychoanalytic 
investigation of selected and attested behaviors in Stalin, from 
childhood to old age’.
83
 Searching Stalin’s childhood for clues to his 
later personality, Rancour-Laferriere identified a fascination with the 
idea of ‘beating’ as central to Stalin’s psychology and leadership. He 
recognised this as a lifelong need to beat his opponents, which 
stemmed from the beatings inflicted on him by his father.
84
 This 
manifested itself, for example, in Stalin’s fascination with Lenin’s 
formulaic question ‘Who will beat whom?’, as well as in the ‘beat the 
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kulak’ mentality which he ‘enthusiastically’ took up.
85
 Rancour-
Laferriere believed that Stalin’s literal and metaphorical obsession 
with beatings was a clear example of ‘displacement of private motives 
from family objects to public objects’.
86
 Philip Pomper also employed 
a psychohistorical approach to Stalin’s childhood, suggesting that he 
was a ‘compound social victim’, thanks to being a member of a 
humiliated minority in the Russian Empire, the son of a useless father 
and downtrodden mother, a ‘dutiful and gifted’ child suffocated by 
the Seminary and a ‘romantic youth’ who looked to the past for his 
value but who ‘ultimately was forced to choose the future’.
87
   
Psychiatrists such as Gustav Bychowski gave weight to these 
psychohistorical interpretations . Bychowski, for instance, suggested 
that due to his ‘crude and tyrannical’ father Stalin had learned early 
‘how to hate and how to suppress hostility until the opportune 
moment’ and that his suppressed hatred for his father ‘transferred 
itself to persons in power and to all authority’.
88
 He highlighted how 
Stalin’s physical ailments would have added to his sense of inferiority 
and that the domination of Russians over Georgians would have 
added further ‘mortifications’.
89
 Stalin’s time at the Seminary drove 
him to further develop a personality in which ‘dissimulating his 
hatred, and biding his time in anticipation of revenge in the future, 
became dominant features’.
90
Thus, while Alliluyeva and Davrichewy 
offered the only factual information about the young Stalin during the 
Cold War period, a psychohistorical approach allowed new links to be 
created between Stalin’s childhood and his later psychology. 
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5. The young Stalin in the post-Soviet era 
 
Like all aspects of research on Stalin and Stalinism, writing on 
Stalin’s youth has benefited from the opening of the archives, 
allowing the picture to become ever more complete. The detailed, 
animated and occasionally humorous accounts we find today of 
Stalin’s youth, such as that of Simon Sebag Montefiore’s Young 
Stalin, are in some ways not so far removed from those of 
Davrichewy and Iremashvili who, drawing on personal experiences, 
were able to write lively and accessible works.
91
  
There has been a notable shift away from dwelling on the young 
Soso’s physical attributes, or his ‘Asiatic’ character. Instead, and 
perhaps due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and an 
increasing awareness of the many nationalities which composed it, 
post-Soviet biography of Stalin points towards a renewed interest in 
Stalin’s Georgian origins and how they might have accounted for his 
character and style of leadership. It is impossible to know Stalin’s 
feelings on his origins since he never revealed them, though accounts 
of those around him, and Tucker’s earlier analysis, suggest that he 
seemed concerned not to make them a defining characteristic. 
Lavrenti Beria’s son, Sergo, for instance, recalled in his 2001 memoir 
that while Stalin liked Georgian songs – and indeed often sang them 
in the company of other Politburo members – read Georgian and 
knew the country’s history well, he had in fact ceased to love 
Georgia. Sergo Beria believed that Stalin saw himself in the lineage 
of Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible and ostentatiously emphasised 
the priority of Russia and his reverence for Russian history. Beria also 
pointed out that Stalin chose traditional Russian names for his 
children: 
92
 Yakov, Vassili, and Svetlana.  
In 1991 Ronald G. Suny published a probing article that reviewed 
the psychohistorical evaluations of Stalin published to date in which 
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he suggested that by the time Stalin entered the revolutionary 
movement he was not a fully formed figure capable of carrying out 
the purges or the Terror. However, he had  
 
acquired deep social hostilities to the repression that hindered his 
advance, a determination to resist what he perceived as injustice, 
and the ability to create a tight, loyal following around him. Other 
contexts and experiences would intervene to shape and reshape 




Similarly, maintaining a focus on the importance of Stalin’s ethnicity 
to his later leadership, Alfred Rieber has used literature on identity 
formation in order to explore the relationship between Stalin's 
struggle to transform and present his own self and his solution to the 
central problem of the Bolshevik revolution: how to construct a 
centralized polyethnic state on a proletarian class base. Rieber has 
constructed Stalin as a ‘man of the borderlands’ in order to do this, 
examining Stalin’s representation of self and identity formation 
during his early years, and ways in which the specific social and 
cultural conditions of the Caucasus may have shaped his beliefs, 
attitudes and politics in those formative years. In addition to these two 
aspects, Rieber also undertook a rereading of his political writings as 
a function of the transformation of his persona within the 
revolutionary movement in order to gain insights into his subsequent 
policies as the leader of the Soviet Union. It is the concept of Stalin as 
a ‘man of the borderlands’ that Rieber uses as the unifying theme to 
link these three aspects of his approach to the question.
94
 The 
importance of Stalin’s early years and Georgian origins is key to 
Rieber’s understanding of Stalin as a leader, and he suggested that 
Stalin created the state in his own image, and as an extension of 
himself, with the three aspects represented as the proletariat as the 
dominant class, the ethno-cultural region as the territorial unit, and 
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Great Russia as the political centre of the state. Only Stalin, through 
his own personal understanding of the interaction between these three, 
could control, adjust and run this state.
95
 Erik van Ree too has 
highlighted the importance of those formative years in Georgia to 
Stalin’s later political doctrine, and especially his nationalities policy, 
having become ‘acquainted with the milieu of Georgian revival even 
before he moved to Tbilisi’, during his years as a young boy in Gori. 
96
 
Similarly to the focus his ethnicity, writing in the post-Soviet era 
has shown a continuing interest in the direct links between the 
psychology of Stalin, his method of rule and their relation to his 
childhood experiences through the continued practice of 
pyschohistory. This has been done by directly linking Stalin’s violent, 
difficult and at times religious upbringing to his later career. For 
instance, Montefiore stated that Stalin had learnt violence from an 
early age at home, in the face of his father’s behaviour,
97
 and 
Kuromiya has highlighted the similarities between the young Soso 
and adult Stalin, notably his patience and hard work, but also his lack 
of capability for kindness or compassion towards others or animals, 
and his inability to accept authority.
98
 Kun suggested that in terms of 
psychology, the blame for Stalin’s sudden and dramatic changes of 
mood between depression and euphoria in adulthood lies with the use 
of ‘slapping as a pedagogical device’ as used not only by Beso, but 
also by Keke.
99
 Service noted that ‘He had known no fairness from 
his father; he would show none to those contemporaries who got in 
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 While Service stated that Stalin’s upbringing did not 
determine his career, and a lot more had to happen before 
‘psychological settlement’ occurred, he nevertheless suggested that 
‘without the childhood experienced by Joseph there would have been 
no Stalin. For the tree to grow there had to be a seed’.
101
  
These shifts in emphasis in writing also reflect wider biographical 
trends which came to the fore in the 1990s. Indeed these trends 
proposed that far greater understanding of particular institutions and 
forms of social change could be gained by analysing how they had 
been understood and negotiated by particular individuals. For many 
historians, therefore, biography has been increasingly seen to provide 
a unique lens through which the relative power of political, economic, 
cultural, social and generational processes on the life chances of 
individuals could be assessed, or to provide a prism that enabled later 
historians to see how particular individuals understood and 
constructed themselves and made sense of their lives and their 
society.
102
 This is particularly well reflected in the case of Rieber and 
his search of Stalin’s childhood for an explanation of the way in 
which Stalin viewed Soviet communism and his role within it.  
The moral dimension of earlier twentieth century biography, 
which sought to identify strengths and failings of individuals, has also 
given way to a more encompassing form of analysis that focuses on 
‘personality’ rather than ‘character’. The idea of character had 
previously provided a framework for allocating praise or blame in 
accordance with the behaviour and the underlying characteristics of a 
person. It also suggested the possibility of emulation. Personality, by 
contrast, involves a far stronger emphasis on intellectual and 
emotional qualities and suggests the possibility of a psychological 
rather than a moral approach.
103
 As with the wider historiography of 
Stalin and Stalinism, the centrality of morality in writing on Stalin 
himself decreased significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
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and a psychohistorical-type approach to his youth and ethnic origins 
has instead acquired prominence. 
 
6. Young Stalin and the West 
 
How does the evolution of the historiography of the young Stalin 
reflect the changing Western attitudes towards Stalin and Stalinism 
identified in the previous chapters? The historiography of Stalin 
written in the West in the period prior to the Cold War was primarily 
concerned with Stalin’s suitability as a successor to Lenin, and this 
trend was reflected in both the official and non- official works on the 
young Stalin examined in this chapter. The official works published 
in the West sought to conceal an unhappy childhood and elevate 
Stalin’s credentials as a revolutionary and Marxist-Leninist by 
focusing only on these parts of his career. Sympathetic biographers 
such as Barbusse romanticised Stalin’s childhood while also 
reinforcing his Soviet communist leadership qualifications. However, 
the non-official works published in the West on the young Stalin were 
almost all written by individuals who had in some way become 
alienated from the Soviet Union and who were writing biographical 
works on Stalin’s whole life to date. This was certainly the case for 
Trotsky, Souvarine and Deutscher. As a result, most works published 
on Stalin in the West at this time were by émigré, exiled or 
disenchanted socialists and were largely exercises in assessing 
Stalin’s suitability, or lack thereof, as successor to Lenin. There was 
very little middle ground: those writing about Stalin were either 
unwaveringly supportive or anti-Stalinist socialists. It was these same 
authors who wrote about Stalin’s childhood, as they attempted to 
create a complete biographical work on Stalin, and similar themes on 
personality emerged in both their constructions of the young and adult 
Stalin. In these, he continued to be their other, intellectually, 
ideologically physically and ethnically. 
The intense anti-Soviet drive of the Cold War era writing on 




Stalin as a man and onto the nature of Stalinism as a system and as a 
regime. Stalin himself did remain central to scholarship, especially 
during the 1950s and 1960s, but the emphasis moved primarily onto 
the level of his control and involvement in governing the Soviet 
Union. After Khrushchev’s 1956 secret speech, this was especially 
true regarding his role in the purges and the Terror. This shift was 
reflected in the lack of biographical writings on Stalin during this 
period and in the vast amount of scholarship published on Stalinism 
generally at this time, especially in the USA. The revisionist 
movement of the late 1960s, and overall Western scholarship to the 
end of the Cold War, continued this trend: any major shifts in focus 
occurred within the parameters of the study of Stalinism and Stalin’s 
involvement in it but did not reignite an interest in the life of Stalin. 
This made all the more uncharacteristic of this era the appearance of 
two first-hand accounts of Stalin’s life, including references to his 
childhood by his daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva and Joseph 
Davrichewy. For the first time in decades further corroboration of 
stories of Stalin’s troubled upbringing and loathing for the Seminary 
had become possible. 
 In the post-Soviet era, the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
and access to new archival documentation have engendered a revival 
in Stalin-centric works. In biographical writing on the young Stalin, 
the most noticeable trend has been in searching Stalin’s Georgian 
origins for insights into his later political policies and practices. While 
this has not been so evident in more general writing on Stalin and 
Stalinism in this era, it nonetheless ties in with the larger trend 
identified in writing on Stalin, which stems from the archival 




This biographical body of work is informative and representative both 
of biographical writing on Stalin and of the wider historiography of 




early years is composed of works by professional historians as well as 
memoirists, journalists and biographers whose lives and times were 
strongly reflected in the way the historiography developed over the 
Soviet period and beyond. These accounts demonstrate how the 
historiography of the young Stalin has evolved through the gradual 
release of information, wider biographical trends and changing 
Western attitudes towards Stalin and Stalinism. The lack of new 
and/or verifiable information on Stalin’s youth over the course of the 
Soviet period has resulted in one of the key characteristics of this part 
of the historiography: most accounts written during the Soviet period 
are at best tentative, and at worst entirely contradictory. Until the 
1960s, there was only one primary source – Joseph Iremashvili’s 
memoir - which gave a detailed and first-hand account of Stalin’s 
early life; everything that followed either worked to try and establish 
how much of this was accurate, or worked to present an altogether 
different picture. The issue of source availability in writing on 
Stalinism during the Soviet period is saliently represented in the 
evolution of the historiography of the young Stalin.  
Western attitudes to Stalin have again been central to the 
creation and development of writing in this area. Trends in 
biographical writing have also been reflected throughout the period of 
study, though perhaps not as strongly as they might due to the high 
impact of the lack of sources and the changing global context which 
compelled Western writers to delve into Stalin’s childhood. In the 
post-Soviet period, there is still a demand for more information on 
Stalin, not only as a politician but also as a man. As a result, there is a 
continuing interest in researching and writing on this subject, 
reflected in the large amount of on-going research into all aspects of 
the Stalinist era. And yet it cannot be said that a radically new, 
different or amended Stalin - or Stalins - has emerged since the 
opening of the archives. Rather, there has been a piecing together of a 
more complete Stalin. This is also represented in writing on the young 




corroborated, but not dramatically altered, account of the life of the 
young Soso, and of the significance of this time, to emerge. 







Initial historical interpretations and approaches to Stalin and 
Stalinism emerged in the period 1925-1947, while Stalin was still 
alive and before the Cold War began. In the 1920s and 1930s analyses 
stemmed from personal political convictions, rather than academic 
exercise or wider international political issues, although the latter 
started to play a certain part in writing on Stalin after the Second 
World War. Leon Trotsky, Boris Souvarine and Isaac Deutscher all 
began by supporting the Bolsheviks, yet it became clear that 
Trotsky’s loss of power combined with his hostility towards Stalin 
offered similarly disillusioned communists with an alternative belief 
to follow and one which crucially did not require an ideological break 
from socialism. It was Trotsky’s thought and work that provided the 
basis for the first ‘self’ to the Stalinist other in Western publications 
by presenting Stalin and Stalinism as a personal and ideological other. 
For many of the writers in this period, Stalin and his regime 
epitomised everything that they were not, and their reassertions of his 
personal and political deviancy, inferiority and threat presented a 
clear process of this othering. On the other hand, the positive accounts 
by writers such as Barbusse also constructed Stalin as an other, only 
in this case he was to be elevated to God-like status: he was a 
dynamic, positive and benevolent force who not only watched over 
his people and protected them, but who also drove his country 
forward. All of the individuals writing at this time were in some way 
directly affected by Stalin and his regime, and they were above all 
bound inextricably in their writings by their own personal, political 
and theoretical engagement with Stalin and Stalinism. It was in these 
works that the Stalinist other first emerged in Western historiography.  
From the late 1940s, the foundations of Western scholarship 
on Stalin and Stalinism altered radically, and the notion of 
‘totalitarianism’ occupied centre stage. There have been some 




totalitarianism has been used by scholars in the West in their 
assessments of the how and why of Stalinism during the Cold War, 
notably by David D. Roberts and Abbott Gleason, and there exists a 
vast body of work dedicated to the notion of totalitarianism itself, 
which explores its contexts and meanings, evolved over the twentieth 
century and beyond. With these assessments already providing a vast 
and rich source of information on Cold War totalitarian 
historiography, this thesis aimed to shed light on one specific aspect 
of this within the field of Soviet studies, arguing that, in both explicit 
and implicit ways, many of the works published during the early Cold 
War period systematically presented Stalinist totalitarianism as the 
other, which, in turn, provided an additional tool with which to other 
Soviet communism. The works of this era focused particularly on the 
coercive and terroristic methods of communist rule under Stalin, as 
well as the threat of such a nation, constructing and reinforcing the 
notion of the ‘two worlds’: East and West, opposites and opponents. 
The basis for these constructions is found in writings on 
totalitarianism around this period, such as those of Jacob Talmon and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, but also in the general political context which 
had immeasurable influence on scholarship on Stalinism, particularly 
in the USA. At the same time, the simultaneous development of the 
idea of Stalinism as a continuation of a Russian tradition of leadership 
showed a pattern of Orientalist-style analysis, reinforcing the notion 
of the unchanging national Russian character. More specifically, the 
suggestion by some scholars that Bolshevism and eventually 
totalitarian Stalinism were in fact tsarism turned ‘upside-down’ 
demonstrated the extent of this perceived similitude. During this era, 
totalitarianism represented the ultimate other to the West, and in 
Western historiography on Stalin and Stalinism totalitarianism 
provided a new tool with which Western scholars were able to 
construct the Stalinist, and Soviet, other.  
In the same period, Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 secret speech 
had severe repercussions for the lives of Western communists living 




deemed dangerous and worthy of persecution and where they 
themselves represented the other. This study has examined the impact 
of this event on the way in which Stalin and Stalinism were written 
about by non-Soviet communists in the West and specifically by 
British communists in the period immediately after the speech. The 
analysis in Chapter 3 demonstrated how Khrushchev’s speech 
precipitated a fast and dramatic evolution of British communist 
writing on Stalin and Stalinism, from the positive othering of the pre-
1956 era in the Daily Worker newspaper and other works, to the split 
in the Party, as many members attempted to come to terms with the 
revelations of the speech. The notions of morality and deviancy were 
central to the way in which many British communists attempted to 
deal with the revelations about Stalinism and with their own actions 
and beliefs. This manifested itself through distancing their own 
beliefs from Stalinism within a socialist framework, through a 
reinforcement of the idea of Stalinism as a deviant and degenerate 
form of socialism. The prominence of the notion of personal moral 
responsibility in this section of the historiography both implicitly and 
explicitly suggested that Stalinism was immoral, dangerous and 
ideologically erroneous and that coming to terms with their own 
shortcomings was a process through which British communists hoped 
to erase the stain of Stalinism from both themselves and from 
socialism.  
A public political and academic discourse focusing on the 
totalitarian nature of Stalinism, setting the Soviet Union apart from 
the Western democracies, emerged in the first two decades of the 
Cold War. As the Cold War progressed and social history acquired 
increased prominence, the conflict over the validity of revisionism in 
the Russian Review editions examined in Chapter 4 suggests that the 
concepts of ‘morality’ and ‘blame’ dominated the process of 
construction of the Stalinist other at this time. This was exemplified 
in two ways: firstly through a typical pattern of othering based on the 
recognition and reinforcement by all, revisionists and non-revisionists 




Stalinist regime and that Stalin himself was at least largely if not 
entirely responsible for these. Stalinism remained the other in this 
period through its failure to live up to the West’s moral standards and 
was universally reinforced as such in the debates.  An unexpected 
secondary outcome of this was that by being seen to diminish Stalin’s 
responsibility, or seeming to neglect these moral failings, the ‘new 
cohort’ revisionists by extension also took on an immoral quality in 
the eyes of their critics. Their neglect or refusal to attribute the locus 
of blame for Stalinism to where the older scholars demanded it be 
placed meant that they, as well as Stalinism, were presented as 
immoral in these debates. Stephen Cohen, Peter Kenez, Alfred Meyer 
and Robert Conquest, for example, were at pains to point out the 
differences between their own research agendas, interpretative 
paradigms and moral integrity, and those of the revisionists. The most 
striking characteristic of these debates uncovered in this chapter was 
therefore that the same concepts of morality and blame were used to 
define Stalin, Stalinism and the ‘new cohort’ revisionists. This 
demonstrated how significant the Western construction of the 
Stalinist other was to the totalitarian model scholars, and some first 
generation revisionists, as well as the deep effects of the global 
context of this period, once again in a state of change and upheaval.  
 The advent of glasnost’ and perestroika in the late 1980s, and 
the eventual demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, created several 
important interpretative and contextual shifts that impacted the 
Western historiography of Stalin and Stalinism. While there has been 
a continued focus on the Terror and Stalin’s role in the running of the 
regime, the new post-91 generation of researchers of Stalinism have 
used the vast amounts of information released from the archives to 
research such a wide range of aspects, and achieved such a diverse 
expansion of our knowledge and understanding of these aspects, that 
it is impossible to state that an identifiable orthodoxy on the question 
of ‘what happened’ during Stalinism has emerged. This study has 
suggested that the breadth of this expansion of research has, for now 




‘everyday’ Stalinism, as nationality, ethnicity, economy, culture and 
modernity and all other aspects of life under the Stalinist regime are 
being vigorously investigated, thanks to the documentation released 
during the archival revolution. The principal character of the post-
Soviet historiography is that for the time being it has none: set against 
the backdrop of the previous periods examined in this study, it 
demonstrates both continuity and change. Where in the previous 
periods clear trends in writing and interpretation emerged that were 
hinged on Western perceptions of Stalin and Stalinism, the post-
Soviet era proposes a multitude of foci, interpretations and accounts 
of Stalinism, suggesting, in turn, a multitude of perceptions of 
Stalinism by the West. On the one hand, it remains for certain 
scholars the Stalinist totalitarian other, while for others it more 
closely resembled Western capitalist modernity. For some it is neither 
of these. Nevertheless, this thesis suggests that continued and indeed 
revived research on Stalin himself and his leadership, and the largely 
universal acceptance of the nature of Stalin’s regime, indicates that 
previous perceptions of Stalin and Stalinism as the immoral, deviant, 
dangerous antithetical others of the West do in fact persist, only the 
common nature of their articulation across the new scholarship still 
remains to be seen.  
Nevertheless, these interpretations do highlight two current 
trends which are particularly relevant to the West’s construction of 
the Stalinist other. The first, with its roots in the totalitarian era, and 
more latterly expressed by the neo-traditionalist school, suggests that 
the study of Stalinism is important because the West needs to 
understand the enemy other in order to protect itself from it and in 
order to define itself against it. The second trend can be linked back to 
Arendt’s notion of the banality of evil, then the work of the 
revisionists on the role of social and bureaucratic pressures on the 
course Stalinism took, and finally the modernity school’s argument of 
similarities between capitalism and Stalinism. In this case, it is not 
only the enemy the West must be vigilant of: it must also be aware of 




polities. Both cases demonstrate the on-going relevance of research 
on Stalinism to the West: in the former, the identification and 
understanding of the Stalinist other is a necessary tool in identity 
formation, as well as in protecting the Western way of life. The latter 
allows the West to acknowledge its own weaknesses and internal 
threats and to work towards preventing any potential deviation from 
the course of liberal democracy.  
In consolidating these era-specific findings, themes common 
to the entire historiography have emerged. Firstly, this study suggests 
that Western attitudes to Stalin and Stalinism have been central to the 
creation of this historiography. Throughout the Soviet period, 
Western constructions have been hinged on specific concepts which, 
in turn, have been used to create the Stalin(ist) other, demonstrating a 
clear continuation of the historical process of othering outlined in the 
Introduction. In the era leading up to the Cold War, Stalin and 
Stalinism were held up against socialism and Marxism-Leninism and 
were depicted as the most deviant form of these. In the Cold War 
period, a fresh angle on the old ‘totalitarian’ debate revealed that the 
term itself, and its usage as the defining characteristic of Stalinism, 
were systematically used to create a great distance between Stalinism, 
the Soviet Union and the West and to render Stalinism inferior and 
deviant in comparison to Western liberal democracy. Even within the 
socialist world, once the facts of Stalinism emerged from 
Khrushchev’s speech,  it was during this period defined as deviant 
and immoral, both in relation to its actions in the name of socialism 
and in relation to its general character. In the later Cold War period, 
morality and blame became the central concepts on which debates as 
to the nature of Stalinism were hinged and allowed totalitarian-model 
scholars to continue constructing Stalin and Stalinism as the evil 
totalitarian other. In the post-Soviet era, however, there has been a 
break from this pattern, with no clear identifiable method of othering 
Stalinism in relation to the West, demonstrating the impact of the end 
of the Cold War and the removal of the perceived Soviet threat on 




in effect, provided a prism through which Western attitudes to Russia, 
the Soviet Union, Stalin and his regime have been measured 
throughout the period of study. This, in turn, has shown that the 
historical process of othering Russia by Europe and later by the USA 
outlined in the Introduction had continued throughout the twentieth 
century. 
A principal characteristic of this overarching trend in writing 
has been the use of key concepts when discussing Stalin and 
Stalinism in the West. Across the entire period of study, notions of 
immorality, deviancy and difference have been crucial to the way in 
which Stalin and Stalinism have been constructed by the West. As 
exemplified by the analysis in this thesis of both Soviet and British 
socialists writing on Stalin and his regime, the idea of Stalinism being 
a deviant or degenerate form of Socialism, for instance, prevailed in 
writing by socialists, whether they were writing in the 1930s and 
1940s or in the second half of the century. Writers of the totalitarian-
model persuasion saw Stalinism as morally degenerate and as a 
deviant form of civilisation in the face of Western liberal democracy. 
This was reflected in both their writings during the early years of the 
Cold War and in the revisionist period, where their argument acquired 
such strength as to attribute these characteristics by extension to the 
revisionists themselves. In this latter period, the question of the locus 
of blame for Stalinism also became central to the question of, 
morality. In the post-Soviet period morality and moral judgements 
have appeared less central to writing on Stalin and Stalinism, 
although, as Kershaw suggested in the case of Nazism, it is difficult 
to write about the realities of Stalinism without some level of moral 
engagement, often manifested through the use of words such as 
‘criminality’ or ‘barbarous’.
1
 One, albeit extreme, example of this 
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 Ian Kershaw suggests that while the explicit extreme morality present in early 
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resilience of moral judgement in writing on Stalinism can be found in 
The Black Book of Communism, which bases its entire analysis on 
moral and criminal judgement.
2
 
This commonality helps to explain the lack of major 
alterations to Western understanding of Stalin and Stalinism 
throughout the period of study. Neither a new Stalin nor a new 
Stalinism have emerged, including in the post-Soviet period when the 
field of Soviet studies acquired a renewed vibrancy thanks to the 
opening of the archives. These continuities are striking and 
remarkable in a body of work whose dominant characteristic is its 
hugely diverse and at times contradictory nature. Instead a more 
complete, but not radically altered, picture of the man and his regime 
has emerged. This thesis shows that our basic perception of the nature 
of Stalin and Stalinism has not dramatically shifted since the first 
substantial works of the 1930s. Throughout the entire period of study 
it has remained consistent: Stalinism was coercive and violent, but 
also vigorously productive. Its immorality and deviancy too have 
been central to this characterisation. This is not to say there have not 
been vast leaps made in the depth of our knowledge. What was learnt, 
especially in the latter half of the period of study, thanks to the 
revisionists’ work, for example, was that society under Stalinism was 
far more dynamic and complex than had previously been assumed. 
Our knowledge of Stalinism has acquired many layers of detail and 
                                                                                                                  
degrees of success, to eschew moral judgement, doing so with Nazism and Hitler is 
‘clearly an impossibility’. See I. Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and 
Perspectives of Interpretation (London, 1993), pp.14-16. There is a body of work 
dedicated to the study of Hitler, Stalin and their regimes in a comparative 
perspective.  See, for example, Alan Bullock’s biographical work on the two 
leaders: A. Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (London, 1998), and his 
lecture for the German Historical Institute London Annual Lecture, A. Bullock, 
Personality and Power: The Strange Case of Hitler and Stalin (London, 1995). See 
also M. Geyer and S. Fitzpatrick (eds.), Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and 
Nazism Compared (New York, 2009); I. Kershaw and M. Lewin, Stalinism and 
Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison (Cambridge, 1977). Edward Acton has also 
questioned whether there is a case for comparing the two and given a thorough 
overview of the historiography of the subject in E. Acton, Nazism and Stalinism: A 
Suitable Case for Comparison? (Shaftesbury, 1998). All of these works commonly 
argue that there is much to contrast as well as to compare between the two regimes; 
however, there was enough common to both to have generated a need for 
comparison. 
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nuance, and the scope of research continues to grow. Yet these basic 
characteristics of the regime itself, and Stalin’s role within it, have 
remained largely constant and unchallenged, continuing to provide 
the common foundations of even greatly varying interpretations of its 
more complex characteristics. Where challenges have been made, 
such as J. Arch Getty’s argument that the purges were a largely 
bureaucratic phenomenon, for instance, they have not become the 
accepted version of events by the majority, even if debates are on-
going as to the scope of Stalin’s responsibility for key crimes.
3
   
Stalin himself has remained an enigma, but the fundamental 
perception of his character has not changed since the 1930s: he was 
brutal, crude and sly, and the principal architect of his eponymous 
regime. We now know more about how his childhood may have 
affected him psychologically, about his daily life in the Kremlin and 
his relationships with the rest of the leadership; yet core conceptions 
of his private and political personality have remained unchanged. 
Instead, these basic characteristics of both the man and his regime 
have been used in changing ways by the West as the foundations on 
which to construct the Stalinist other. This has been illustrated in 
particular in this thesis through the case study of biographical writing 
on the young Stalin: over the course of 70 years, the young Soso and 
the basic facts and questions around his early life have remained 
largely unchanged. It is only the changing focus of Western 
scholarship on different aspects of his early life – his relationship with 
parents and his Georgian origins for example – which has led to a 
wider variety of interpretations on the significance of his youth and 
ethnic origins. This lack of radical new interpretations of Stalin 
himself seems unlikely to change, since all evidence presented to date 
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suggests that these perceptions are accurate. Yet there are still many 
unknowns: with little personal correspondence, no memoirs or 
diaries, it is difficult to unearth new information that might enlighten 
us further, if indeed at all, on his private experiences, feelings and 
thoughts about his life, his regime and the world around him.  
Wider historiographical trends have also shown themselves to 
be important to the creation of this historiography. The evolution of 
biography as a genre and the advent of social history, for instance, 
have impacted on the way in which Stalin and Stalinism have been 
depicted. Indeed, by tracing research on the life of young Stalin, it has 
become clear that despite all the particularities of source accessibility 
and Western attitudes, trends in biographical writing nevertheless 
manifested themselves throughout the period of study: from early 
eulogistic accounts, to the anti-hero depictions, to pyschohistorical 
investigations, leading finally into the contemporary style which aims 
to expose all facets of an individual, from their public lives to the 
most intimate parts of their private lives. From the 1970s, the 
increasing prominence of social history in the wider profession found 
its way into the field of Soviet studies and provoked the most 
passionate debates in the field to date, as old and new scholarship 
came to blows over the very nature of Stalinism, and Stalin’s role 
within it. In the post-Soviet period, the everyday detail of cultural 
history has remained a focus in writing on Stalin and Stalinism. Yet 
there also seems to be an incidental character to the presence of these 
trends in the historiography during the Stalinist and early Cold War 
periods: this thesis has clearly demonstrated that those writing about 
Stalin and Stalinism in those eras were strongly compelled to do so by 
personal and political motivations, and the changing interpretations 
and representations of Stalin and his regime have been largely 
explained by the circumstances in which that writing occurred.  
However, the development of psychohistory had a clear 
impact on biographical writing on Stalin during the later Soviet 
period and laid the foundations for strong connections between his 




Similarly important was the rise of social and cultural history, whose 
impact on research into Stalin and his regime has been immeasurable.
  
A more consistent and sustained impact has been the lack of 
source accessibility over the course of the Soviet period, and the 
elimination of this obstacle in the post-Soviet era. As highlighted in 
the Introduction, there was during the majority of the period under 
study virtually no new release of information from the Soviet Union, 
and the information which did become available did so extremely 
gradually and irregularly. The first primary source on Stalin himself 
was Joseph Iremashvili’s memoir, and, aside from the Smolensk 
Archive acquired after the Second World War, sources on the inner 
workings of the Stalinist regime thereafter largely came in a drip-feed 
of newspaper articles, testimonies of escapees, foreign policy 
observations and the reworking and reinterpretation of these same bits 
of information. Once again, the young Stalin case study has 
highlighted this trend, bringing to the fore not only the impact of the 
lack of source accessibility, but also of the problem of the accuracy, 
reliability and corroboration of the sources that did become available 
in a drip-feed from the Soviet Union. 
This partly explains why accounts and interpretations of 
Stalinism vary so noticeably during the Soviet period: a little 
conjecture was necessary in order to complete the picture, and this 
conjecture could take many forms. A statement made by Conquest 
exemplifies this. Made within the context of a criticism of the 
revisionists’ use of sources, and what he perceived to be their 
unwillingness to engage with any sources they considered to be ‘anti-
Stalinist’, Conquest suggested that writing about Soviet history was a 
case of wringing out the truth from the sources:  
 
It relies on attention to detail, on common sense reasoning, on 
a developed 'feel' for history and chronology, on familiarity 
with human behaviour, and on ever enlarging stores of 




matter, and no simple or mechanical criteria for validating or 




With this degree of rather subjective ‘feel’, common sense and 
intuition required in the place of solid evidence, it is clear why 
Western historiography on Stalin and Stalinism developed such 
varying interpretations of the regime. This thesis has demonstrated 
that these interpretations have been so resilient as to be largely 
unaffected by the eventual release of large amounts of documentation 
from the archives in the post-Soviet period, and in this way have 
continued to be central to the way in which Stalin and Stalinism are 
currently interpreted and written about in the West.  
On the other hand, the now vast amount of information 
available to researchers of Stalin and Stalinism has broken the pattern 
that saw specific interpretative trends emerging periodically 
throughout the twentieth century. Twenty years after the opening of 
the archives, and aside from a general acceptance of the nature of 
Stalin’s regime, there has been no overall orthodoxy to emerge. 
Nevertheless, after the rise of social and cultural history and their 
impact on research on Stalinism from the 1970s onwards, this thesis 
has shown that there has been a renewed focus on the political aspects 
of Stalinism, notably the role of Stalin himself and the nature of his 
leadership. Similarly, research has increased on the way in which the 
regime functioned, and how decisions were made, most especially 
during the defining eras of Stalinism, such as industrialisation, 
collectivisation and the Terror.  
All three of these influences – Western attitudes to Russia, 
historiographical trends and source accessibility – reflect the huge 
impact of the changing global political context on writing on Stalin 
and Stalinism over the course of the period of study. The twentieth 
century was awash with events that constantly changed and 
challenged the relationship between the two blocs. Stalin’s rise to 
power and his ensuing regime, the Second World War, the Cold War 
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and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union each provided shifting 
interpretative frameworks within which observers, researchers and 
writers in the West placed their writing on Stalin and his regime. This 
thesis suggests that Western attitudes to Stalin and Stalinism were 
immeasurably shaped by the political context at any given time over 
the period of study. In the 1930s and 1940s, Stalinism had alienated 
many socialists, both Soviet and Western, and those who ended up 
outside of the Soviet Union were able to publish works on Stalin and 
his regime that otherwise would not have been able to be published 
while he was still alive. For instance, this was the case for 
Iremashvili, Deutscher and Trotsky.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, there 
was an increase in writing on Stalin in the West that was mainly 
concerned with his life and character and that reflected a growing 
curiosity and concern with the man at the helm of this emergent 
super-power. When the post-war climate evolved into the Cold War, 
the global political context became the most influential determinant of 
Western attitudes to the Soviet Union, and to writing on Stalinism. 
The academic and political worlds became tightly intertwined, 
especially in the USA, and the totalitarianism of Soviet communism 
and its threat to Western liberal capitalist democracy became central 
to research.  
Yet, as the Cold War progressed through the era of the 
Vietnam War, the context shifted, and the notion of capitalism as the 
only viable ideological position was increasingly challenged in the 
West. This malaise spread through all spheres of life, and in different 
forms, and was most notably publicly manifested in the 1968 student 
uprisings. In the academic world, this expressed itself with a retreat 
from politics-centred research and a vastly increased focus on the 
social sciences. In the historiography of Stalin and Stalinism, the 
impact of this change was considerable. Social historians challenged 
the totalitarian-model scholars and called for new ways of examining 
Stalinism, leading to intense debates steeped in moral judgement. 




the advent of social and then cultural history greatly expanded the 
breadth of knowledge and research in the field.  
And yet, within all these changes, one constant remained, 
itself also a product of the particularities of the Soviet Union and its 
relationship not only with the West, but also with its own past: source 
access remained strictly limited, not only in terms of archival 
document access, but also in terms of access to the Soviet Union itself 
and its people. So while interpretative frameworks changed greatly 
over the course of the period of study, the information available to 
researchers itself changed very little during the Soviet period. It was 
not until the Soviet Union collapsed that both of these elements 
shifted into new territory: Soviet communism, and with it the Cold 
War, came to an end – and this final shift of political context in this 
period of study led to the long hoped-for ‘archival revolution’. 
In attempting to answer how these contexts, and their direct 
impact on individuals writing on Stalin and Stalinism, manifested 
themselves in the historiography, this thesis has highlighted certain 
aspects of the ‘politics of knowledge’ of this field: the contexts, 
arguments, conflicts and processes which affect the production, 
dissemination and reception of knowledge in a field or discipline.
5
 
This notion is in itself not universally accepted, and there have been 
scholars across many fields and disciplines who reject it, arguing that 
their work is the fruit of their own scholarly impartiality, critical 
faculty, good judgement and the usage of tried-and-tested scholarly 
methods. 
6
 However, it is clear that the field of Soviet studies has 
been particularly susceptible to the emergence of a politics of 
knowledge, the considerable impact of which on the historiography of 
Stalin and Stalinism has formed a principal line of enquiry in this 
study. This study has highlighted that this politics of knowledge is 
manifested in the overall historiography by a continuous othering of 
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Stalin and Stalinism by the West, but is expressed in different forms, 
and is based on different premises, as we move through the period of 
study. As a result of these various and varying experiences and 
contexts, and while the Stalinist regime has been on a basic level 
understood as repressive and violent, there has been and remains a 
high level of lively debate relating to key elements of Stalin and 
Stalinism, such as the nature of the regime and Stalin’s role within it.  
More questions have inevitably arisen from this study, in 
particular relating to the West’s constructions of Stalin as the other. A 
line of enquiry that deserves closer attention is how Stalin might have 
been used as a proxy for representing other forms of Western anxiety 
in the evolving global context. In the early years of writing on Stalin 
by the backward-looking Trotsky school, was Stalin simply a 
contemporary Napoleon, betrayer of the revolution, yet still a 
legitimate hero to some? Did the totalitarian-model scholars see him 
as another Hitler, the embodiment of pure evil and a much more 
disturbing figure than the tinpot dictator of the previous era? In 
today’s post-9/11 world, could links be made between neo-
traditionalist constructions of Stalin as the true believer, the sincerity 
of evil and the Wests’ anxieties about religious fundamentalism? Is 
Stalin the Bin Laden of current Western scholarship? An answer to 
these questions would require a systematic and comparative analysis 
of scholarship on all the personalities and themes they concern. The 
conclusions of this potential line of enquiry may help us to further 
understand how the West has viewed and defined the Russian, Soviet 
and Stalinist other.
7
 Furthermore, a wider, complementary and 
comparative analysis of Western historiography which is neither 
American nor British would help to develop a wider-reaching and 
more nuanced understanding of the West’s othering of Russia. 
                                                 
7
 With thanks to Iain Lauchlan for sharing his thoughts on this matter from his 
current research: I. Lauchlan, ‘Seven Psychopaths: Joseph Stalin and the 




In the meantime, the purpose of this thesis has been to shed 
new light on the conditions that led to the emergence of trends, 
themes and patterns in the large and varied body of work we now 
have on Stalin and Stalinism in the West. In this way it hopes to have 
made a valuable contribution to our understanding of the complex 
ways in which the West has constructed and continues to construct 
Stalin and Stalinism in scholarship, both in relation to its own identity 
and to the changing historical, political and historiographical context 
in which it has found itself over the period of study, and in which it 
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